日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬
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| 深藍 於 2003/04/04 13:29 | |
| 日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
深藍按: 此篇文章為中華民國全國教師會網站上的文章, 也轉貼多處, 全文為 『給史英的話--第二集』作者自稱是中小學老師, 此段為一開始的論述, 但很明顯的錯誤連連, 幸由 Ryan 兄出聲反駁, 小弟已經反駁第一集文章, 正在寫反駁第二集, 既然軍事茶館臥虎藏龍, 人才濟濟, 因此轉貼此部份給大家參考, 也讓大家認清這是台灣中小學教師的歷史認知水準 (跟看中國連續劇的差不多), 如大家仍有補充或能提供相關資訊來源, 先謝謝各位. 相關在媒體評論版貼文: 另外一種媒體污染---e-mail 傳送 ***************************************************************************** 史英先生，你應該聽過清末的自強運動吧！當初自強運動所建立起的北洋艦隊可說是亞洲首強，其噸位及戰力的總合甚至勝過當年的美國太平洋艦隊，而其中“定遠””鎮遠”兩艘大船更是日本敬畏不已的戰艦；但為何會在甲午海戰中被打得落花流水？查了當時文獻，才得知雖然當時的艦長和高級軍官如方伯謙等雖都是留英的優秀人才，但基層官兵卻都是濫竽充數臨時抓伕的農漁民，他們目不識丁根本看不懂砲管上的刻度，當然永遠打不到日本船。可是歷史該責怪那批不識字的船員嗎？到底是什麼樣的制度讓他們成了歷史的悲劇角色？ | |
NO:240_1
| 深藍 於 2003/04/04 13:30 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
ryan2181 於 2003/04/04 12:19 Re:另外一種媒體污染---e-mail 傳送 >>史英先生，你應該聽過清末的自強運動吧！當初自強運動所建立起的北洋艦隊可說是亞洲首強，其噸位及戰力的總合甚至勝過當年的美國太平洋艦隊，而其中“定遠””鎮遠”兩艘大船更是日本敬畏不已的戰艦；但為何會在甲午海戰中被打得落花流水？查了當時文獻，才得知雖然當時的艦長和高級軍官如方伯謙等雖都是留英的優秀人才，但基層官兵卻都是濫竽充數臨時抓伕的農漁民，他們目不識丁根本看不懂砲管上的刻度，當然永遠打不到日本船。可是歷史該責怪那批不識字的船員嗎？到底是什麼樣的制度讓他們成了歷史的悲劇角色？ >>>>>但基層官兵卻都是濫竽充數臨時抓伕的農漁民， 北洋艦隊的水手都是領工資的職業士兵，其中管輪，槍砲，雷電，航海類技術兵都是在北洋艦隊附屬的學校中進行訓練的，普通招募來的水兵作爲三等水勇先上練船進行基本訓練，通過見習之後升任一等水勇，然後根據個人表現和艦艇需要，分別接受相關專業的進一步學習，待理論學習結束以後分配上艦到各自的專業部門擔任相關工作，專業技術工作士官有兩種培養手段，一種是直接派往英德，在造船廠或者海軍艦艇上學習業務並參加工作實習，待戰艦完工，隨軍官一道回國擔任首批技術骨幹（就是相當於種子教官），第二種就是來自水勇經過培訓后的基層技術人員，逐級提升，這一套制度一直在北洋水師行之有效（這一點要表揚郎威力，他在業務方面的操守和努力是不容懷疑的，特別是制訂制度的過程中） 什麽臨時抓壯丁之類的廢話可以當放屁，要是那樣連船隻航行都做不到，北洋艦隊成軍之前之後可是多次遠航的，寫這種文章的人根本不知道海軍和陸軍是截然不同的，沒經過技術訓練的人根本一點用處也沒有（怎麽給鍋爐生火都不知道），還以爲陸軍那種給只槍穿上二尺五就是丘八的做法能用到海軍來，沒經過訓練的補充兵至少會走路，沒經過訓練的水手卻絕對沒辦法讓一艘戰艦跑起來，不是會開帆船搖舢板就能來開軍艦管鍋爐的。 >>>>>他們目不識丁根本看不懂砲管上的刻度，當然永遠打不到日本船。 真的打不到嗎？翻翻正確戰史紀錄還真找不到日本的主力戰艦哪艘曾經連一發炮彈也沒吃上，兩場大戰，旗艦松島號被人家一砲轟得傷亡1/3船員，立即退出戰鬥；英雄巡洋艦吉野號被濟遠（北洋最老的戰艦之一）連續命中，最後放棄追擊行動。如果覺得日本海軍的素質優勢強大，大家可以去算一下甲午海戰和日本海大海戰日本海軍主力艦艇炮擊命中率，特別是前一場戰鬥中日本看起來最嚇人的320mm主炮命中率。 有的時候，大家把歷史當成傳奇小説或者政治傳單來描繪了，這次舉例的文章就是這一類。 >>>可是歷史該責怪那批不識字的船員嗎？到底是什麼樣的制度讓他們成了歷史的悲劇角色？ 如果他們真的目不識丁，那麽北洋艦隊的全體軍官就該死了，作爲一個技術兵種的主官，經過長期學習具有專業能力和操守的職業軍官怎麽能驅市人爾戰，這是對自己的事業極大的不尊敬和不負責，如果在這種情況下軍官還去堅持作戰，本身就説明他們不稱職，不能表現出一個職業技術軍官應有的責任感和專業性。事實上艦隊本身的人員構成並不算不合理，人事建設和訓練教育也維持在一個限度以内（所以北洋實撥經費經常挪用到人事費用上），所以當時海軍基層官兵才具有比較強烈的主動性，戰場上那種頑強的表現也體現了這些軟体建設的成果，問題在於國家對於海軍的戰略建設方針的錯位和政治因素對技術發揮的毀滅性制約作用 。 | |
NO:240_4
| 深藍 於 2003/04/04 14:01 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
Ryan, Luke 已抄收, Thanks! ^__^ | |
NO:240_5
| ryan2181 於 2003/04/04 14:01 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
ra老大的日清海戰巨著: | |
NO:240_6
| ryan2181 於 2003/04/04 15:59 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
↑對北洋水師一文的討論 | |
NO:240_7
| 傅鏡暉 於 2003/04/04 17:07 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
對於這場海戰, 小弟很有興趣 但是目前確陷入一團謎霧, 資料蒐集越多, 謎霧反而越濃 最大的徵結在於原始史料就有問題, 泰萊和麥吉芬都在吹牛, (可見唐德剛晚清70年一書) 官員戰後上的奏章也似乎有諉過的問題, 如方伯謙是否是冤案? 後世討論似乎變成涇渭分明的兩派, 一派是平反派, 想為北洋艦隊說話, 甚至是捧成民族英雄, 另一派則是罵的體無完膚, 前者代表如戚其章 因此在引用資料上也呈現截然不同的情況, 例如平反派説丁汝昌是被日艦砲火擊中受傷 另一派卻說是定遠自己開砲, 把丁汝昌震傷, 兩種說法天差地遠 我目前的看法, 兩派說法都有問題, 甚至有傳統北洋(山東)派與南洋(福州)派較勁參雜在 內, 戚其章的平反太過民族情緒, 而反派多引用泰萊和馬吉芬的吹牛也太過偏頗 希望能與有深入研究的網友一起討論 | |
NO:240_9
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/04/04 20:44 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應傅鏡暉兄之問題，如下： 〉〉〉〉泰萊和麥吉芬都在吹牛, (可見唐德剛晚清70年一書) 很簡單，結合他們在艦隊中的職務（兩個副艦長，前一個還幹過顧問秘書）和日常負責工作（他們的正職軍官分別擔任分隊司令，所以他們的工作就是輔助艦長管理本艦，而不是決策指揮）來篩選材料，對比一下另外一個地位，資歷和職務都勝過他們的郎威力寫文章的毛病，就大致知道他們寫的東西那些可信，那些可參考，那些可不信 〉〉〉〉一派是平反派, 想為北洋艦隊說話, 甚至是捧成民族英雄, 另一派則是罵的體無完膚, 對於這個問題，我個人有一些相關的討論，就我個人目前掌握的資料和分析，我個人始終認爲方伯謙為一個基本稱職的中級軍官，既沒有表現出驚人的勇氣和責任感，也沒有過度的膽怯和動搖，他以自己的判斷為依據，決定了自己的行動，他沒有在主觀上有陣前逃亡的理由（兩次的戰鬥過程中他都表現出了水準以上的戰鬥積極性和勇氣），也沒有直接的證據説明他逃亡（撤離戰場的過程中，他已經失去了與編隊的指揮聯係，他擁有全權決定戰艦動向的資格，北洋戰艦都曾經退出戰鬥），，他確實是最早退出戰鬥的軍官之一，但是考慮到當時全艦隊失去指揮和有效聯係，特別是他的行爲沒有為艦隊的戰鬥造成直接的損害（它既沒有牽動隊形，也沒有撞沉友艦，甚至還在戰鬥中拖住了敵人最強大的分艦隊戰鬥了一段時間，也因此損失嚴重），我認爲他的行爲可以接受。在他的行爲準則下（保護戰艦，維持戰力），他執行了自主的指揮決策，戰前並沒有任何人確定戰鬥的目標和限度，各艦都有自己的選擇權，方伯謙戰鬥到失去戰力而後就以保護戰艦為目標是他指揮權限内的行爲，不算瀆職更加不能算逃亡，但是也絕對夠不上英雄的標準（英雄要能發揮突出的，具有代表性和鼓動性作用，並做出在相當程度改變戰局的主動行爲，也就是要在主觀和客觀兩個方面同時滿足要求，按這個標準說，北洋艦隊一個英雄也沒有，鄧世昌自己也不過是一個用自己的方式盡職的軍官），一個普通軍官，發揮了平平無奇的作用，對得起他的工資不過不值得加發獎金分紅，他不需要為戰局的結果負責（這卻是他被處死的最大理由），所以他的遭遇是不公正的，不過絕對不需要爲了糾正這一點就把它塑造成英雄，一個戰敗的艦隊沒有英雄 就這個問題，大範疇上我傾向相信北洋艦隊上下官兵已經盡力而爲，這可以讓北洋艦隊從造成戰爭失敗的主要責任上退下來，也可以很大程度的緩解對海戰失敗的指責（不可抗客觀影響因素太多了），但是絕對不足以讓北洋艦隊變成一座英雄的豐碑，我很討厭中國人研究問題的兩極輪，不是英雄豪傑就是烏龜王八，天下哪有這麽容易分辨的黑白論，強烈要求大家不要用英雄或者罪人來定義在戰場上發揮作用的軍官，他們中的大部分沒有能力儅英雄也不夠資格儅罪人 當然戚其章可不能算給老方平反的那一派，這個部分到不用延續了…………………… 〉〉〉〉因此在引用資料上也呈現截然不同的情況, 例如平反派説丁汝昌是被日艦砲火擊中受傷，另一派卻說是定遠自己開砲, 把丁汝昌震傷, 兩種說法天差地遠 這不是給方伯謙平反，這是給劉步蟾平反，劉步蟾的問題早就平反了，這個史料的爭執只是對第三方資料進行驗證的衍生而以，如果說這一部分，顯然我們大家現在都確認了，泰萊的記述是不完全和填充了相當的想象成分的，麥吉芬不在旗艦，而且在戰鬥中被打成重傷，而郎威力的相關記述不僅缺乏參考性（他人根本不在戰場）而且很大程度是一個懷著私心和怨恨進行的個人攻擊。所以現在我們都清楚這些客觀材料都有問題，只能全部拿來對比，然後再參考海軍戰術和技術背景資料篩選補充，形成自己的史料，看任何一方的資料都會上儅；不過從技術上說，我強烈傾向相信丁汝昌是從被火砲發射的暴風和震動摧毀的觀察地點掉下來受傷的（因爲日本人絕對沒辦法在13點之前靠近定遠所以他們也沒有打中定遠的機會），現在唯一的疑點是這個地點是飛橋還是觀禮台 如果僅僅對這個情節有興趣，從我的看法，我始終認爲這個部分真實性對整體戰局的意義不大，丁汝昌的負傷幾乎沒有對戰局的發展產生影響，因爲他其實根本不是艦隊的真正指揮官，也不太參與決策，只是一個綜合別人的建議然後發佈出去的傳聲筒，指揮官是左右翼總兵官劉步蟾林泰增，即便泰萊在他身邊，也沒有起什麽作用。真正造成全艦隊失去指揮這個關鍵性影響的因素是定遠被打飛了信號旗，或者說全艦隊的隊形拉得太開，造成指揮系統在一開始就失靈了，隨著旗艦失去通信機能而事先又沒有任何戰艦或者軍官受命代替指揮，造成了進一步的全面混亂，之後有兩次其他戰艦試圖升旗代替指揮，但是根本就不起作用（整個隊形已經被切割了，互相無法聯係，而且升旗戰艦自己也被第一遊擊隊包圍並很快擊沉，根本無法執行指揮艦任務），所以這個部分，討論價值不大 〉〉〉〉我目前的看法, 兩派說法都有問題, 甚至有傳統北洋(山東)派與南洋(福州)派較勁參雜在 看法很正確，但是北洋南洋衝突對戰爭的影響作用其實很小，大家去看看南洋艦隊的那點家底就知道了，這些船要北上的還不夠聯合艦隊塞牙縫，北洋艦隊本來有機會提前撤退（至少在威海和大連失守后，應當不計代價的突圍）到上海或者馬尾去休整，這樣廣東和福建水師的小船可能能夠配合砲臺保護北洋戰艦休整再戰，如果戰局拖延下來，日軍的注意力被引導到南方，甚至提前動用第二軍開始臺灣攻略戰，那麽戰場的環境會發生很大的變化，我們不能單純的考慮戰術改變戰略的可能性，因爲戰術環境的改變會帶來利弊的雙重影響，不過我們也確認這種變化的可能性。但是在我的文章中我已經分析過這種戰略在政治上的不可行性，歸根結底，軍事是從屬于政治的，不能讓軍人去反抗政治來發揮（也不應該提倡這種行爲和思維習慣） | |
NO:240_10
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/04/07 10:15 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
Philo McGiffin may have been badly injured but he was never out of action during the battle. While he was not on the flagship, he was the XO on the other battleship in the line. As such, he was in an excellent position to observe the conduct of the action. Further, he was the only fully trained officer with any real naval experience. His account, while not perfect, must stand as an important source material. This is especially important since the flag staff on the Ting Yuen were all put out of action by the opening salvo ... the flying bridge lived up to its name ... the main guns fired and it went - flying! Since Tyler was amongst those who went flying and was out of action through most of the battle - his account is mostly second-hand info. Trouble Ive found with quite a few of the Chinese accounts of the battle is that they were not written by people familiar with fleet tactics and technology of that period. One point is very clear, there was plenty of bravery, bravado and insufficient appreciation of technology - especially gunnery - by both sides. The unfortunate part was the deficiency was greater on the side of the Peiyang Fleet. The battle was mostly a cruiser action. The 150mm, 6inch and 4.7inch quick-fire (QF) scored most of the damaging hits. Armor protection against these guns were critical. The large guns 12inch Krupp on the Chinese battleships and 12.6inch Canet on the Japanese cruisers scored very few hits. These big guns could shoot further but technology for accurate long range gun fire - ie. director fire control - has not yet been developed. Both sides wasted a lot of ammo by firing at long range. Yet, when the range was closed to point blank in the latter part of the action, the Chinese found they had very few HE Common shells left for their 12inch guns. One precious 12inch HE shell - treated tenderly bby the gunners like a new born baby - scored a telling hit on the Matsushima and almost blew her up. If only there were more and, almost as importantly, if only the 12inch Krupp could have been reloaded and traverese more quickly. While the heavily armored Chinese battleships were largely immune to Japanese guns, their large guns did very little damage because of the mismatch in targets - fast cruisers rather than slow battleships. A heavier secondary armament would have been more useful but they only had two 5.9in Krupp QF. It is worth noting that after the Japanese captured the Chen Yuen, they re-armed her with 4 Armstrong 6inch QF. The rest of the Chinese force had QF guns but most had inadequate armor. The Yang Wei and Chao Yung were virtually unarmored. They were designed to fight a previous generation of warships. Their main guns and top speed were superior to the previous generation but technology had overtaken them. Against up-to-date Japanese cruisers like the Yoshino - they were doomed. It also didnt help that poor maintenance slowed down many of the Chinese ships, especially the older ones. In contrast, most the Japanese cruisers were new and in top shape. They had the QF guns - adequate armor to survive and most were very fast ofr their time. Their training, especially gunnery, was also excellent. There is no substitute for preparedness. There has to be the political will to pay for an effective force structure. This includes up-to-date equipment appropriate for the threat AND the operational testing and training to ensure effectiveness. Otherwise, you repeat history - it could be the Battle of the Yalu or 1965. | |
NO:240_11
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/04/07 13:16 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： >>>>he was in an excellent position to observe the conduct of the action
〉〉〉〉the opening salvo ... the flying bridge lived up to its name
〉〉〉〉Trouble Ive found with quite a few of the Chinese accounts of the battle is that they were not written by people familiar with fleet tactics and technology of that period.
〉〉〉〉The 150mm, 6inch and 4.7inch quick-fire (QF) scored most of the damaging hits. Armor protection against these guns were critical. 我非常非常非常支持這個意見，就我個人觀點來説，我認爲這是影響整場戰鬥最關鍵的戰術因素（而所謂的掃射甲板的小口徑炮我個人認爲效果並不像想象的那麽大），正是這些中口徑的速射主炮把北洋艦隊的巡洋艦打得沉的沉燒的燒，戰後幾乎所有的中國巡洋艦船體都被打得千瘡百孔，這些貫穿船體鐵甲護板的致命傷都是中口徑阿姆斯特朗炮的功勞（哈乞凱斯2寸速射炮的效果就差一點）。因爲日本的巡洋艦在速射主炮上佔有的絕對優勢，徹底終結了中國艦隊的主力——快速巡洋艦，造成了中國最嚴重的損失，這些主炮的威力被證明還不足以擊毀重裝甲，但是卻足以把當時生産的裝甲巡洋艦擊沉，而北洋艦隊要達成制海任務，巡洋艦是不可或缺的，結果巡洋艦隊卻遭到了毀滅性打擊，從而注定了北洋艦隊之後一蹶不振的結果 〉〉〉fast cruisers rather than slow battleships 問題就在於那個時代雙方都沒有真正的BB，否則巡洋艦哪夠BB塞牙縫啊 〉〉〉 A heavier secondary armament would have been more useful but they only had two 5.9in Krupp QF 這一部分我持保留意見，我認爲讓主力艦安裝太多不同口徑的大炮是很無謂的一件事情，我屬於傳統派的BB教條主義者，我認爲主力艦就應該安裝統一的大口徑主炮，便於測距修正和保持隊形，中口徑速射主炮應該主要安裝到巡洋艦上，交戰中主力艦列隊炮擊對方艦列，巡洋艦和驅逐艦負責擊退穿越重炮攔截的零星敵艦，或者單獨編成一個分隊圍攻，驅逐並追擊敵人的巡洋艦隊，迫使他遠離主力艦隊列，保障主力艦可以專心于重炮對射的交戰。當然這是太純粹的事後諸葛亮，這一套技術和戰術的發揚還有待于之後十年戰艦技術的突飛猛進，在那個時代採用這樣一套超前的艦隊運用規則，結果未必理想 〉〉〉〉The Yang Wei and Chao Yung were virtually unarmored. …………………… Against up-to-date Japanese cruisers like the Yoshino
〉〉〉Their training, especially gunnery, was also excellent. 這就難説了^^不在一個基礎上難以比較 〉〉〉There is no substitute for preparedness. There has to be the political will to pay for an effective force structure. This includes up-to-date equipment appropriate for the threat AND the operational testing and training to ensure effectiveness.
| |
NO:240_12
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/04/08 10:45 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
〉〉〉〉Trouble Ive found with quite a few of the Chinese accounts of the battle is that they were not written by people familiar with fleet tactics and technology of that period.
I am referring to so-called historical accounts published in China - plenty of nationalistic rhetoric and mythology but deficient in informed critical analysis. Some of the accounts published in Taiwan - eg. Detailed Account of Ching Dynasty Wars by Loh Yun, publ. 1975, Hsiang Yun Publishing, Taipei - are more objective. However, they do a good job describe what happened but do little analysis of WHY things happened. There needs to be more Operations Research-based discussions exactly like this one we are having. A key lesson for us today is that superiority is not gained by simply having the most powerful weapon. It is far more important to have the most appropriate for the expected opponent. Ultimately, the big battleships with thick armor and big 12inch Krupp guns could not defeat armored cruisers. It was a result of the limitations of the technology of that time. Naval fire controls were very primitive then. Guns were laid individually, salvo fire and spotting is virtually unknown. Effective engagement ranges were less than 3,000 yards, ie. point-blank range no matter what size guns you are talking about. The major caliber guns in the battle - 12inch Krupps and 12.6inch Canets - had relatively short barrels and low muzzle velocity. Theoretically, they could shoot farther but, with a high trajectory, they not expect to hit anything consistently beyond a couple of thousand yards. These guns were needed against a battleship threat because they were the only ones capable of penetrating heavy armor. A heavily armored battleship would be slow and have similar limitations in gunnery. They would need to come close to you to use their own guns effectively. Against a close and slow target, the 12inch Krupp would have been effective. Problem was, the other guy didn t have slow battleships but a Flying Squadron of cruisers. Against the faster cruiser targets, the low rate of fire, slow traverse and high trajectory made these guns much less likely to score hits. That is why I said you needed a secondary battery of 5.9inch Krupp QF or Armstrong 6inch QF - for an anti-cruiser role - not the Hotchkiss or Nordenfeldt 47mm 3pdr or 57mm 6pdr for fighting torpedoboats. Director fire control which made long range (9,000+ yd) engagements with heavy guns effective was still more than 10 years away. That s what made a single caliber main armament of the Dreadnought practical. Before that, it didnt matter if you had many different calibers. But even after director fire control of a single caliber main battery, you still need a secondary armament against torpedo firing light cruisers and destroyers. This consisted initially of 4inch QF and later 6inch QF for for dealing with improved, longer ranged torpedoes. Strongly agree with the last paragraph but would like to add that a winning navy is one that learns from its defeats. The finest display of forward looking and adaptive development of systems to fit operational needs in the ROCN came after the defeats of 1965 and the emergence of the antiship cruise missile threat. The improvisation of a main gun stabilized director fire control system using aircraft gyros to meet the needs of a FAC threat was brillant. This was especially so under the difficult circumstances back then - the system was developed from practically no technology base and it worked. The other example of excellence was the indigenous combat systems program culminating in the H930 MCS. Resources then were scarce, the political situation very tough but that didnt stop the likes of Dr Han Kuang Wei. It is easy to be discouraged by the setbacks of the last few years. But as I said earlier, a winning navy learns from its past defeats - it should also emulate the Can-Do attitude of its successful predecessors. | |
NO:240_13
| 布蘭妮 於 2003/04/08 13:10 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
埃 .......只能說或許北洋是敗在慈禧的手上因為她害的北洋艦隊沒錢升級 所以還沒開打就注定失敗 不過大家可以去中國軍艦博物館看看那裡也有詳細的北洋艦隊介紹也有兩大主力艦的 | |
NO:240_14
| ryan2181 於 2003/04/08 17:07 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： 〉〉〉〉The major caliber guns in the battle - 12inch Krupps and 12.6inch Canets - had relatively short barrels and low muzzle velocity. ……………………not the Hotchkiss or Nordenfeldt 47mm 3pdr or 57mm 6pdr for fighting torpedoboats 我完全理解您的看法，我也贊同您對北洋艦隊臨戰前應當增加中口徑速射炮的看法，我只是以一種海軍長期建設的觀點來做分析，我認爲作爲正確的（當然這種正確建立在我預知了戰艦發展的未來這一前提之上）做法，應當確認的是主力艦的任務是也始終是遠距離的交戰以擊毀對方的主力艦。承擔騷擾突襲和反騷擾突襲任務的是巡洋艦和魚雷艇（也包括即將成熟的驅逐艦），不能讓主力艦將注意力轉移到攻擊對方的快速艦艇身上，因爲這樣不僅會造成主力艦無法發揮自己強大戰鬥力的優勢一面（遠射程，大威力）被迫在不利的一面交戰（即便有速射炮，由於運動性的限制戰艦和快速艦艇交戰還是處於先天不利的地位），而且還造成了主力艦無法執行自己的關鍵使命——擊毀對方的主力艦 所以在組成一只強大的主力艦隊時，必須要明確分工，主力艦的任務就是專心于發揚遠程火力；巡洋艦隊的任務就是哨戒追蹤，騷擾對方主力艦和驅逐對方快速戰艦以保護己方主力艦戰列完整等等輔助任務，所以從根本上說，應該以強化巡洋艦為對抗對方快速艦艇威脅的手段，主力艦武裝次口徑副炮只能是一種補充，不能作爲主要的手段，必須用快速戰艦來驅逐快速戰艦，以輔助戰艦來牽制輔助戰艦。儅然這一切建設在一個前提條件上，就是真正意義的戰列艦產生
其實從上一次的回應開始我就跑題了，我不是在回應您對北洋艦隊的問題進行的討論，而是衍生到了一個新的命題：北洋艦隊的硬体建設重點何在而展開，抱歉^^
這個部分實際上就是我抱有一點的地方，兩個主力艦隊交火，輔助戰艦是否能突破對方的遠程火力和快速艦艇的攔截，接近到對方主力艦的次口徑副炮範圍内呢？我認爲結合日德蘭大海戰和對馬海戰的過程來看，戰列艦和巡洋艦的搭配得當就能迫使對方的輔助艦艇無法展開戰鬥（雖然日本魚雷艇取得了大戰果，但是那是在俄國太平洋第二艦隊艦列綳散，而且戰艦被擊沉擊傷多艘的情況下，也就是主力艦已經被對方擊敗的前提下），除非在夜暗霧大視野不良的天氣或者意外情況，否則巡洋艦，驅逐艦和魚雷艇難以迫近到對方主力艦附近發起攻擊（當然囌裏高海戰或者提供了我們不同的證據，但是要考慮這場戰鬥的信息優勢非常不平衡） 〉〉〉adaptive development of systems to fit operational needs in the ROCN came after the defeats of 1965 原來是崇武以東海戰（65海戰），我還在想1965年在東海發生了哪一次大海戰呢^^ | |
NO:240_15
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/04/10 13:26 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
Regarding torpedo attacks in fleet actions, the levels of technology during the Battles of Yalu, Tsushima and Jutland were all different. Prior to 1896, torpedoes did not have gyro stabilization and could only shoot accurately for just a few hunderd yards. The torpedoboats were small and could be dealt with using 47mm or 57mm guns. However, by that time, fast and accurate 4inch and 6inch QF guns had become available. They would have been quite effective against contemoprary torpedoboats. Thats probably why the Japanese did not bring them to the battle. The Chinese torpedoboats led by the Kwang Bing were able to make an attack only because the target - a converted merchantman - was already damaged. Nevertheless, the two torpedoes launched both missed - probably due to poor stability or depth keeping. The one that ran under the target may have been due ironically to the Chinese boat coming in too close. The fish did not have time to climb back and stabilize at its proper run depth after being launched. Shoot too far out and the thing runs wild because of no gyro, wait too long and the thing runs under! It is worth noting that the Japanese torpedoboat that sank the Ting Yuen had to sneak into the Weihaiwei anchorage behind two Chinese torpedoboats. Even then, it had to get so close to ensure a hit that she herself was sunk by the Ting Yuen s secondary battery. By the time of Jutland, torpedoes with gyro and improved propulsion technology could go 4,000+ yards. There was also the ability to fire spreads to increase hit probability. The destroyers were also bigger, faster and more robust. Having a screen of light cruisers and destroyers was vital to counter these attacks. Battleship secondary batteries and light cruiser main batteries by this time were also director controlled with telephone transmission of range and deflection data sent from plot to the sight setter on the guns. The statistics are very interesting. Of the 8 British destroyers lost at Jutland, 6 were hit by battleship or battlecruiser 5.9inch secondary guns. Of these, two were first disabled by light cruiser or destroyer gun fire. Of the remaining two, one was lost to a collision and the other was sunk by a destroyer torpedo after being disabled by light cruiser 105mm and destroyer 88mm guns. Of the 14 British destroyers damaged, 9 were hit by battleships or battlecruisers. Two survived single 12inch hits! Of the 5 German destroyers lost, only one was caused by a battleship - 13.5inch main battery fire from HMS Iron Duke. Five of the 12 damaged were hit by battleship or battle cruiser 6inch secondary batteries. Two others were damaged by splinters from battleship main battery near misses. In exchange, the British destroyer torpedo attacks on the German battle line hit one German battle cruiser in daylight and one predreadnought battleship at night. The only German torpedo success on the British battle line was not from a destroyer but from a light cruiser on a battleship. My conclusion, battleship secondary batteries were very important. Good shooting on destroyers can also be done using director controlled main guns. I would also like to point out the Battle of Samar as an interesting case study of daylight destroyer torpedo attack disrupting cruiser and even battleship battle formations. As for Surigao Straits - technology also played a vital role. DESRON 54 had tracked Nishimura s force on radar for a long time while remaining undetected by hiding close to Hibuson Island (dark background - hard to see and hard to detect using radar). The Japanese did not see the US destroyers and switch on search lights until torpedoes were already in the water. Finally, there were three actions in 1965 that were setbacks for the ROCN. In addition to the one you mentioned, Tung Kiang was damaged by 2 Hainan class PGs on May 1st and while the PCE Chien Men and the PC Chiang Kiang were both sunk on August 6th by 4 Shanghai class PGs and 11 P6 class PT. In the latter battle, even proximity fuzed 3inch 50 shells were not effective against the torpedo boats. Stabilized guns - preferably directed by radar were needed. Hence the development of the indigenous Type 62 fire control system using gyros taken from retired F-86 fighters. Hats off to ROCN ingenuity! | |
NO:240_16
| ｃｃｐ 於 2003/04/13 09:37 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
三景艦的完成対北洋艦隊有何影響？ | |
NO:240_17
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/04/15 05:47 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
The three armored cruisers referred to were: Matsushima They each had a single 12.6inch (320mm) Canet guns to counter the Chinese battleships but these guns had a low rate of fire. As far as we can tell not a single hit was scored. As such, these ships did not actually fulfill their intended role of using the big gun to penetrate the armor of Ting Yuen and Chen Yuen. However, their large secondary batteries of 4.7inch (120mm) QF guns did considerable damage. While they failed to penetrate the battleship armor, they caused much topside damage and casualties. Against the smaller Chinese warships, these guns were sufficient to penetrate and cause serious damage. Matsushima was hit by one of only two HE (common) shell that one of Chen Yuen s 12inch guns had in its magazine. It set off some ready use ammo and caused 70 casualties. | |
NO:240_19
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/04/25 17:04 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
ra兄在DTM軍武論壇之戰史版，回應所轉述之問題，其回應文可詳： http://61.219.142.242/cgi-bin/topic.cgi?forum=6&topic;=110&show;=0 | |
NO:240_20
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/04/27 11:10 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
Interesting points made about the Battle of Fend Dao over at DTMonline: The description of the large crews needed to load and fire the guns on Tsi Yuen applied only to the two Krupp 8.2in (208mm) Breech Loaders (BL). It is thought that these were 22cal firing 217lb (98.6kg) Armor Piercing (AP) and 174lb (80kg) HE shells. It is obvious that these projectiles would need a couple of people (at least) to lift, load and ram. However, both of the 8.2in guns were put out of action early in the battle. It was a Krupp 5.9in (150mm) BL gun that was thought to have hit the Yoshino in the bridge. This was the gun mounted aft on the Tsi Yuen which was able to bear on the pursuing Japanese cruisers. The projectiles of of the Krupp 150mm 35 cal BL was 39kg. One person is certainly able to lift and load this projectile. The bagged propellent charges are loaded separately. So, was it possible that the two seamen loaded, rammed the projectiles and then trained, elevated and fired the gun? The answer had to be definitely yes! It would have taken both guys to load and ram. Then both working together could have aimed and fired the gun. (In fact, during that period, many guns of that size could be trained and aimed by one person, eg. 6in 40 cal Armstrong QF and the Krupp 8.8cm QF.) Remember, the Japanese fired without warning from only 300 yd, resulting in everyone on deck (including all gun crews) killed, wounded or driven below decks. (In all, 3 officers including the XO and 13 enlisted men were killed and 25 wounded; out of a crew of only 180!). For Wang and Li, not part of the normal gun crew, to even try to man the aft 150mm gun took a great deal of courage and initiative. To score a hit was an even greater achievement. (The Japanese only admitted to being hit once - on the bridge of the Yoshino). It would be a great injustice to the memory of these brave men to cast doubts on this act of exceptional bravery - especially if the assumptions about the gun used was not accurate. | |
NO:240_21
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/04/27 17:45 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： >>>>The projectiles of of the Krupp 150mm 35 cal BL was 39kg. 這一部分我抱有懷疑，40KG的重量幾乎達到了一個成年壯漢體重的一半，要把這麽一發砲彈從甲板下的彈藥箱中取出，裝定引信，運送到炮位，再提升到炮尾用推彈杆頂入，僅僅依靠李仕貿是非常難以想象的，如果是快速連續發射，那就幾乎不可能了，而150mm克式尾炮也有一個炮盾（唯獨這個炮盾我沒有把握說有沒有在之後拆除，我曾看見據説是濟遠自大東溝返回的照片，其中尾炮仍有護盾，但我懷疑那張照片的真實性），所以炮手是根據瞄準手在炮外測量的參數調定火砲的提高提前量，如果炮位上只有一個王國成，那麽他一人操炮的難度就很大（考慮到當時雙方的距離還有3000碼以上，通過炮膛窺視直瞄射擊是不可靠的），所以我才強調這次利用尾炮攻擊是一小群炮手共同行動的結果，爾這也無法派出艦上指揮機關存在的作用 我很感謝fer-de-lance先生的重要補充，我的敍述部分引述自210mm克式前主炮而不是150mm后炮，所以我列舉的炮手數量是不正確的，不過同時也引出了一個新的問題，就是原來被推定傷亡殆盡的正選炮手其實是前主炮的人員，后炮人員不祥，那麽是否在王國成發炮的時候炮手班還幸存或者至少幸存若干人，他們有其了什麽作用？這就無法現在來回答，我想我會盡快從這個角度收集補充，謝謝fer-de-lance提供的重大補充指正 PS：我無意否認中國海軍人員的勇敢健鬥（但我也無意表揚他們，無法影響戰鬥和戰爭結果的勇敢不能過度宣揚，否則就會變成廉價止疼葯來彌合中國人根深蒂固的狂妄自大），我的評論也沒有針對這一點，我希望能指出英雄在戰鬥中的實際作用是有限的，戰鬥是依靠全體官兵共同努力才能進行的，所以我否定那種塑造英雄決定勝負的神話，更否定利用塑造英雄來打壓其他官兵存在作用的做法，這纔是我對王國成炮傷吉野進行考證的理由 此外，對於吉野在300碼偷襲濟遠的紀錄，我非常有興趣，之前我接觸的資料中，從來沒有這樣的記述（日方的資料更是聲稱濟遠在數千碼外先攻），這是很重要的補充(這就更好的解釋了一交火濟遠就人員傷亡器材損失的原因），我想看看相關的介紹 | |
NO:240_22
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/04/28 21:42 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
I am all for an objective discussion of the facts as recorded by various obesrvers. Where there was exceptional bravey - on either side - it is right to recognize it. However, I would agree with you that things should not be blown out of proportion for hero-worship and to attack the C.O. and the normal gun crew. If this was a Board of Inquiry, the obvious thing to do is to interview all surviving members of the crew who were topside during the action. Checking the casualty lists of the aft 15cm gun crew could also help establish how much of a role Wang and Li played in hitting the Yoshino. I am also interested in whether there was a smear campaign to blame the C.O. and the gun crew. It is almost certain that some of the 15cm gun crew would have been hit in the initial barrage by the Japanese. Perhaps most of the 15cm gun crew had become casualties. If there were surviving members of the gun crew that helped get off the 4 rounds - they should also be recognized. More research is needed. As for the weight of the 15cm projectile. It is normal practice for one person to lift and load this or the even heavier (45kg) British 6in projectile. Normally, there would be multiple loaders each holding a projectile and one person dedicated to ramming - all to achieve a higher rate of fire. If most of the gun crew became casualties, and only two men are available (and both are physically challenged), I would have both guys lift the projectile. Load it, ram it, load the propellent, close the breech - and then train, aim and fire. As for ammunition, it is normally hoisted up from magazine below decks. The ammo hoist crew - being below decks - were probably still intact. There is also likely to be ready use ammo on the mount itself. I am not sure of the exact arrangement on the Krupp 15cm but a smaller Krupp 8.8cm gun of the period had two large hand wheels for training and pointing (elevation) that could be operated by one person. An Armstrong 6in gun of the period also used only one gun-layer who can operate two hand wheels for both training and pointing. So, one man could have aimed and another fired the gun. One of the most comprehensive (and objective) accounts from the view point of a trained naval observer was one by Fred T Jane - founder of Janes Fighting Ships. He made use of info from both sides. The Japanese fired first without warning - there is not disputing that. The one important clue about the intial range comes from the Japanese insistence that they fired because they thought Tsi Yuen was closing in for a torpedo attack. As I had mentioned before, the effective range of torpedoes of the period is only a few hundred yards. That would be consistent with the account for a 300yd range when fire was first opened. Jane recounted that the Japanese claimed that they broke off the chase because they thought the Tsi Yuen was leading them into a trap. They also claimed that only one 15cm hit was scored on the bridge of the Yoshino. More credit should, perhaps, be given to Kwang Yi for her sacrifice. She charged in for a torpedo attack which had to be dealt with. She claimed a hit on the Matsushima (probably the Yoshino) with her 4.7in (120mm) QF guns. Her sacrifice and the time the Japanese spent on shelling her after she went aground probably gave more time for the Tsi Yuen to escape. | |
NO:240_23
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/04/29 00:16 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： >>>Perhaps most of the 15cm gun crew had become casualties. 〉〉〉but a smaller Krupp 8.8cm gun of the period had two large hand wheels for training and pointing (elevation) that could be operated by one person 但我認爲考慮到克式88毫米炮和阿式6寸炮其實是後期發展的速射炮，在定裝彈，彈性炮架，油性复進技術等技術上要比濟遠的尾炮先進，所以在快速裝彈方面兩者的對比性爲何還值得考慮，所以我想我可能會把這一點列入下一步考察的項目中，目前對甲午戰爭中武器的具體研究与考證還是一個薄弱的環節，我很有興趣進行這一方面的進一步考證分析，當然更加歡迎fer-de-lance先生這樣的有識之士提供自己的寶貴知識与見解，先行謝過 〉〉〉they broke off the chase because they thought the Tsi Yuen was leading them into a trap 這一部分和中國現在總結的資料有比較大的差距，中國提供的濟遠艦航海日誌上註明日艦先入牙山灣口，后轉向東航行，再轉西行，雙方距離3000米交戰開始，而日本海軍的《二十七八年海戰史》則宣稱中方濟遠戰艦在這個距離上首先炮擊日艦，但目前以中方的紀錄為准（也就是7時45分交火論），你舉薦的佛理得簡先生聲稱日方自承首先開炮且距離極近是一個很新鮮的補充，請提供原書的名稱，我想設法代購一本作爲閲讀查證及收藏之用 〉〉〉Her sacrifice and the time the Japanese spent on shelling her after she went aground probably gave more time for the Tsi Yuen to escape. 事實上廣乙重傷退出戰鬥僅有浪速前往追擊，而秋津州轉向去圍攻濟遠，而吉野始終在攻擊濟遠（雖然廣乙試圖對他進行魚雷攻擊），最後因爲發現廣乙火勢太大，艦體殘破已不堪使用，日艦全部放棄追擊，轉身圍攻濟遠，所以說濟遠最後能逃出生天實在是狗運當頭（以常理計濟遠十死無生），基本上廣乙的犧牲沒有產生必然的價值，不過我們也應該肯定廣乙苦戰的功勞，至少它和日艦苦戰到全艦起火，人員傷亡2/3才退出戰鬥，于情于理已經是戰至最後了，沒有能更多的支援濟遠也無可厚非 | |
NO:240_24
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/05/01 13:28 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
Janes book was called the Imperial Japanese Navy and was published in 1904. The book is out of print - I would have bought one if it was available. Alas it is not - not easily found any way. I have exerpts e-mailed to me by a friend. Wright in The Chinese Steam Navy publ 2000, Chatham Publishing, London also said the range was close. Three thousand yards was long for the period - in the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, Deweys squadron managed a hit rate of 2.4% - at targets that were anchored(!) That only reflects the level of technology of the period. Regarding the 15 cm Krupp BL - the important point here is whether the mounting would have allowed two people or even one to aim the gun. The answer had to be yes. The key difference between the BL and QF guns of the period was not in the mounting and travesring mechanisms. Recoil buffers and fast travesing mechanisms have been in use for some time before the QF breech and fixed or semi-fixed ammo became available. US Navy BL guns of the period had recoild buffers and fast tarversing mechanisms - they just lacked the interrupted screw breech and fixed ammo to make them QF - or RF rapid fire as they called it. For a gun that size (15 cm), mountings of the period such as the Vavasser would have allowed traversing by a single person turning a hand wheel. You are quite right in pointing out that Yoshino was always chasing the Tsi Yuen. The attack by the Kwang Yi probably ooly diverted the Naiwa and the Akitsushima from chasing the Tsi Yuen. Yoshino, with her speed advantage, should have had no problems overtaking the Tsi Yuen. Wright also pointed this out and said it was a mystery why Yoshino did not catch and sink the Tsi Yuen. He speculated that the 15 cm hit on the bridge probably affected the Yoshino more than the Japanese would like to admit. So, the evidence again point to the aft 15 cm gun of the Tsi Yuen playing a significant role - whether it was Wang and Li doing it by themselves or in conjunction with the surviving members of the gun crew. | |
NO:240_25
| ryan2181 於 2003/05/01 17:38 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： 〉〉〉Janes book was …………………… Chatham Publishing, 〉〉〉in the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, Deweys squadron managed a hit rate of 2.4% - at targets that were anchored(!) That only reflects the level of technology of the period. 所以我從來不追究爲什麽北洋艦隊的命中率在賬面上看偏低，因爲以當時的條件看命中率在一到兩個巴仙就相當不錯了,還有一票命中率在小數點以下的例子呢 〉〉〉He speculated that the 15 cm hit on the bridge probably affected the Yoshino more than the Japanese would like to admit. 我倒認爲日本人事後的解釋（擔心濟遠把他們引入了中國艦隊主力的包圍圈）也是能説明問題的，作爲日本分艦隊的旗艦，吉野號沒有理由冒自己這樣的一只小艦隊去挑戰中國海軍的主力的風險，更何況當時他還抛掉其他遼艦。所以在當時的情況下吉野退出追擊在邏輯上說得通 | |
NO:240_26
| ryan2181 於 2003/05/02 17:42 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代轉Picard47AT 提問: 有個問題：依照當時的技術，方伯謙有辦法在艙內指揮嗎？他怎麼看得到敵艦？還是需要有些小兵留在露天艦橋報告敵艦方位，然後在艙內瞄跡？ ＞＞所以我才強調這次利用尾炮攻擊是一小群炮手共同行動的結果，爾這也無法派出艦上指揮機關存在的作用 | |
NO:240_27
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/05/09 11:21 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
Yes, you can see out of the armored conning tower which is the normal battle station for the C.O.. Commands are relayed via voice tubes. However, the Tsi Yuen was running away from the enemy. The view aft from the conning tower of any ship is limited. Question is, was the C.O. in the conning tower all this time? Director control of guns have not yet been developed then. There were also no optical range-finders. According to McGiffin, range was estimated from an observer from the foretop by a simple depression range-finding sight which measures the angle from the horizontal to the waterline of the enemy ship. Knowing the height of your own mast to the foretop position you can estimate the range to the target by trigonometry using the angle the sight has to be depressed to align with the waterline of the target: If (I remember my trig correctly ...) and a = the height of the mast; D = the angle the sight is depressed to align with the waterline of the target R = slant range to the target then (with cos(90 - D) = a/R R = a/cos(90 - D) The depression range-finder sight was probably calibrated to directly give range readings for each depression angle. The range estimates are not very precise, especially if the ship was pitching and rolling heavily and gun smoke obscures the waterline. With the Yoshino pursuing so closely at the time, the 150mm Krupp would have been firing open open sights (at close to point blank range). Range estimates from the foretop would not have been very useful at that time, especially given the decimated gun crews and difficulties relaying data. (Flags were probably used from the foretop to the gun). | |
NO:240_28
| Monkey 於 2003/05/09 13:40 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
北洋水師的艦隊還曾經由丁汝昌率領訪問日本,當時在日本引起很大的震撼,丁汝昌當時的神色很自得且倨傲! 當時就在日本海軍軍官上上下下都對清朝水師敬畏不已的時候,惟獨東鄉平八郎不已為然,認為清朝海軍的水兵在軍艦上曬衣服,砲衣上還有灰塵,由散漫的軍紀中看出了他們的戰力並不怎麼樣! | |
NO:240_29
| ryan2181 於 2003/05/09 21:40 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： 〉〉〉Question is, was the C.O. in the conning tower all this time? 呵呵，熟悉的三角測距，當年用紙筆解算魚雷偏轉角打電動的時代^^ | |
NO:240_30
| fer-de-lance 於 2003/05/09 23:20 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
In the Battle off Anshan, Fang cannot be attacked for leaving the exposed bridge and going to the conning tower - especially after the casualties on the bridge from enemy fire. Faced with overwhelming forces and the loss of the main guns early in the battle, he had little choice but to try and escape. What he could be faulted for was the initial maneuvres and the material condition of the Tsi Yuen. A steering failure left her unable to change course. She kept heading straight for the Japanese ships - looked very provocative to the Japanese who thought she was trying to make a torpedo attack. The white flag might have been flown at this time to signal no hostile intentions - (not after the battle started to feign surrender). But clearly, it did not have the desired effect - the Japanese opened fire. >當年用紙筆解算魚雷偏轉角打電動的時代^^ Your geometry teacher should have been proud of the practical applicationDuring WWII, the Royal Navy used a specialized slide-rule, nicknamed the Greek Slide-rule after the nationality of its inventor. The USN had a electro-mechanical (analog) computer to do the same job - calculating the torpedo firing solution. | |
NO:240_31
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/05/10 12:41 | |
| Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 | |
代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下： >>>>The white flag might have been flown at this time to signal no hostile intentions - (not after the battle started to feign surrender). 問題的焦點集中在追擊時懸挂的白旗上，不過理論上白旗表示非武裝行爲（所以難民團體和中立單位等非武裝人員通過火綫需懸挂白旗表明身份），兩軍交戰懸挂白旗表示要求停火交涉，如果是軍艦懸挂白旗還可以加挂救生信號旗表示艦上有傷員或失去動力（加挂對方國旗表示自己已經被俘虜並在對方的指揮下行動，理論上方伯謙是不可能挂這面旗的，他也沒有資格自作主張的挂日之丸旗），請求停火並提供緊急救生援助。兩軍未交戰而懸挂白旗是什麽意思？方伯謙懸挂白旗表示無惡意符合海事常規嗎？ 〉〉〉Your geometry teacher should have been proud of the practical applicationDuring WWII 電動，電動，我只是打電動玩具而已^+++++++++++++++++++++++^ | |
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