2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

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William(楓葉國) 　於　2003/04/08 16:00
2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

上欄又滿150，在此繼續~~~~~~~~~~~
NO:254_1
flak 　於　2003/04/08 17:04
美軍打巷戰的方法

http://tw.news.yahoo.com/2003/04/08/international/bcc/3920392.html
美軍坦克殺手A10攻擊機首次攻擊共和宮
NO:254_2
旁觀者2 　於　2003/04/08 17:23
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

我認為這次戰爭和91年波灣戰爭有幾項決定勝負的優勢

1.丁渝州先生指出來很重要的一點 聯軍重點情報掌握分析
有一定可靠度 始聯軍統帥能夠根據情報大膽做出決定
其中除了敵軍情報外 還包括周邊國家 氣象 地形等
而敵情部分 有很多是靠中情局和特種部隊的地面情報收集
2.指管通情的進一步高科技化 後勤 參謀 受高科技影響 能在短時間內發揮更大的彈性
整合戰力增強
3.精密導引武器的使用量大增 也更精準

以上各點 尤其第二點 是最值得台灣學習的
而且絕對有可能做到的
至於武器方面 除基於前次沙漠戰隊武器的改良外
我不認為91年和這次的差別會有重要的影響
至於人員訓練 除增加沙漠經驗外 其他我也不認為有多大差別

NO:254_3
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/08 17:31
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

剛剛又傳出其中一架A-10在巴格達國際機場附近墜毀,
飛行員安全逃生獲救.

另外國際記者住宿的巴勒斯坦旅館也遭M1砲擊, 數名
記者受傷. 據說是有狙擊手從旅館射擊美軍.

NO:254_4
小毛 　於　2003/04/08 18:32
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

下午看電視才看到A-10在巴格達上空亂飛,沒想到已傳出墜毀! :P
NO:254_5
Golden L't Foot 　於　2003/04/08 18:51
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

一擊必殺AEON環宇軍武網

美國裝有熱壓彈頭的新“地獄火”飛彈完成試驗並準備戰爭使用
2003-04-08

　　據美國《航太日報》2003年4月3日報導，美國防部防務研究和工程主管Ronald Sega稱，裝有熱壓油氣彈頭的“地獄火”飛彈改良型已完成了試驗並準備戰爭使用。
　　
　　這種新武器是2002財政年度國會提供資金實施的快速發展計劃的一部分。
　　
　　在4月2日《防衛週刊》資助的媒體早餐會上Sega說：“國會提供了快速反應彈藥經費…。。。我們應用這些經費實施兩項計劃，它們正在取得快速進展。”
　　
　　Sega說，在大約12個月時間裏，減少國防威脅局(DTRA)把熱壓彈頭綜合到“地獄火”飛彈，從而將該飛彈系統從“基礎化學物”變成了一種已試驗的武器。他未透露該系統是否已用於或將用於伊拉克戰爭。
　　
　　使用2002財年經費實施的快速發展計劃所選擇的另一種武器概念，是低成本導引影像火箭(LOGIR)，該火箭是由陸軍夜視技術實驗室開發的熱成像技術而發展來的。Sega說，“我們認為在2.75英寸火箭上使用這種技術能使其成為一種更靈巧的‘發射後不管’型武器。”該系統目前正在發展之中。
　　
　　在阿富汗“持久自由”行動中首次使用的熱壓武器是富燃料炸彈一類武器的一部分，富燃料炸彈釋放的能量比標準炸彈更長久，能穿透深埋的目標。該武器透過產生極高的溫度和氣壓殺傷敵軍。
　　
　　熱壓武器的高溫和緩慢燃燒還可摧毀化學和生物戰劑，而不使它們散放到空氣中。在阿富汗，熱壓彈頭被安裝在鐳射導引的GBU-24炸彈上，該炸彈被重新命名為BLU-118B。

NO:254_6
BWS 　於　2003/04/08 19:34
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>記得好像有一個車臣的反抗軍大頭打cellular phone被老俄截收定位,
>>結果被Su-25扔的 LGB 炸死...

我這裡有幾個版本
一個是軍網裡,城鎮通信的俄國觀點
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/urbanwar/urbanwar.htm
表明被飛機丟的炸彈炸死的
第二個車臣共和線上http://www.amina.com/
版本有幾個
一個是被直昇機發射火箭打的
一個則為兩枚250公斤高爆空對地火箭??(應該是雷射導引炸彈)

Zakayev said. Zakayev presumes that the self-aiming missiles zeroed in on the radio signal emitted by Dudaevs transmitter and the transmitter was spotted by a Russian flying laboratory a few minutes before the strike. To prove his story Zakayev demonstrated (to an NTV correspondent) the scene of the incident and the tail fins of the two 250-kilogram high- explosive air-to-surface rockets.
關於這個還有陰謀論說俄羅斯願意跟車臣領袖談和
在衛星通訊的過程中藉機幹掉......
殺手.....應是給衛星電話的那個
難怪海珊只會在地底跟自己人開會

NO:254_7
yuio 　於　2003/04/08 22:35
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

不知道波音有沒有興趣請台灣代工JDAM的導引段?成本大概可以降低20%~40%,還可以用鋁鎂合金製作精美外殼,而且可以彈性生產各種磅數使用的型號,三班制日夜趕工,要多少有多少! (笑)>>>一枚JDAM 改裝套件才2萬美金而已,國軍要買的話數量應該可買多一點
NO:254_8
yamyam90 　於　2003/04/08 23:06
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

據我們對電子廠商的瞭解
任何電子產品落在我們台灣人手上
六個月內價錢絕對可以降到十分之一
還可透過戴爾電腦郵購

100 dollars rebate and may even
be free shipping to whereever you
aim at.

NO:254_9
路過的人 　於　2003/04/09 09:09
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

one F-15E was down, two crew members were missing...
NO:254_10
雪風 　於　2003/04/09 10:04
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

↑事情發生在星期天，美軍現在才發佈新聞，搞不好又是愛國者的戰果 :P
NO:254_11
flak 　於　2003/04/09 10:53
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>一個是被直昇機發射火箭打的
>一個則為兩枚250公斤高爆空對地火箭??(應該是雷射導引炸彈)
>self-aiming missiles zeroed in on the radio signal emitted by Dudaevs transmitter
我比較相信JED的SS-21版本，原因是：
1.無線電歸向飛彈說我覺得是最不可能的，因為反輻射飛彈能夠歸向手機這麼小的輻射源是一件很詭異的事，如果成真的話也不可能分辨哪支手機是目標。尤其俄羅斯的反輻射飛彈不論質或量都很差。
2.雷射導引武器說我覺得不太可能，因為無線電標定後，雷射還需想辦法標定目標，而飛行員完全沒有概念在標定「區域」的目標該長什麼樣子。
3.無導引火箭說跟SS-21說都一樣，只需座標就可以攻擊，但我懷疑俄羅斯空軍或直昇機有沒有辦法維持24*7的持續警戒以攻擊時間緊迫目標。
4.所以我最相信SS-21說，無線電定位只能得到座標，SS-21也需要這個。而SS-21可以維持長時間警戒，等待命令，很顯然是當時俄國人作得到的。另外，當時俄羅斯正在圍城戰中，所以陸軍應該是接近到足夠的射程來使用，而不是經過複雜的軍種聯繫手續由其他軍種執行。
NO:254_12
旁觀者2 　於　2003/04/09 10:54
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>據我們對電子廠商的瞭解
>>任何電子產品落在我們台灣人手上
>>六個月內價錢絕對可以降到十分之一

十分之一是有可能
問題是這種價錢 可靠度 品管往往也打了對折

NO:254_13
BWS 　於　2003/04/09 13:27
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

有沒有可能是AS-11??
真是...
電磁波不僅僅會導致腦瘤,還會引來飛彈...
NO:254_14
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/09 17:19
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

巴格達解放之日已到, 但是戰爭還沒結束.
NO:254_15
Armstrong 　於　2003/04/09 17:22
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

Baghdad has been liberated !! At least the Shiite section of the city.
People are celebrating on the street openly....
NO:254_16
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/09 19:24
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

剛剛每日簡報中有報導美軍搜到一卡車改裝過, 配備IR尋標段的SA-6地對空飛彈.
這下子老俄想狡辯說SA-6是老法做的也騙不了任何人了吧.
NO:254_17
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/09 20:44
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美軍已經進城了,
而且也看到M1A2出現了.
CITV的造型跟之前所看到的不一樣,
只是像一個直立的長方形盒子.
目前看來M1A2對路面沒什麼損傷.
NO:254_18
flak 　於　2003/04/09 20:49
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美軍裝甲部隊進入巴格達市中心,伊拉克新聞部長的新聞秀已經播映完畢,外國記者改拍美軍裝甲秀
NO:254_19
Armstrong 　於　2003/04/09 21:26
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

The most ironic image must be the one with three Iraqi holding
on a banner, Go home, Human shield.......
NO:254_20
Armstrong 　於　2003/04/09 21:31
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

Taking down the statue of Saddam live across the globe !!!
What a moment in history !!
NO:254_21
flak 　於　2003/04/09 21:32
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美軍的第二回合作戰算是告一段落.雖然打了21天,比不上當年的100小時戰爭,但這次空戰陸戰加起來21天就攻進巴格達,與當年空戰炸到睡著還是很大的進步.

美軍這次的作戰計劃其實相當簡單,很多專家都想太多了.我覺得大概是太多人受到三國演義的影響,以為打戰一定是雙方罵陣,架勢擺開,我一招對你一招的方式.事實上,打戰比較像足球,有時候一些假動作很有用,但是就只是要讓敵軍轉移注意力,一下就過去了.致勝的關鍵仍然是你能不能從敵人的空隙中穿越直攻球門,剩下的就是火力與速度,大巧不工,根本沒時間玩花招(不過國內的球評也是暴爛)

美軍的計劃目標就是敵軍的重心:海珊與巴格達,只要拿到這兩個敵軍就會崩潰,其餘的都不重要.第一回合美國先試圖用機會牌把海珊掛掉,失敗後便以3ID與101AD直取巴格達,海陸與英軍則固定伊科防線的伊軍並威脅巴斯拉.理論上聯軍不應該分散兵力去攻擊兩個目標,但伊軍的虛弱允許美軍這樣做.不過如果伊軍如此虛弱的話,美軍一開始便應該同時攻佔伊北與伊西機場,如此一來或許傷亡會增加五倍,但一週內就可以與共和衛隊在巴格達城郊作戰,兩週內就可以攻進巴格達.當然美國人選擇了保守中帶點進取的道路,這也是無可厚非的.

第一回合的作戰因為沙暴暫停,但這也恰好給美軍休息的機會,因為美軍的補給並不是源源不絕的自來水管,事實上是一波一波的車隊,所以攻擊維持適當的節奏很重要.另外美軍的車輛飛機也都需要清理空氣濾清器的時間,所以在沒有立即威脅的情況下,美軍走走停停是很正常的.不過也不能怪媒體大驚小怪,當年史瓦茲柯夫對第七軍走走停停的態度也是吹鬍子鄧眼睛,但第七軍軍長當上陸軍準則部,把 節奏 一字寫進FM100-5之後,美國陸軍就光明正大走走停停,才不理會外界的眼光.

第二回合的開始非常安靜,甚至許多媒體還以為美軍停滯不動.事實上可說是3ID大老遠把101AD護送到巴格達城郊之後,101AD與11AB開始轟擊巴格達城郊的共和衛隊.事實上,這時就可以看出巴格達大勢已去.

因為共和衛隊居然沒有回城裡躲得好好的,而駐守在城郊.而伊拉克唯一勝利的可能,便是將美軍困在巴格達城內三個月以上,並持續製造大量傷亡.城市絞肉戰是唯一勝利的希望,這點很多人都看得出來,但是要達到這點必須全城軍民有一致的共識,那就是伊拉克要付出數十倍以上的傷亡才有可能換取得到.而很顯然的,巴格達平民沒興趣陪共和衛隊玩,共和衛隊只能乖乖出城駐守,而這正好讓接近的美軍可以空陸戰徹底打擊.

第二回合打擊的成功,使得第三回合的攻城由原本預想的慘烈戰鬥變成肅清作戰.美軍所做的便是簡單地把裝甲部隊硬打進去,反擊任何想戰鬥的伊軍.伊軍企圖發動多次反擊,但在沒有平民大規模掩護的情況下,只是滿足了美軍捕捉主力的企圖.很多人以為只要勇猛的攻擊就會把美國人嚇跑,但其實美軍的火力最歡迎勇敢的敵人.例如在梅爾吉伯遜的勇士們電影中,很多人只看到美軍一降落被北越包圍,事實上是美軍降落在敵軍主陣地旁,企圖捕捉敵軍主力,或吸引敵軍主力來攻擊自己.攻即是守,守即是攻.

所以,伊軍的成功條件太難,失敗是意料中的.而美軍的表現則比當年爛炸幾十天的好,陸軍算是出了口鳥氣.真正的決戰其實出現在第二回合,大規模的快速屠戮巴格達城郊的共和衛隊,奠立了第三回合的順利.

NO:254_22
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/09 22:20
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>外國記者改拍美軍裝甲秀
真的是裝甲秀. AAV7, LAV-AT, M88, M93A1都一一出場.
NO:254_23
ryan2181 　於　2003/04/09 22:25
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>老俄想狡辯說SA-6是老法做的也騙不了任何人了吧.....
北極熊:
呃...出品30年的東西...我們總得作些售後服務...
NO:254_24
SK2 　於　2003/04/09 22:35
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

海陸在巴格達大學激戰中
NO:254_25
壞人 　於　2003/04/09 23:36
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

> 如在梅爾吉伯遜的勇士們電影中,很多人只看到美軍一
> 降落被北越包圍,事實上是美軍降落在敵軍主陣地旁,企
> 圖捕捉敵軍主力,或吸引敵軍主力來攻擊自己.攻即是守,守即是攻.

Flak 你這裡太抬舉美軍了。當時美軍真的不知道自己降在
北越軍主要集結區附近，他們只是想降在那裡抓一些沒有
提防的小部隊，卻不知附近有近兩個團的越共。更何況當天
美軍機降能力一次只有80人左右，每次間隔要近一個小時，
要是北越軍反應快一點，先下去的美軍就是肉包子打狗。
那個營除了營長夠力、運氣夠好外，北越軍也配合得太好，
正面直攻了好一陣才想到要迂迴，開始迂迴時美軍卻又剛好
來了一批補到原來空無一人的後方去防守。這其實還是跟
北越通訊指揮能力有關，前方接敵部隊基層指揮官執著於片
面戰局沒有快速應變能力，而卻又沒有足夠通訊能力將戰局
即時回報後方大部隊指揮官來改變作戰方向，才讓美軍逃過
大難。

NO:254_26
Waits 　於　2003/04/10 02:12
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

可是按照書上的說法是
把那個營丟到X光去之前, 就已經知道附近有北越的大單位在
NO:254_27
Luftwaffe 1946 　於　2003/04/10 02:27
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

本人很懷疑影片中的是M1A2.

固然有CITV, 造型是長方體, 但是車長觀測塔依舊是A1規格, 不是
A2規格. 而且從煙霧彈發射器的造型可知, 那是海陸的M1. 記得
目前海陸配備的是M1A1.

NO:254_28
壞人 　於　2003/04/10 05:11
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

> 可是按照書上的說法是
> 把那個營丟到X光去之前, 就已經知道附近有北越的大單位在

對，可是那個「附近」是方圓50公里的「附近」，只知道這個地區內
有一兩個北越團的兵力，但是不知道會在X Ray 方圓10公里的「附近」
，更不知道北越軍會這麼集中。

那個營的任務是「搜索並摧毀」，只會是針對小部隊，目標絕對不會
是一整個團，那只會變成「搜索並被摧毀」。

NO:254_29
旁觀者2 　於　2003/04/10 10:04
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>實上,打戰比較像足球,有時候一些假動作很有用,但是就只是要讓敵軍轉移注意力,
>>一下就過去了.致勝的關鍵仍然是你能不能從敵人的空隙中穿越直攻球門,剩下的就
>>是火力與速度,大巧不工,根本沒時間玩花招(不過國內的球評也是暴爛)

我美式足球迷的朋友評論這場戰爭 認為根本是美式足球的打法
第一時期像長傳球急攻
第二部分像跑鋒被掩護衝鋒
第三部分像短傳球

NO:254_30
flak 　於　2003/04/10 10:26
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>那個營的任務是「搜索並摧毀」，只會是針對小部隊，目標絕對不會
>是一整個團，那只會變成「搜索並被摧毀」。
事實上，那是一個團，而且被搜索到，也真的摧毀了。
美軍搜索那個地區已經搜索很久了，一直不確定敵軍有多少，在哪裡。所以才會空降一個營級兵力，建立降落場。如果是建立降落場之後再派小部隊出去搜索，遇到大部隊只會更慘。

其實，在那場戰役結束後，美軍步行轉移陣地時就遇到敵軍殘部伏擊，死傷反而超過前幾天在降落區的激戰。

巨蟒行動也是類似的案例，美軍空降，遭遇敵軍強烈還擊，這反而暴露位置給空軍與直昇機壓制攻擊。這種威力搜索或威力空降最重要的目的是希望能夠偷襲或偵測到敵軍，但是在敵暗我明的情況下這種首要目標是可遇不可求，次要目標便是吸引敵軍攻擊以呼叫優勢兵力反擊。

NO:254_31
壞人 　於　2003/04/10 11:24
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

flak 你得去把書再翻一翻。

那個摧毀根本不是摧毀，是把圍攻的北越軍打退，那一個營僅以身免。
北越軍的損失不是被美軍主動攻擊造成的，最後他們是不再攻擊，消失
在叢林中，不是被摧毀了。更何況，後來另一個營碰到的北越部隊根本
沒有參加第一場戰鬥，完全是生力軍，所以才會那麼慘。

這再怎麼樣也不是把整個團當成摧毀的目標。

NO:254_32
flak 　於　2003/04/10 11:34
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>北越軍的損失不是被美軍主動攻擊造成的，最後他們是不再攻擊，消失
>在叢林中，不是被摧毀了。
北越軍在圍攻美軍的過程中，被美軍防守大規模殺傷，以及原本捕捉不到北越軍的砲兵與空軍趁機大規模轟炸暴露的北越，如果你認為被這樣痛宰的攻擊部隊不再攻擊，「並」放棄原本的團部陣地而撤退，算是「不再攻擊」，而不是放棄陣地逃跑的話，那我不知道怎樣才算打輸。

攻擊有多種方式，這就是我要說的。並不是要對敵軍陣地主動衝鋒才算攻擊，佔領戰略要地，迎擊反攻的敵軍，這也是一種常見的方式。
>更何況，後來另一個營碰到的北越部隊根本沒有參加第一場戰鬥，完全是生力軍，所以才
>會那麼慘。
這點我要再確定一下
>這再怎麼樣也不是把整個團當成摧毀的目標。
摧毀並不是要包圍並殲滅，在你追我跑的戰鬥中本來就很難殲滅。主動投入敵軍陣地，尋找敵軍主力進行會戰，以求在會戰中殺傷大部分敵軍兵力，這也是摧毀。這從隆美爾到美軍都是這樣打的，差別只是一個用車，一個用直昇機而已。

直昇機突擊是一種攻擊行動，不是一個建立基地的後勤行動。而投入一個營級兵力的突擊作戰，就是有打硬戰的心理準備，追求在會戰中摧毀敵軍。

NO:254_33
Luke-Skywalker 　於　2003/04/10 12:37
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

↑本欄主題是第二次波斯灣戰爭，不是越戰，OK！越戰美軍與北越軍的戰術、戰史可另開欄討論！
NO:254_34
6810 　於　2003/04/10 13:46
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

英美聯軍陣亡不超過200人 其中超過一半以上還是遭己方誤擊
不曉得大家對傷亡數字看法如何

巴格達既已攻克 那些英美戰俘是否已找到


NO:254_35
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/10 15:16
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

「柏林」已攻下, 不過「eagles nest」都還沒進攻
剛剛傳出一陸戰隊員在巴格達市外交戰中陣亡, 數人受傷.
NO:254_36
flak 　於　2003/04/10 16:13
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

家裡的電腦有點問題，昨天寫得不太精確。

現在最有趣的問題是：巴格達守軍似乎已經崩潰了，為什麼？

有幾個可能：
1.第二波暗殺行動成功，重心：海珊被摧毀。由於海珊與其官員都消失無蹤了，所以這是很可能的。
2.第二波的空陸戰成功摧毀了巴格達城郊的守軍主力，由於巴格達城內幾乎看不到重裝部隊，所以重裝部隊主力也很可能只部署在城郊。
3.這兩三天的攻城戰打垮了伊軍的抵抗意志。伊國人民看到直昇機掉下來就唱歌跳舞，看到海珊銅像倒下來也是唱歌跳舞，讓人懷疑到底有多少意志力。

NO:254_37
William(楓葉國) 　於　2003/04/10 16:27
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

巴格達既已攻克 那些英美戰俘是否已找到

我認為他們凶多吉少了。

NO:254_38
apollo 　於　2003/04/10 16:37
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

最嘔的就是那個農夫了, 領不到海珊的獎金....

三個星期就攻下巴格達, 實在不了解為何還有人說美軍的突襲戰略失敗?

記得有一次英美要聯合用直昇機空降聯軍至巴斯拉的某地突襲,結果美軍不知何故中途退出,令英軍將領很生氣,說此計劃已經在「好幾個月前」擬好,不知為何美軍中途退縮,陷英軍於危險之中! 可見此戰役英美聯軍早在幾個月前就已經經過完全的兵棋推演了,其計劃之縝密,令人佩服!

NO:254_39
WILLIAM 　於　2003/04/10 16:42
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

有個砲兵上校退役的同行表示
伊軍戰車及戰機至今仍未現身問題可能出在妥善率
事實上伊拉克經過十餘年經濟制裁及軍售限制
帳面上有龐大的數量但可出戰之裝備已剩不多
也許能用的也已被聯軍給摧毀殆盡
NO:254_40
flak 　於　2003/04/10 19:07
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://news.yam.com/cna/international/news/200304/200304100099.html
錢尼比較兩次波灣戰爭讚嘆軍事科技進步神速
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030409-4.html
NO:254_41
flak 　於　2003/04/10 19:57
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

台灣媒體真是亂翻，找來錢尼的原文：
In Desert Storm, only 20 percent of our air-to-ground fighters could guide a laser-guided bomb to target. Today, all of our air-to-ground fighters have that capability.
GWI時，只有20％的空對地戰機能導引LGB，現在全部都可以。
PS：挑語病，至少A-10還不行。原文應該改成PGM的。

In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight.
GW1，需要兩週的時間來計畫一次轟炸
GW2，以近即時得到目標座標與影像後，以E-mail傳給已經出發的戰機飛行員。
PS：應該只有B-2與F-15E有，不太確定。
In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade and division commanders had to rely on maps, grease pencils and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today our commanders have a real-time display of our own forces on their computer screens
GW1：地面指揮官要靠地圖與筆來畫出自己的位置。
GW2：從電腦螢幕上可以及時知道自己的位置。
PS：GW1時，GPS已是成熟的科技，但因為美軍沒有配發軍規GPS，所以只有部分部隊發民規GPS。另外GPS星座當時也還沒有全部到位。
In Desert Storm, we did not yet have the B-2. But that aircraft is now critical to our operations. And on a single bombing sortie, a B-2 can hit 16 separate targets, each with a 2,000-pound, precision-guided, satellite-based weapon.
GW1：沒有B2可以玩
GW2：B2一次可以轟炸16個不同目標
PS：這話有點詐，轟炸16個目標不一定非要B2不可，B1也可以作類似的改良。B2真正花錢的地方是要作成超級匿蹤，而這投資在這次戰爭中卻沒機會回報。
But there are many others. Desert Storm began with a 38-day air campaign, followed by a brief ground attack. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ground war began before the air war.
GW1：空軍先炸38天
GW2：地面戰比空戰還早
PS：這也有點詐，因為GW1到GW2經過十年禁運，所以GW2繼承了上次的成果。
1991, Saddam Hussein had time to set Kuwaits oil fields ablaze. In the current conflict, forces sent in early protected the 600 oil fields in southern Iraq, prevented an environmental catastrophe, and safeguarded a resource thats vital for the future of the people of Iraq.
GW1：伊拉克放火燒600座油田
GW2：部隊快速佔領了油田
During Operation Desert Storm, Saddam managed to fire Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia. This time was different, again, thanks to Special Operations Forces, which seized control of the missile launch baskets in western Iraq, preventing their use by the enemy.
GW1：伊拉克不斷發射飛彈攻擊以色列
GW2：特種部隊一開始就佔據了飛彈陣地
PS：這點一直沒有明確的報導，H-2與H-3真的找到飛彈了嗎？
with less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the air assets used 12 years ago in Desert Storm, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks have achieved a far more difficult objective.
美軍這次兵力只有上次2/3的空軍與一半的地面部隊
PS：伊拉克也禁運了12年


NO:254_42
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/10 21:13
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>GW2：B2一次可以轟炸16個不同目標
啊?? B-52難道不可以這樣做??
NO:254_43
小毛 　於　2003/04/10 21:17
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

不好意思,吐個槽! :P

>GWI時，只有20％的空對地戰機能導引LGB，現在全部都可以。
PS：挑語病，至少A-10還不行。原文應該改成PGM的。

根據以下資料:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a-10/index.html

The Northrop Grumman Litening ER (Extended Range) targeting pod has been successfully integrated on an A-10. Litening ER features a 640 x 512 pixel thermal imager, CCD TV, laser spot tracker/rangefinder, IR marker and laser designator.

按理來說,裝了Litening ER後應該就具有LGB導引能力,只是不知道美軍有沒有這樣搭配.

(我是來亂的!) :P

NO:254_44
flak 　於　2003/04/10 21:18
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>啊?? B-52難道不可以這樣做??
應該沒那麼多個，不過應該也只是一些軟體沒改而已。
丟巡弋飛彈是另一回事。

B-52倒是有一點比較吃虧的是沒有SAR，B-1與B-2都可以「再標定」目標

NO:254_45
壞人 　於　2003/04/10 23:30
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

> 3.這兩三天的攻城戰打垮了伊軍的抵抗意志。伊國
> 人民看到直昇機掉下來就唱歌跳舞，看到海珊銅像
> 倒下來也是唱歌跳舞，讓人懷疑到底有多少意志力。

唱歌跳舞那一節倒是可議，我看第二次斬首後在鏡頭上出現擁人悼哭的一個胖子
好像在幾天前海珊在街頭出現時的錄影帶裡也見過，不知道是否我看錯，不過我
懷疑說不定阿薩夫下有專職演員。


NO:254_46
路人T 　於　2003/04/11 00:57
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>GW1：伊拉克放火燒600座油田
這個好像是燒別人家的田吧？！
NO:254_47
Golden L't Foot 　於　2003/04/11 01:22
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

老當益”準”的最佳典範.........

http://www.defense-aerospace.com

B-52 Dons New Upgrade

(Source: US Air Force; issued Apr. 9, 2003)


EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. --- Aircrews flying the Air Forces oldest aircraft can now better verify targets and pick them themselves thanks to experts integrating a targeting pod on the B-52 Stratofortress.

Maj. Keith Colmer, one of the original operational test pilots here for the Litening II targeting pod that was developed for fighters in 1990s, recently traveled to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., to fit it to the B-52. He called it no small order considering this was the first time a targeting pod has been installed on a B-52.

The concept was to turn out a combat capability that wasnt there before, said Colmer. It included integrating the targeting pod on the aircraft, conducting the test and evaluation and finally training the aircrews and maintainers on the use and care of the pod.

Integrating the targeting pod, originally scheduled for June, was accelerated to improve the B-52s ability to drop laser-guided munitions in operations around the world.

The B-52 community and Air Combat Command officials were interested in the Litening II pod for a couple of reasons, according to Colmer.

One of the biggest reasons was target verification, Colmer said. Adding the targeting pod will allow B-52 crews to identify targets before releasing their munitions, preventing potential fratricides and improving combat effectiveness.

B-52 crews currently use forward air controllers or predetermined coordinates to target objects. With human error possible in either case, Colmer said, the Litening II targeting pod will allow aircrews to look at what they are targeting before releasing their munitions.

According to Mo Kalhor, an engineer in the B-52 system program office engineer at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., the pod will greatly enhance the B-52s capabilities.

The Litening II pod provides the B-52 with self-lasing capability for laser-guided bomb deliveries, eliminating the need for other sources to lase the target for them, said Kalhor. It will also allow for targets to be identified (and) verified and coordinates generated before delivering the numerous types of weapons the B-52 employs. Its a tremendous capability for the aircraft.

The other big reason for the push was to give the B-52 crews the capability to pick targets for themselves.

ACC and the (people in the Central Command area of responsibility) wanted to know if a B-52 could use the Litening II to self-designate their own targets, said Colmer. They also wanted to see if the pod could derive coordinates for inertial-aided munitions like the joint direct attack munition.

As you get better and better sensors, you are able to reduce target location error, he said. That was part of this test, to determine if the coordinates generated by the B-52 using the Litening II pod could reduce the TLE to something useable. Once you have that, you have the opportunity to target buildings, a tank or a truck.

Kalhor said the pod will allow the B-52 to conduct battle damage assessment by recording video of munition drops, allowing experts to analyze how and where the bombs hit.

The test was an operational utility evaluation conducted by Air Reserve Commands 93rd Bomb Squadron and the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Test Center in Tucson, Ariz. B-52 operational testers from the 49th Test and Evaluation Squadron at Barksdale AFB also participated in the test, providing aircraft instrumentation, data analysis and two weapons systems operators for the test and training.

According to Kalhor, the test included six sorties that took less than a month to accomplish, a major feat for the project.

Some of the issues we had to deal with were funding, getting support from various organizations and receiving approval from the appropriate agencies to conduct the test, said Kalhor. Once the project started, we had some technical issues we overcame, including aircraft power availability for pod usage, conducting electromagnetic interference testing with a laser inside a hangar, etc.

The interesting thing about the test, said Colmer, was that the 93rd BS from Barksdale did most of the work on the test, but they are not normally testers.

They called for experts to come out and verify their work, Colmer said. Some of the things we looked at were integrating the pod onto the airframe, working out some software issues and training the crews to use the system.

The test team had to contend with continuous deployments of the B-52 crews from Barksdale, as real-world taskings came in for B-52 assets.

A positive aspect that helped testing was that none of the tactics used were different from those B-52 crews already use, Colmer said.

Once they learned how to operate the pod to track the target and use the laser, they were able to visually identify the target and designate laser-guided weapons, said Colmer. We didnt have to change how they flew or maneuvered the aircraft, which was great because when youre trying to conduct a rapid combat test, you try to change as little as possible.

-ends-

NO:254_48
BWS 　於　2003/04/11 01:31
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美軍未來的轟炸機飛行員將會很激動的宣稱......
我阿公以前也非B-52,我老爹也飛~~我也是!!!
一們忠烈搞不好都在同一架轟炸機上盡忠盡瘁一甲子~~~
NO:254_49
Golden L't Foot 　於　2003/04/11 01:44
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

豈止............B-52在美國預定服役至至少到2040年左右，搞不好一家九代都能在上面鞠躬盡瘁..........P
NO:254_50
雪風 　於　2003/04/11 01:45
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>伊國人民看到直昇機掉下來就唱歌跳舞，看到海珊銅像倒下來也是唱歌跳舞，
>>讓人懷疑到底有多少意志力。

索馬利亞人看到直昇機掉下也是唱歌跳舞
但真想不到伊拉克共和國衛隊也好民兵也罷，竟然比摩加迪休的拖鞋兵還不濟

NO:254_51
感慨大師 　於　2003/04/11 01:58
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

唉~看來真正的獨裁者衛隊非納粹的SS莫屬了!
死忠的護衛國會大廈到最後一兵一卒!還有些是外國人..
那些穆斯林怎麼了?不是很多人跑去護衛巴格達?說要自殺攻擊?
NO:254_52
第一號軍事迷 　於　2003/04/11 02:35
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

B-1真不簡單；我看的好恐怖的一幕─它好大的一個身軀，竟敢也竟然可以像戰鬥機一樣，左鈎、右鈎、又俯衝，同時超音速(帶有音暴環)，像老鷹班的在巴格達上空來回似機投彈。說要自殺攻擊，單只這一幕早就叫人嚇破膽了！
NO:254_53
小毛 　於　2003/04/11 02:50
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>竟敢也竟然可以像戰鬥機一樣，左鈎、右鈎、又俯衝
小毛在法茵堡航空展看到空中巴士也在低空這樣玩.....而且飛的超慢....當時很怕會砸到觀眾席....
NO:254_54
壞人 　於　2003/04/11 04:52
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

John Warden 接受 CNN 訪問，說他的叔叔是 B52 計畫主持人，最近接受訪問
，覺得它們還在用很不可思議，不可思議的地方是應該早有比 B52 好十倍的
飛機來取代它，卻沒有發生。看來他對 B1 的評價並不高。
NO:254_55
cobrachen 　於　2003/04/11 05:19
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>豈止............B-52在美國預定服役至至少到2040年左右，

這個時間是和換發動機有關係，之前看到的是說因為實際上的換裝加上操作成本的計算，美國空軍算的和波音不一樣，導致空軍不敢下決定。

NO:254_56
Luke-Skywalker 　於　2003/04/11 09:44
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://tw.img.webfile.yahoo.com/photo/godfighter/4/22/13/-1/369.jpg
之前那架迫降的AH-64D
被伊拉克軍方於數日前運走了......
NO:254_57
旁觀者2 　於　2003/04/11 09:58
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>那些穆斯林怎麼了?不是很多人跑去護衛巴格達?說要自殺攻擊?

搶錢比攻擊來的吸引人多了
這種時候抓到也不會被人剁手
人就是人 不管信什麼宗教

NO:254_58
Golden L't Foot 　於　2003/04/11 10:02
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

看來他對 B1 的評價並不高。

確實不高，老美空軍的三大戰略轟炸機支柱中，B-1B是唯一後續升級改良計劃被取消者，也是最早被取代（FB-22？？）退役者。

機體航電複雜度超過太空梭且大小毛病不斷，許多重要電子系統的操作表現始終無法達成設計需求目標，雷達截面積與低空突防的性能表現也無法有效穿透現代高強度戰場上的敵國防空體系，機體結構又因低空突防的劇烈負荷變化，老化得遠較B-52為快速......委實是令人難以給予好評。

NO:254_59
flak 　於　2003/04/11 10:24
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>許多重要電子系統的操作表現始終無法達成設計需求目標，
但還是比B-52強
>雷達截面積與低空突防的性能表現也無法有效穿透現代高強度戰場上的敵國防空體系，
但還是比B-52強
>機體結構又因低空突防的劇烈負荷變化，老化得遠較B-52為快速
但還是比B-52強
>......委實是令人難以給予好評。
B-1的基本能力設定就是比B-52高，所以B-52只是可靠而已，除了載彈量之外，沒有哪一個性能設定比B-1高。

那為什麼B-52比較好？因為它可以發射巡航飛彈，B-1不行。但這其實是很可惜的一件事，因為B-1才有那個速度跟戰鬥機一起「進出」，在匿蹤不重要的戰場上，有一架B-1可以省好幾架的出勤費用。

不過繼ALE-55被砍之後，B-1配備JASSM的計畫也被砍了。這就是次子的宿命，長子負起家計，三子惹人憐愛，次子就只能混吃等死。

NO:254_60
flak 　於　2003/04/11 10:35
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

看了一些網路上的討論，覺得很多人無法把戰局對起來的原因是沒有掌握第二回合的發展。

如同旁觀者二說的：「第二部分像跑鋒被掩護衝鋒」，第三回合的攻城是決勝點，而GWI的經驗就是在會戰前先停頓整補，然後就要一鼓作氣衝進去。第一回合結束在沙暴中，美軍已經接近巴格達南郊，趁機停頓整補。第二回合一開始，就是空軍、3ID與101AD合作發起對巴格達城郊的攻勢。我還沒時間對一下當時會戰發生的地區，但我記得卡巴拉有發生3ID的大規模戰鬥，101AD最後並空降佔領了卡巴拉。當時有傳出數十輛戰車被殲滅的消息，聯軍也一再強調第二階段軟化共和衛隊成功。

所以，第三回合看不到重裝部隊的原因，應該是重裝主力在第二回合被重創，第三回合一開始攻擊巴格達機場時又吸引殘部主力反擊，在會戰中摧毀了殘部。所以第三回合就是輕裝衛隊的守城戰。

NO:254_61
flak 　於　2003/04/11 10:58
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>像老鷹班的在巴格達上空來回似機投彈。
那真的是B1啊？！我還以為是F-14

在新加坡航空展看過一次B-1....全場就只有它只表演起飛跟降落的 OOXX....

NO:254_62
6810 　於　2003/04/11 11:34
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)


看了一些網路上的討論，覺得很多人無法把戰局對起來的原因是沒有掌握第二回合的發展
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

太多的細節被英美聯軍保留 我們現在的訊息多是一些片段
也許過一段時間之後我們才能了解整個戰況 如果有法蘭克斯的
著作那最好

有一批人我倒是覺得很可笑 就是我們國內派到當地的記者 一大票人
只能再剛開始時湊一下熱鬧之後就消聲匿跡

NO:254_63
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/11 12:18
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>那為什麼B-52比較好？因為它可以發射巡航飛彈，B-1不行
有配備迴轉發射架的B-1B竟然不能發射CALCM?


NO:254_64
flak 　於　2003/04/11 12:27
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>有配備迴轉發射架的B-1B竟然不能發射CALCM?
這問題真是FAQ，平均每半年我就得回答一次....：P

B-1B有三個彈艙，由於CALCM太長，所以需要特製彈艙模組，而且會佔掉一個半的空間（剩下一半記得是改放油）。當年有發展這種東西，但在限武談判中，美蘇達成限制空射巡航飛彈平台數量的協議。由於名額有限，而科技較老舊的B-52顯然需要飛彈來提高自己的生存性，所以美國就把名額全部給B-52，B-1就負責裝八枚SRAM+八枚B61自己用核彈炸出一條血路。CALCM彈艙計畫就全面終止，也根本沒有投產（所以現在後悔想加裝也是來不及）。

不料，冷戰終止，SRAM與B61變成高放射性雞肋，B-52頓時成為美國空軍唯一的巡航飛彈發射平台，從此吃香喝辣，享盡榮華富貴。

NO:254_65
VOR 　於　2003/04/11 12:47
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

比較誇張的是竟然有些人覺得伊拉克主力沒什麼戰鬥或
仍隱藏實力，我還看到什麼「主力突然消失」之類的話。
這些錯誤的觀點不只政治論壇上有，一些軍事論壇及
BBS 似乎也不少。

媒體站在勝者這方，報導很多聯軍的細節，有關伊拉克
軍力的描述相當貧乏。不過這並不代表完全沒有…

以現有訊息來看，共和國衛隊的三個裝甲師 Al Madina
Al Munawara 、Adnan 、 及 Al-Nidaa 現在只剩下Adnan
還存有一點實力在 Tikrit ，其餘已被聯軍殲滅。

步兵師方面， Hammurabi 跟Al-Abed 都在 Tikrit 附近，
還有一些散佈在 Kirkuk 及 Mawsil 。巴格達首都被打下來時
有部份陸軍及共和國衛隊的兵力撤到Mawsil 。

總而言之，Tikrit 還有為數不少能造成威脅的伊拉克雜牌軍。
不過就整體軍力來說伊拉克陸軍已沒有什麼反擊的力量，
共和國衛隊也被重創而剩下一半不到的軍力。

至於伊拉克的戰車及戰機…
戰車其實因為伊拉克以小團兵力作戰，大都已被分而擊之，
倒不能說沒現身。
戰機部份則是硬體的問題再加上空軍忠誠度的問題所以完全
無法發揮。伊拉克除了在戰前還有利用定翼機偵察以外，
一直沒有打算正面對抗聯軍的空中力量。為保存實力而分散
部署在城鎮的戰機也如之前提過的已被聯軍逐一搜尋摧毀。

NO:254_66
Golden L't Foot 　於　2003/04/11 13:11
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

歷史上的蠢事總是一再重演，太平洋戰爭末期，幾乎是呈日本帝國海空軍被美帝海軍一路壓著打的局面，但是日本軍方卻不斷大言不慚的發表大捷的消息，最後宣稱擊沉美帝艦隊艦隻的數量甚至超過美帝當時所擁有的艦艇數總和，以至於海賽爾上將在聽到這段喪家犬式的囈語後，對總部發了一段著名電文：”本艦隊正自海底朝日本本土全速前進中......”

如今，類似的喪家犬式狂吠囈語依舊充斥在本次戰役中，只是拜媒體網路發達之賜，流傳更加廣遠罷了；但是事實就是事實，不會因謠言嘴炮有任何改變，沒實力又愛逞強的喪家犬無論再怎麼哀號狂吠，也不會成虎成龍，終究只是得在強者巨棒下倒斃的喪家犬而已．

NO:254_67
VOR 　於　2003/04/11 13:33
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw030408_1_n.shtml
US Army takes aim on Tikrit
Tim Ripley, JDW Correspondent
from US Central Command, Qatar
08 April 2003

這篇JDW 的文章提到﹕
According to coalition military sources several thousand hard-core troops
loyal to the regime are massed in the centre of Baghdad, including elements
of the Special Republican Guard, Fedayeen fighters, Presidential Guard and
Special Security Organisation. The remnants of the Hammurabi and Al Nida
Republican Guard divisions are fighting in the eastern suburbs of the capital,
according to US officers.

這是兩天前寫的報導, Hammurabi 應該已撤退

另一則 JDW 文章﹕
http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw030408_2_n.shtml
New urban warfare tactics employed by US troops
Kim Burger JDW Staff Reporter
Washington DC

NO:254_68
flak 　於　2003/04/11 13:36
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

這是聯軍3/28的位置，這時是沙暴剛結束，第二回合開始
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/images/030328-d-6570c-012.jpg
這是聯軍4/3的位置，這時準備攻城，第二回合結束
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/images/030403-d-6570c-011.jpg
我們可以發現的是，在這段期間內，幼發拉底河南岸兵力（3ID與101AD）唯一的進展就是攻佔了Karbala，而北岸兵力（USMC）反而在Al Kult與北方完成貫穿幼發拉底河與提格理斯河。但是USMC應該是比較弱的側翼部隊，地理上進展卻反而比3ID與101AD多。所以可見得這段時間內，3ID與101AD的重點就是奪取Karbala。

另外，聯軍在Karbala墜毀了一架黑鷹、三架阿帕契（兩架迫降）與一架F-18C，這幾乎是聯軍最多戰損的單一地點。

最後，我們在101AD出擊的紀錄中可以看到敵軍利用椰子樹作妥善的防空輕火力陣地，與巴格達幾乎無工事是天壤之別。而在一開戰，也有聯軍空襲Karbala的報導。由此可以推測，共和衛隊並沒有將主力擺進巴格達，而是巴格達南方的Karbala，所以聯軍南翼的真正目標也一直是瞄準Karbala。


NO:254_69
sohonor 　於　2003/04/11 16:15
啊!那個沙哈夫 跑哪去了.......

號稱地球上最強大的數位陸上終結者第四師,尚未動用的情況下
美軍只花三個禮拜時間就攻下巴格達,真是又猛又強,但與其說美軍打的太好
倒不如說伊軍實在打的太差!!本來也沒有期待伊軍會有如北越軍般如此死纏濫打的精神

但目前看起來伊軍的表現,比巴勒斯坦的或索馬利亞的民兵更不如
所謂的共和國衛隊變成落跑大隊,而烈士旅變成棄械旅,充份的實踐發揚敵進我退
敵來我跑的要義!看起來近期在媒體上預言美軍將在巴格達街頭遭遇接烈抵抗
的一狗票戰略專家.學者博士可以開始準備捏蛋蛋了......

伊軍的表現雖然如此差,如此窩囊,但有號人物卻不可不提....
那就是以一嘴之力 力抗聯軍20日 讓我們萬分景仰的IRAQ新聞部長沙哈夫 .......

前一陣子每天看完美軍中指部的戰況記者會後,會立刻轉台看IRAQ新聞部長沙哈夫 的記者會
而隨著戰事的進展,記者會的場地也不拘,有時候在新聞部有時候就在巴格達的街頭


半島問曰:美軍已逼巴格達? 他老兄回答:美軍還在遙遠的南方.......
隔日CNN問曰:美軍已佔領巴格達機場? 他老兄回答:我們會立刻將其逐出.....
又隔日TV-5問曰: 美軍先頭部隊已攻入巴格達城.....
這回他老兄橫眉怒目的回答:若美軍敢斗膽進城必血濺牆前!!

此君總是一派自信滿滿從容不迫的回答記者的提問,短期內知名度人氣狂飆不止
但巴格達城破後此君人間消失,據馬路消息有此一說,有人目睹其於街頭憔悴喃喃自語:
這不是真的,這一切都是幻覺一定是是幻覺...另有好事之徒調閱沙哈夫 大傳係之畢業論文

為(犀牛皮與臉皮厚薄之我見) 可見此君吹噓之本事原為專業養成!!

唉!也難為他了!以一嘴之力力抗聯軍三星期,原本就非易事!

不過寫本文的此刻的我卻心虛的想到一句台灣廣告名言:

喳逋人不能光靠一張嘴啊........
與天下男人共勉!!

NO:254_70
WKYS 　於　2003/04/11 16:15
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

禮拜天Whashinton Post有篇相當深入淺出且精闢的文章<>, 看完終於明瞭為何伊軍很少出現...與大家分享

答案是:靠著精確空中攻擊, 幾乎就搞定了地面戰

首先, 伊拉克軍隊不是像媒體所說的消失, 而是被摧毀了--- 只是媒體沒有看見.

在美軍地面部隊來到共和衛隊陣地之前,共和衛隊已經因為無法承受來自空中的攻擊而潰散. 這些,隨地面部隊一起行動的記者,當然沒有看見.

美軍在一個禮拜之內,從空中除掉共和衛隊一千多輛坦克, 這個戰果在第一次波灣戰爭時花了六週才達到.(這也解答了為何這次沒有先炸個一個月再發動地面攻勢)

由於衛星偵搜&跨軍種指管通勤的精進,加上幾乎所有飛機均可自高空執行精確空擊(前面有大大提過,A-10除外), 這次從空中投射的的火力中, 70% 是屬於Precision Guided Munition, 跟91年的6% 比較起來,可以說是空中火力運用模式是截然不同的.

Gulf War I 決大部分的精確攻擊是用來打擊重要戰略目標, 至於地面部隊, 還是靠著傳統的, 從中低空大量投射炸彈來對付....因此給人的印象是上次海空軍炸的很猛. 其實不然, 這次波灣戰爭裡的空中攻擊不但有效率得多,而且地面的伊軍根本束手無策.

傳統上, 對地攻擊要提高準確率, 就要犧牲飛行高度, 也就是得冒被擊落的危險. 伊軍沒有雷達看不到敵機, 沒有中高空防空飛彈沒關係, 你飛機來了我還是知道, 低空防空飛彈 & 炮火還是可以構成威脅.

現在老美可以從40,00呎高空投彈, 然後精準到幹掉地面上的裝甲車輛, 卡車, 防空點...等等小型目標. 伊軍在沒有雷達的情況下, 美機都飛到頭上投彈了也看不見, 聽不見(太高了)...然後這些不知道從哪裡丟下來的炸彈竟然準得不像炸彈, 不但有效的殺傷伊軍, 對士氣更是極大的打擊.

更有效率的空中攻擊不但替地面部隊開路, 甚至是取代了部份地面部隊主戰的角色.但這並沒有被媒體注意...至少遠不及對地面戰況的注意.

美軍的空中作業(Air Operation)指揮官 T. Michael Moseley 上個禮拜曾說I find it interesting that folks say were softening them (Republican Guards) up. Were not softening them up. Were killing them......聽起來大有替自己的功績不為人知叫屈的味道...


事實上, 這次美伊戰爭,空中精確打擊甚至分擔了支援地面部隊城市戰鬥的任務.印象很深, 前幾天報上(Washinton Post還是USA Today?)一篇導裡面, 陸戰隊在巷戰中用雷射標定一棟伊軍盤據的建築物, 然後呼叫空中的超級蟲, 說我要炸它右半邊(由此可知對其準確度的信賴!)....結果砲兵官有點不爽, 一直說銅斑蛇就可以搞定...

共和衛隊不是消失, 不是不戰而逃,他們的確是被擊潰--從空中. 只是,沒有攝影機拍下這些畫面. 攝影機只拍到伊軍散落在戰場上,被摧毀的坦克和陣地...

NO:254_71
flak 　於　2003/04/11 16:31
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>空中精確打擊甚至分擔了支援地面部隊城市戰鬥的任務.
空中精確打擊要支援地面部隊的頭號問題就是通信。戰機通常使用UHF波段，民航機與地面部隊則是VHF無線電。所以空陸要聯合作戰，在新一代的軟體無線電或戰術TCP/IP網路完成前，要嘛戰機要加VHF無線電，要嘛地面部隊要有UHF無線電。

所以美軍CAS機種都會裝VHF無線電，也才有可能發生地面部隊可以選擇呼叫砲兵或戰機的事。然而台灣....通常是兩不相干...

NO:254_72
William(楓葉國) 　於　2003/04/11 16:48
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美國海空軍的戰損率比上次波斯灣戰爭還要低。
NO:254_73
mind1984 　於　2003/04/11 22:21
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

台灣的陸軍和空軍是兩不相干,
但是總叫得到陸航的直昇機吧,
所以CAS還是有人來幹的.
NO:254_74
CW 　於　2003/04/12 00:00
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>所以美軍CAS機種都會裝VHF無線電，也才有可能發生地面部隊可以選擇呼叫砲兵或戰機的事。然而台灣....通常是兩不相干...>>

這也是我想問的問題. 美國外交官曾提到台灣沒有整合三軍聯合作戰. 所以
台灣地面部隊無法呼叫戰機支援.

NO:254_75
雪風 　於　2003/04/12 00:06
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>所以台灣地面部隊無法呼叫戰機支援

應該可以，只是要營旅級大層級單位才有設備 >_<

NO:254_76
雪風 　於　2003/04/12 00:25
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

沙暴發生時巴格達和巴斯拉曾有大批車隊人員出城，有人說逃亡也有人說利用沙暴展開逆襲
但蛇出洞馬上遭到空中精確打擊，整個有生戰力被殲滅掉，巴格達輕易陷落的命運可能在那
時候就已經註定
NO:254_77
BWS 　於　2003/04/12 00:48
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

這裡大概沒有朋友在海空援作業講習裡
聽到戰機飛行員跟地面旅級單位通信車做通聯
陸軍建構的IMSE系統,其通信系統係利用UHF、VHF、SHF等通訊頻率，並透過微波中繼站
作區網連結,在921時早已經驗證過能與空軍S-70系列作通聯
當然..歷屆的海空援演練最好看的是戰機在RF5000導引(營)以及配合延伸交換機GRC-408(旅)下作淺俯衝模擬炸營區房舍飛行
聲勢驚人呀 !!
NO:254_78
第一號軍事迷 　於　2003/04/12 01:11
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>但目前看起來伊軍的表現,比巴勒斯坦的或索馬利亞的民兵更不如
>>所謂的共和國衛隊變成落跑大隊,而烈士旅變成棄械旅,充份的實踐發揚敵進我退
>>敵來我跑的要義!

老美由頂下攻的威力，看了就叫人心有餘悸(索馬利亞那仗缺這個的震撼)，常理分析一下─就是有不知死的精神，也換不回一死，逃了還有命，拼了必死，降了有人道的待遇也可享飽三餐，為一個神化的人事確是不值得的。

反思一下未來五年必有一戰的挑釁，打從知道這息後我天天的念著在等著它來，這不代表我好戰而是有決心要跟它一戰•••，各位您們會怎麼作想！？好像時間要到了而意識到了沒？大家要準備了！

NO:254_79
TTSO 　於　2003/04/12 02:37
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

沒記錯的話，美軍現在所有的戰術戰鬥機都已經裝了VHF comm...
(最後一個裝的是不是F-15E？OEF之前才裝的)

NO:254_80
flak 　於　2003/04/12 10:00
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>沒記錯的話，美軍現在所有的戰術戰鬥機都已經裝了VHF comm...
>(最後一個裝的是不是F-15E？OEF之前才裝的)
我看IAPR，好像F-15E還沒有，所以要指揮機轉發。

不過，的確美國空軍在這方面是最努力的，這也是為什麼美國陸軍還有機會嫌空軍的服務不好，而很多國家陸軍被支援一次就會感激涕零。

NO:254_81
flak 　於　2003/04/12 10:02
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>看了就叫人心有餘悸(索馬利亞那仗缺這個的震撼)，常理分析一下─就是有不知死的精神，
>也換不回一死，逃了還有命，拼了必死，
索馬利亞的民兵是很可怕的，無武裝的平民上街叫陣，讓有武裝的民兵可以利用人群掩護發動攻擊，就算M1/M2面對這種不要命的攻擊，也是膽寒。
NO:254_82
VOR 　於　2003/04/12 11:41
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

Update 伊拉克陸軍現狀讓大家參考﹕

戰前伊拉克有五個軍團，約有三個機械化師、
三個裝甲師、及十一個步兵師。

第一軍團一直部署在伊拉克北部的 Kirkuk ，經由聯軍包圍後
不斷轟炸，應該隨著該城被攻下而已沒多少戰力。
見 CNN 報導﹕
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/10/sprj.irq.kirkuk/
U.S. reinforcements arrive in Kirkuk

第二軍團部署在 Deyala ，現在動向我不太清楚，
好像在西北部﹖

原本部署在 Al-Naserria 的第三軍團已經被殲滅。

第四軍團戰前部署在 Almajar ，目前在巴格達東方跟聯軍交戰。

第五軍團部署在 Mosul ，該城被切斷後被攻擊，已投降。見﹕
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/11/sprj.irq.mosul.centcom/
Looting as Iraqis surrender at Mosul

NO:254_83
flak 　於　2003/04/12 11:46
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>美軍的空中作業(Air Operation)指揮官 T. Michael Moseley 上個禮拜曾說I find it
>interesting that folks say were softening them (Republican Guards) up. Were not
>softening them up. Were killing them......聽起來大有替自己的功績不為人知叫屈的味道...

如果美軍真的做到的話，那是平反了科索夫衝突的挫敗。當科索夫衝突結束，南聯裝甲車輛，甚至防空車輛浩浩蕩蕩、排列整齊地從科索夫山區離開的一剎那，這打在美國空軍臉上一巴掌的威力，不下於海珊銅像被拉倒之於阿拉伯國家。

不過，這次美國空軍的確有很多機會可以雪恥，科索夫有歐洲雲霧幫忙，伊拉克沒有。科索夫時美國只有B2可以丟GPS武器，現在幾乎都可以。科索夫有山區與森林，伊拉克沒有。

但值得注意的是，GW1時美國空軍也是掌握了全面優勢，但是共和衛隊仍是遭遇第七軍才潰敗。這並不是美國空軍的火力不足，而是偵測速度與廣度的關係。所以，我相信Karbala周遭的伊軍，應該是在3ID與101AD接近時，迫使他們開火、調動，才讓美國空軍為數眾多的偵測器（E-8、掠奪者、U-2）發揮作用，引導戰機大規模攻擊。不過，這精確的時間點，就需要戰後的分析才能確認了。

所以，美軍改編了86年版的空陸戰教範，但在後冷戰時代最強的戰術仍然是脫胎換骨後的「新空陸戰」。
86年版的空陸戰是空軍的後線打擊與陸軍的前線攻擊對龐大、容易發現的華約裝甲雄師發動同步攻擊。利用長短距離「火力」破壞華約部隊在「數量」上的優勢。
新一代的空陸戰則是利用空軍的廣域「非接觸偵測」與陸軍小區域「接觸性、強迫性偵測」，強迫「隱匿」的敵人暴露，再對暴露的敵人進行同步的打擊。

NO:254_84
VOR 　於　2003/04/12 11:53
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

之前貼東西的時候沒使用統一的名稱，抱歉﹕
Mawsil
Mosul

–––
媒體錯誤的報導造成許多不正確的印象，
例如以下兩文﹕
http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WORS1/1271129.shtml
聯合報﹕共和衛隊棄械了？ 數萬人不知所蹤

http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110501+
112003041100008,00.html
中時﹕怪怪 剽悍的共和衛隊呢？

難怪網上會有很多奇怪的論點。

NO:254_85
旁觀者2 　於　2003/04/12 13:17
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>索馬利亞的民兵是很可怕的，無武裝的平民上街叫陣，讓有武裝的民兵可以利
>>用人群掩護發動攻擊，就算M1/M2面對這種不要命的攻擊，也是膽寒。


我認為這種現象這次不是沒有 只是規模一開始還小的時候
就踏到了大鐵板 老美看到有威脅 不管三七二時依照轟
後面有武裝的軍隊也被精準的幹掉了
搞個一兩次 哪個平民願給伊軍當絕對的砲灰

NO:254_86
CW 　於　2003/04/12 13:17
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

thanks for the info.
NO:254_87
VOR 　於　2003/04/12 15:55
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

啊﹏發覺我打錯了﹕
>第二軍團部署在 Deyala ，現在動向我不太清楚，
>好像在西北部﹖

真離譜，應該是「東」北部才對。
-----

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u;=/ap/20030412/ap_on_re_mi_ea/war_the_north&cid;=540&ncid;=716
Coalition Focuses on Saddams Hometown
此篇提到﹕
「The dusty desert town of Tikrit has been so battered by U.S. airstrikes,
Central Command officials said Friday that it seems unlikely the fighters
left there will be able to muster an effective force. … Planners are not
ruling out a battle. One of Saddams longtime confidants, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri,
is believed to have moved missiles into the Tikrit area to bolster its defenses.
U.S. officials have seen remnants of Republican Guard and other Iraqi army units
join up with other stragglers in and around Tikrit, about 90 miles northwest of Baghdad.
Vehicles and other military equipment remain.
…A few thousand Special Republican Guard troops are believed to remain in northern
Iraq, including near Tikrit and Bayji, a town about 25 miles to the north. 」

NO:254_88
Luke-Skywalker 　於　2003/04/13 23:02
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

七名被伊拉克軍方俘虜的美軍
被釋放了
NO:254_89
acetw 　於　2003/04/14 05:57
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/13/sprj.irq.int.war.main/index.html

唉，仗真的打完了…

對了，那兩塊板子（我不是說海珊畫像）到底是拿來幹嘛用的？敵我辨識？

NO:254_90
flak 　於　2003/04/14 11:21
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

仗打完了，有趣的檢討與回顧才開始啊....：P
以下是華盛頓郵報對作戰決策過程的報導
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14839-2003Apr12.html
NO:254_91
VOR 　於　2003/04/14 11:59
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

愛國者部份數據出來了
http://aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/patriot04103.xml
A mix of Lockheed Martin Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles and
upgraded versions of the older Raytheon Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2)
missile have intercepted about nine Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles fired at U.S.
forces and Kuwait. About four PAC-3 missiles have been used, a number that could
have been higher if the Army had a larger inventory, Kadish said.

攔截了九枚
五枚是愛國者二型
四枚是愛國者三型

NO:254_92
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/04/14 13:35
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>唉，仗真的打完了…
還沒打完, 陸戰隊才正要攻入Tikrit.
NO:254_93
helldog 　於　2003/04/14 15:09
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>新一代的空陸戰則是利用空軍的廣域「非接觸偵測」與陸軍小區域「接觸性、強迫性偵 >測」，強迫「隱匿」的敵人暴露，再對暴露的敵人進行同步的打擊。
但先決條件是要拿到絕對空優吧??如果沒有絕對空優,此招是否無法順利的施展??
NO:254_94
helldog 　於　2003/04/14 15:10
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

請問GPS的訊號是否比較不易受到環境的干擾??例如天氣與煙霧
NO:254_95
flak 　於　2003/04/14 16:50
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>但先決條件是要拿到絕對空優吧??如果沒有絕對空優,此招是否無法順利的施展??
對，但如果承受得起損失的話，也未必。
老美打戰是那種追求零傷亡為目標的，其他國家未必要這麼嚴苛
>請問GPS的訊號是否比較不易受到環境的干擾??例如天氣與煙霧
對，GPS信號是接近L波段，是大氣穿透率相當高的波段。
NO:254_96
VOR 　於　2003/04/14 22:19
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

有關美伊戰爭中的俄製 GPS 干擾器﹕
Copyright 2003 Agency WPS What The Papers Say (Russia)
April 11, 2003, Friday
EMOTIONS RUN HIGH OVER JAMMERS
Vremya Novostei, April 11, 2003, p. 5
Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Valery Yeremenko
THE US STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN BLAMING RUSSIAN COMPANIES FOR ALLEGEDLY
SELLING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ, BUT NOW IT HAS PROGRESSED TO BLAMING
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY. BASED ON THIS MATTER, WASHINGTON IS THREATENING
TO PREVENT RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN POST-WAR IRAQ.
Sources in the Defense Ministry say that during her recent visit to Russia
for talks with the heads of Russian security structures, Condoleezza Rice
discussed the matter of American accusations against Russia concerning arms
deals with Iraq. Specifically, the charges concerned alleged violation of
the international sanctions. The US State Department had been blaming Russian
companies, but now it has progressed to blaming the Russian government directly.
Based on this matter, Washington is threatening to prevent Russian participation
in post-war Iraq.

The jammers are what has enraged the Americans in this war. They may be
called the bane of the whole campaign. The 1991 American military doctrine
stated that high-precision weapons and electronic surveillance over the
Iraqi theater of operations paralyze enemy resistance and lead to capitulation
of enemy troops, leaving civilians and infrastructure safe and unharmed.


The Pentagons faith in the omnipotence of the aviation and high-precision
weapons systems lasted only a week into the present hostilities.

The matter concerns the very same jammers: equipment for interfering with
the GPS. Too many American missiles strayed from their designated targets
in the first days of the war. The day before yesterday, an American missile
struck the Iranian town of Abadan on the border with Iraq, killing a teenager.
Almost 3,000 smart bombs and missiles of the latest generation were shipped
to the Persian Gulf directly from the factory. The American military-industrial
complex sent them for field tests there, free of charge. At first, every
failure to hit a target was attributed to flaws in the weapons, which had
not been tested in combat. However, five days into the hostilities, experts
representing the Pentagon and arms producers concluded that the matter must
involve interference with the guidance systems.

It was the Air Force that had to correct the mistakes made by American intelligence.
American pilots reported unidentified signals sent their way and erratic
behavior of bombs and missiles, particularly on the final approach to targets.
Two or three days later, at least five jammers manufactured by Aviakonversiya
(based near Moscow) were discovered in Iraq and Kuwait. How could they have
reached Iraq, which was under sanctions?

A GPS transmitter was declassified on the eve of the Zhukovsky air show
in 1997. The Americans saw, to their dismay, that the small box was blinding
their latest guidance systems. They immediately bought several dozen, to
try to design an antidote. The Americans are unlikely to come up with
anything effective, at least in the next several years. The device operates
on an elementary principle of physics. Automatically determining an objects
working frequency, it makes its own signal just a bit stronger and thus
leads the object away.

Shortly before the war, the US Embassy in Moscow offered Aviakonversiya
a huge sum for all GPS equipment and spare parts (it wanted to make sure
that no one else would have them). The company turned the offer down.

Aviakonversiya General Director Oleg Antonov admits that about fifteen Iraqi
delegations have visited Aviakonversiya over the last four years. Each delegation
brought up the matter of contracts, and inevitably backed away as soon as
financial issues were mentioned. On the other hand, this is defense equipment
- and Antonov says that its sale to Iraq would not have bent the rules.

Aviakonversiya specialists made several trips to Iraq, sources in the Russian
Agency for Conventional Arms admit. The visits were private; but we cannot
very well forbid them to take their brains along, can we? Shortly after
the visits, the Agency was informed that Iraq managed to upgrade the equipment
which jams guidance signals of guided bombs and missiles.

According to a source in the Defense Ministry, shortly before the war in
Iraq a group of NATO military attaches was invited to an electronics research
center in Moscow. The attaches were shown a device the size of an ordinary
suitcase and told that it had been assembled for peaceful purposes only
- to study the effect of radiation on the atmosphere. Tests of the device
made it clear, however, that it generated stable electromagnetic interference
affecting all electronic devices within several dozen kilometers. The Russians
mentioned in passing that several dozen notebooks had been recently shipped
to Iraq for additional tests.

Presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky says that the Iraqis might have bought
jammers anywhere since it is quite legitimately sold to dozens of countries,
from India to Yugoslavia to the United States. It is therefore pointless
to blame Russia and Russia alone.

The Americans should concentrate on finding an antidote. We will study
and analyze the hostilities. Eighty percent of weapons used by the US Army
in Iraq are extremely sophisticated. No wonder that it was mostly intelligence
officers who stayed behind in the Russian Embassy in Baghdad. A war is the
best time for gathering military intelligence.

We should remember, however, that a smart bomb or missile on its final approach,
when it is beyond ground control, may blindly hit anything at all - from
a crowded marketplace to a maternity hospital.(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

NO:254_97
TTSO 　於　2003/04/15 09:38
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

Reply for flak
>> 沒記錯的話，美軍現在所有的戰術戰鬥機都已經裝了VHF comm...
>> (最後一個裝的是不是F-15E？OEF之前才裝的)
> 我看IAPR，好像F-15E還沒有，所以要指揮機轉發。
我看CA(還是AFM，忘了)上面寫OEF前F-15E才裝，目的不是CAS.. 是在逛街逛到目標區前可以與民航ATC通聯..
上面還寫了一個神奇的數據... 有史以來F-15E執行的最長作戰任務: 19.x小時，air refule沒計錯的話..11次...:Q

> 不過，的確美國空軍在這方面是最努力的，這也是為什麼美國陸軍還有機會嫌空軍的服務> 不好，而很多國家陸軍被支援一次就會感激涕零。

NO:254_98
flak 　於　2003/04/15 13:18
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

B-52用雷射標定莢艙投擲並導引GBU-12炸彈。
美國空軍真該把F-15E裁掉，把B-1到B-52全面加裝雷射標定系統與導引炸彈艙的。

B-52 Litening II Pod Used In Combat

(Source: US Air Force; issued Apr. 11, 2003)


OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM --- For the first time in combat history, a B-52 Stratofortress used a Litening II targeting pod to strike targets at an airfield in northern Iraq on April 11, according to officials at the U.S. Central Commands combined air operations center.

Using the Litening II system, a crew of reservists from the 93rd Bomb Squadron at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and active-duty airmen from the 23rd BS at Minot AFB, N.D., flew the bomber from a forward-deployed location and dropped one laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II munitions on a radar complex and another on a command complex at the airfield, officials said.

The Litening II pod provides real-time images, greatly increasing an aircrews flexibility to identify targets in a continually-changing battlefield environment. The pod then allows the B-52 radar-navigator to designate the targets and direct laser-guided weapons without having to rely on another aircraft or person on the ground to paint the target with a separate laser designator.

NO:254_99
老頭 　於　2003/04/15 14:15
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

伊戰直播有“盲點”美軍制勝靠“秘方”

中國日報網站4月15日消息／不可否認，本次伊拉克戰爭是人類歷史上首次實現全程直播的戰爭，全球電視觀眾幾乎可以在第一時間內看到許多戰爭實況。不過，將於4月21日出版的美國《新聞週刊》撰文指出，在美國有線新聞網（CNN）等媒體大肆渲染聯軍的高度機動性和靈活戰術的同時，他們有意無意地漏掉了一些看似沒有新聞價值的東西，而這些才是美軍打贏這場戰爭的“秘方”。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

秘方之一：美軍學孫子兵法“攻心為上”。早在2000多年前，中國著名的軍事家孫武就總結出了“知己知彼，百戰不殆”和“上兵伐謀”的道理，曾在越戰深受輕敵之苦的美軍自然將大師的這番話視為戰爭的指導思想。早在戰爭打響之前，美軍的心理專家就已經在緊張分析伊拉克甚至阿拉伯世界的意識形態和文化特點了。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

《新聞週刊》指出，實戰證明，美軍心理分析工作大大提高了美軍的作戰效率和效果。舉個例子，美軍心理專家指出，聽到任何辱罵他們沒有男子氣概的挑釁，年輕的阿拉伯人一般都會暴跳如雷。針對這一特點，美軍在進攻巴格達的每支裝甲部隊中，都加入了幾輛安裝有400瓦高音喇叭的“悍馬”吉普車，在進入任何易被伏擊的地段前，不停地播放辱罵阿拉伯人是膽小鬼的阿拉伯語錄音帶。(chinesenewsnet.com)

這一招對於那些身材彪悍而頭腦簡單的“薩達姆敢死隊”成員最為有效。一聽到美軍的挑釁廣播，他們都會被憤怒衝昏了頭，直接把身邊的“人體盾牌”推開，從隱蔽點一擁而出，一邊嘴裏大罵美軍，一邊往前“捍衛自己的榮譽”。結果，暴露在開闊地帶的他們，自然成為美軍M1A2坦克和M2步兵戰車極好的射擊目標。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

除了上面這種戰術層面上的心理戰外，美軍更是在戰略領域內打一場心理上的“總體戰”。一位五角大樓高級官員早在開戰之前就向《新聞週刊》透露，美軍在戰爭中要用各種手段向伊軍施壓，讓他們“頭腦混亂”。於是在電視螢幕之外，美軍透過強大的空中和地面壓制火力，以及散發大量傳單，不斷向伊軍施壓。最後，向巴格達進軍的美軍部隊，以及全世界在電視機前守候的人們才會發現，伊拉克的道路旁有很多被伊軍丟棄的完好的裝甲車輛和大量伊軍軍服。其中一件伊軍軍服上還擱了一張美軍阿拉伯語傳單，上面最後一句話是：“不要讓薩達姆政權的末日變成你自己的末日。”(chinesenewsnet.com)

秘方之二：美特種部隊是幕後英雄。就在CNN不斷滾動播放通往巴格達路上熊熊燃燒的伊軍坦克畫面、炫耀美軍“戰功”的時候，他們並沒有把鏡頭投向幕後真正的英雄——美軍特種部隊。而正是這些特種兵小隊馬不停蹄地在伊拉克搜索伊軍目標，騷擾他們，將伊軍坦克和部隊引到理想的空闊地帶，交給空中盤旋的聯軍戰機“善後”，最終才有了我們現在所看到的這些美軍戰果。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

《新聞週刊》指出，雖然不能在電視上露面，但美英特種部隊在伊拉克戰爭中的角色是不可替代的。正是由於他們出色的搜索偵察工作，美軍的空中和地面部隊才能夠在伊軍對聯軍構成威脅之前，準確及時地重創伊軍的戰鬥能力。據一位美特種部隊高級官員在戰前透露，美國特種兵在伊拉克境內活動已有數月。他們之中有阿拉伯裔，但更多的人則蓄起鬍子塗黑面孔，看上去和當地阿拉伯人毫無二致。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

而且，國際社會在關注CNN報導美軍保護伊南部油井的消息時，不可能知道特種部隊才是真正的幕後功臣。他們在戰爭的最初階段中，不僅透過軍事行動，佔領並保護了伊南部的關鍵油井設施，還透過賄賂，說服一些伊軍指揮官不要在撤退時點燃油井，從而使薩達姆命令炸毀伊南部石油設施的計劃化為泡影。此外，美軍之所以順利地渡過幼發拉底河，也是特種部隊阻止伊軍炸壩和奪橋的功勞。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

在美軍對薩達姆等伊拉克領導人實施第二次“斬首行動”的背後，也有特種兵的默默努力。幾個聯軍特種兵小隊一直隱藏在巴格達市區，搜索有關薩達姆等人活動的蛛絲馬跡。就在伊拉克國家電視臺播出薩達姆在巴格達街頭和群眾會面的畫面後不久，美國中央情報局立即分析得出結論，認為不管真假與否，薩達姆所在的應該是巴格達的曼蘇爾區。特種兵隨後立即趕到了該地區，並於4月7日發回情報，稱薩達姆一行人進入了該區一所住宅。不到一小時後，全世界都在電視上看到了這條消息：美軍出動一架B－1轟炸機，對巴格達曼蘇爾區一所可能藏有薩達姆的住宅投下了4枚威力巨大的JDAM炸彈。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

秘方之三：美軍C3I系統立大功《新聞週刊》指出，雖然在戰爭中有眾多記者全程報道美軍向巴格達的進軍過程，但光看到畫面上美軍坦克在沙海中疾馳，還不足以讓全世界認識到美軍的高速推進。實際上，在整個西方軍事史上，只有1940年納粹德軍對法國發動裝甲閃電戰的速度，才能同此次美軍的表現媲美。而且，與當年處處受限的隆美爾和古德里安相比，美軍第3機械化步兵師和海軍陸戰隊第1師的坦克指揮官得到的命令是，採取一切辦法，儘快趕到巴格達，在薩達姆能組織起有效防禦之前摧毀他的統治。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

同樣，在CNN的電視畫面上也不可能出現太空中24小時不停頓經過伊拉克上空的偵察衛星、高空預警機和低空無人偵察機。而正是這些被媒體“忽略”掉的C3I（指揮、控制、通信和情報）系統，不僅幫助遠在後方的美軍中央司令部制定作戰計劃，讓前線美軍士兵更加了解周圍的戰場情況，更使美軍戰史上首次實現真正意義上的陸海空和海軍陸戰隊部隊的“協同作戰”。C3I系統的升級，使美軍打擊的準備時間大大縮短。在1991年的海灣戰爭期間，美軍要經過3天的偵察分析，才會發射一枚“戰斧”導彈打擊伊軍目標，而現在這一時間縮短到了45分鐘。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

秘方之四：美軍空中優勢一錘定音。美軍在阿富汗戰爭的經驗顯示，空中火力在某種程度上能取代地面傳統炮兵的地位。因此在本次伊拉克戰爭中，美空軍首次對伊共和國衛隊使用了新型反坦克集束炸彈。這種炸彈經投放後，母彈能在空中分成數十個熱尋的子彈頭，在依靠自身降落傘下降時自行搜索地面目標，並直接攻擊坦克最為薄弱的頂部裝甲。雖然美軍沒有最終宣佈這種炸彈的戰果，但據前線部隊估計，有多達數百輛薩達姆共和國衛隊的裝甲車輛遭到了“滅頂之災”。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

但是這種景像是不會在電視直播中出現的。正當全世界關注著美軍士兵對付沙暴和自殺襲擊的畫面時，螢幕下的美海軍和空軍戰機正在對伊拉克的數個裝甲師投下數以萬噸計的精確制導炸彈。美國白宮一位高級官員向《新聞週刊》透露，布什本人在戰爭期間從來不看報紙，也不看CNN的電視直播，他只要聽弗蘭克斯將軍彙報說“瞧，我們又幹掉了薩達姆一個師”。 (chinesenewsnet.com)

正是美國空中力量不懈的“幕後工作”，美軍第3機步師的士兵和他們身後關注這場戰爭的人們才會驚異地發現，在他們面前的伊拉克共和國衛隊精銳已經是潰不成軍了。而那些戰前期望薩達姆“有所作為”的軍事專家們如果只憑CNN的電視畫面，到死都不會猜出共和國衛隊不堪一擊的原因。

NO:254_100
flak 　於　2003/04/16 13:23
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003Apr15371/index.htm
美國伊北空降作戰的報導。
173旅在C-17機隊的協助下，在五個晚上中出動62架次，空投了2000人，400輛車與3000噸以上物資。
NO:254_101
flak 　於　2003/04/18 16:01
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/17/sprj.irq.casualties/index.html
Coalition deaths fewer than in 1991

這篇報導說：So-called friendly fire deaths -- when troops accidentally fire on allies or their own units -- are counted among combat deaths. Thirty-five happened in 1991 and fewer than a dozen in this war.

愛國者單位：別把愛國者飛彈想簡單了！

NO:254_102
VOR 　於　2003/04/18 16:25
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-14-patriot-missile_x.htm
Patriot missile: Friend or foe to allied troops?
愛國者飛彈﹕聯軍的朋友還是敵人﹖
By Andrea Stone, USA TODAY

文內提到﹕
Army officials said that in the F-16 incident, the Patriot crew was taking
cover from Iraqi artillery and had placed their system in automatic mode
when their radar mistakenly identified the U.S. jet as a target.
噢﹏原來愛國者常常切換到「自動攻擊聯軍」模式﹏
Air Force Secretary James Roche said April 1 that the incident may have
been caused by inexperienced pilots unfamiliar with operating near Patriot
batteries. He said pilots hunting for Iraqi missile batteries are now required
to check with surveillance aircraft or other ground radars before firing.

NO:254_103
acetw 　於　2003/04/18 18:16
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

（acetw：火焰槍也變老美的lost art了…）

http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/newslist-content/0,3546,110501+112003041800031,00.html
2003.04.18 中國時報
拯救油田 我國防部參一腳
呂昭隆

美伊戰事之初，國防部曾意外插上一腳，在極機密作業下，協助美軍辨識軍用裝備，這些中共製造的軍用規格引爆器，係美軍在伊南油田找到的。據判斷，伊拉克埋設這些炸藥，原準備必要時炸掉油田。

美伊開打後，美軍地面部隊自科威特快速進入伊南，作戰目標之一是控制油田，以免遭伊軍破壞。某日，國防部參謀本部情報次長室除了例行運作，多了項特殊任務，美方透過管道傳送一些包括照片在內的文件，希望藉助國軍對中共軍事的掌握，加以辨識，並提供破解意見，由於具有高度時效性，國防部亦「即時」判讀，並回覆美方，成為這場戰事的小插曲。


據軍方相關官員透露，美方提供的「情報文件」，中共製造的爆破裝置上，能清楚識別中文簡體字，儘管這些爆破裝置是以「工程」、「開礦」等名義，由廠商經第三地輾轉到達伊軍之手，但仍可以確定這些引爆器與爆破裝備，都是軍用規格，應屬解放軍使用的裝備。

據了解，由於處於戰事之初，儘管美軍大致控制伊南油田，但戰場瞬息萬變，還是要爭取第一時間拆除伊軍埋設的引爆裝置。

而中共提供伊軍的引爆器，有的須有線引爆，有的可以無線引爆，美軍必須破解設計迴路，始能有效拆除，化解威脅。

軍方相關人士研判，美方希望我協助辦別這批引爆器，有可能同時交由數個國家或單位幫忙，以爭取時效，不一定僅由我方鑑別，唯美方並未告知過多詳情。

事實上，美國攻打阿富汗，也曾協請台灣協助提供軍事後勤裝備，台灣配合亦非常有效率。如美方曾要求提供一百輛軍用卡車，國防部初始僅同意提供五十輛，經國安會向陳水扁總統親自報告，陳總統決定就給一百輛，並且很快便裝運送出。

除了軍用卡車，據稱軍方兵工廠還連夜加班趕製火焰槍等裝備給在阿富汗美軍，不過，軍方對此一概否認。

NO:254_104
BWS 　於　2003/04/18 19:04
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

中國軍方使用的紙雷管引爆性能可觀
且含雙層起爆藥(DDNP&RDX;)
這玩意還具有規避機場X光的能力
甚至能引爆軍規主炸藥..
情治機關得小心才行..
又
之前提供給阿富汗的軍用卡車
著實讓各旅級單位物流速度減緩,美方實在獅子大開口
不過倒是便宜了賓士重車
NO:254_105
旁觀者2 　於　2003/04/18 19:13
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>據稱軍方兵工廠還連夜加班趕製火焰槍等裝備給在阿富汗美軍，不過，
>>軍方對此一概否認。

虎爛成分大了點吧 現在還有人用火焰槍

NO:254_106
BWS 　於　2003/04/18 19:23
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>>>除了軍用卡車，據稱軍方兵工廠還連夜加班趕製火焰槍等裝備給在阿富汗美軍，不過，>>>軍方對此一概否認。

猜測是化兵的連發縱火槍..
超級大左輪

NO:254_107
acetw 　於　2003/04/18 22:04
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>虎爛成分大了點吧 現在還有人用火焰槍

有啦！204廠有做67式火焰噴射器，是仿製美造M9（這可能也就是為什麼找上台灣的原因）。用膠化油的射程有45-55m，如果不考慮己方傷亡的問題，近戰倒是蠻好用的…

NO:254_108
flak 　於　2003/04/19 18:45
U-2新功能

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003Apr15445/index.htm
在接美國七名戰俘的任務中，海陸CH-46直昇機的部隊利用U-2作為通話的中繼「人」（似乎不是中繼台，而是U-2的飛行員轉述訊息），與中央指揮部聯絡。
NO:254_109
VOR 　於　2003/04/20 00:45
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)


http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u;=/ap/20030419/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_rdp_60
Iraqis Demand U.S. Withdrawal in Baghdad

該文說﹕
Australian Lt. Col. Mark Elliott said special forces found 51 MiG warplanes
at a large airfield west of Baghdad, as well as armored vehicles, anti-aircraft
weapons systems and an anti-aircraft missile system. The site also included
bunkers capable of withstanding nuclear, chemical or biological attack,
he said, and instruction manuals relating to weapons of mass destruction.

NO:254_110
VOR 　於　2003/04/20 06:11
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

一篇伊拉克陸軍第二步兵師營長的訪談:
http://search.csmonitor.com/search_content/0418/p01s03-woiq.html
From Iraqi officers, three tales of shock and defeat
In one week, a 4,000-strong unit lost 800 men.
By Scott Peterson and Peter Ford | Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor

BAGHDAD, IRAQ - As Baghdad still smolders, senior Iraqi officers are beginning to absorb the scale of their defeat - and examine what went wrong.

The day that Baghdad fell, April 9, is a date that Iraqi Army Maj. Saleh Abdullah Mahdi Al Jaburi remembers with shame. A military driver took me to my house in Tikrit, Major Al-Jaburi recalls. As soon as I got home I took my uniform off, went to my bedroom, and stayed there for five days. I was so shocked.

Faced with Americas firepower and technological superiority, three Iraqi officers - who fought in different parts of Iraq - say they never expected to win this war. But they voice dismay at the number of Iraqi errors - deployment of militia groups instead of army units, for example- and at the impact of US psychological operations.

Despite their anger, these men could prove to be the voice of a new professional Iraqi army that may emerge - with American assistance - in the aftermath of this conflict.

And they know whom to blame: Saddam Hussein and his sons Qusay and Uday made all key military decisions. We are already used to his mistakes from the Iran-Iraq war and Kuwait, says Colonel Asaad, who asked that a pseudonym be used. Every plan of Saddam was a disaster.

Iraqi armed forces had also never recovered from being pulverized in the 1991 Gulf War. You cant fight with what was left ... and this war was not just about what you learn at the military academy - it is technological, and we recognized that, says Asaad. The Army believed that from the first bullet fired by the British in the south, it would lose.

And so it came to pass. Jaburi, a lean and weary battalion commander with the Iraqi Armys 2nd Infantry Division, knew defeat was inevitable.

But we were expecting that the war would last longer than it did, he says. We were desperate when Baghdad fell so quickly. If we were not Muslims we would have done like the Japanese and committed suicide [but] ...our religion forbids it.

The war had begun in earnest for Jaburi and his men 16 days before Baghdad fell, when his division received orders to pull out from Kifri, in northern Iraq, to join the defense of Baghdad.

Moving under the cover of a dust storm, Jaburis unit made it to the northeastern outskirts of the capital with few casualties, despite US airstrikes on the road. But then, dug in, they felt the full force of American air power.

During the first week of April, Jaburi says, his 4,000-strong unit lost 800 men to massive air attacks. But the survivors stood their ground, and repelled a US Marine assault on the afternoon of Monday April 7th.

We knew that they were afraid to face us, but the fact that they had close air support encouraged them to engage us, Jaburi says. If we had had air cover or missiles I dont think the Americans would have dared enter Iraq, let alone Baghdad.

Airstrikes killed 600 more of Jaburis men on Monday and Tuesday last week. American troops were forced to retreat 12 miles to Salman Pak, he says, but the game was over. Divisional headquarters in Baghdad ordered them back to their base in the north. There was no discussion of using chemical weapons. More than half the remaining men deserted, stripping off their uniforms and heading home to protect their families. Jaburis own instincts for survival overruled his career officers sense of discipline.

Fleeing for home

When Baghdad fell so quickly, we were shocked, he says. The battle was over. We didnt know what to do and you cant judge whether it was right or wrong. Soon his commander expressed his deepest sympathy and condolences, and said we could go home.

The thought of going home also came quickly to troops under Colonel Saad, another Iraqi officer who used a pseudonym. He was based in Al Amarah, in southern Iraq near the Iranian border. On April 3 they heard that American troops had reached Baghdad. The next day, their food supply line was cut.

Soldiers started asking: Why are we using the reserve food? and on April 4 they began to run away, recalls Saad. While news of Fedayeen Saddam and tribal militia resistance against US and British forces in southern Iraq was heartening, Saad says his commander knew that it couldnt last. The mistake was relying on the Fedayeen, which he termed mercenaries.

The Fedayeen hit, but would then go back and collect their 10 million Iraqi dinar reward, Saad says. Only soldiers can hit American troops and progressively move forward.

Besides their inability to press home an attack, the Fedayeen also deployed en masse to the south, and couldnt redeploy before American forces were at the gates of the capital. Officers say that Mr. Husseins several television appearances were also a source of anger.

He only praised the divisions in the south one time, and after that praised the Fedayeen, Baath Party, and militia, and forgot to praise the Army, says Saad. That frustrated leading commanders in the war. We needed more reassurance and motivation, and he gave it only to certain groups.

Another mistake was the decision to move Republican Guard units south of Baghdad - where they could be easily targeted by American jets at Karbala, Hillah, and Al Kut. While they were moving, the Republican Guard were a target for American fighter planes and they lost a lot of men, says Jaburi. It was very easy for the Americans to enter Baghdad.

The way we fought the war was to try to damage American troops as much as possible so that the US and British people would put pressure on their leaders to stop the war, Jaburi adds.

Pressure instead was mounting on Iraqi forces, which were the subject of a building psy-ops campaign since last fall. Saad says his units had little exposure to the messages on tens of millions of leaflets dropped on Iraqi units from the air, because Mukhabarat internal security and military intelligence agents scooped them up first.

The soldiers would see them fall, but were not allowed to read them, says Saad. The Army has lots of Baath infiltrators, which kept a tight grip and collected those very fast.

Faxes to officers

Radio broadcasts warning troops not to fight and telling them how to surrender were not often heard, since few soldiers had radios, Saad says. But faxes and e-mails to commanders had a big impact - even though those lines of communication were cut some 10 days before the war began.

Of course it has an impact - if one commander receives a fax and gives it to his senior, in this simple way the officer knows of the US technical superiority, Saad says. Imagine him thinking: If the Americans are able to get into the mind of a senior commander this way, how can I protect a whole division?

In the south, the picture was complicated by the crossing over from Iran of thousands of Iraqi exile forces loyal to the Shiite Muslim cleric Mohamed Bakr al-Hakkim. It was this militia that forced Saads units in Al Amarah to retreat, he says, not the Americans.

The hit from behind is stronger, says Saad. The militia, known as the Badr Brigade confronted the Iraqis at several rear positions from Baghdad down to Basra, targeting Baath Party and regime command centers, while avoiding contact with US forces.

Along with two other officers, Saad fled the Badr advance late on April 4, and hid with a local sheikh. They changed out of their uniforms and, despite suspicions from the Iran-based militia, the sheikh swore that the officers were his relatives from Baghdad.

On April 6, every Iraqi still in uniform in Amarah was killed by Badr soldiers. Then at 5 a.m. on April 8, American troops nearby ordered that all weapons be given up within 48 hours. The Badr units disappeared, and in that gap, Saad and his two fellow officers made their way home to a capital without a defense ministry anymore.

Losses were great. Of the 700 men under Jaburis direct command, 200 died. That hurt, he said. But to lose our country was worse.

For Saad and Asaad, officers of lower rank but 22-year veterans in the Iraqi military, the possibility of a position in a US-organized national force appeals.

The Army we fought was the most advanced in the world ... and they told us to surrender, and to not lead the country to destruction, says Asaad.

If the Americans provide protection and sovereignty, and if they lead Iraq in a new direction, then our ideas [about the US] will change.

NO:254_111
VOR 　於　2003/04/20 11:29
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

此篇有點長但還不錯
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14839-2003Apr12.html
Confused Start, Decisive End
Invasion Shaped by Miscues, Bold Risks and Unexpected Successes
By Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, April 13, 2003; Page A01

-----------
http://tw.news.yahoo.com/2003/04/05/international/bcc/3915504.html
2003年04月05日
中廣新聞網
英軍將投不會爆炸的混凝土炸彈 以減少平民傷亡

英國皇家空軍的旋風戰鬥轟炸機，將使用一種不會爆炸的混凝土炸彈，攻擊伊拉克
的坦克及大砲，以減少對伊拉克平民造成的傷亡。

　　科威特分遣隊指揮官道布上校表示，這種混凝土炸彈仍然可以由衛星導引，準
確擊中目標，由於沒有爆炸的威力以及四射的碎片，將可大幅減少對平民造成的傷
亡。

　　混凝土炸彈其實就是做成炸彈形狀的水泥塊，每一枚的重量為一千磅，從高空
投下後，如果命中坦克或大砲，將可使其失去作戰能力，但不會對四周的建築物與
人員造成損害。

　　這種炸彈外表漆成藍色，如果投擲後沒有毀損，將可憑顏色認定其沒有爆破危
險。

---------
上面這篇是舊文，不過還是有參考價值。

伊拉克此次將許多武器分散部署，有的隱藏、
有些則是交給小團軍力在小城、民房附近對抗聯軍。

除了最近發現的米格戰機外，聯軍已用上述的炸彈
破壞了不少伊拉克飛機

NO:254_112
壞人 　於　2003/04/20 12:12
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

Light 兄在連線版上貼的轉載，應該是 MSN 上來的。
────

看到最近媒體上一堆軍事「專家」對美伊戰爭的評論，他們對美國軍事事務革新
都顯得一無所知，老是拿越戰以前的印象為根據來評論。下面特別轉譯一篇文章
供作參考，讓大家知道書都在那裡，只是有人都不看而已。
＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝
美國軍隊在伊拉克勝利的背後

伏列德•卡普蘭 2003年4月10日

美國軍隊什麼時候變得這麼厲害？如何變得這麼厲害？在第二次波灣戰爭中獲得
這麼快速勝利的要素已經很明顯了：部隊的靈活運用、炸彈的精準度、指揮官對
戰場狀況的即時掌控、各軍種（陸軍、海軍、空軍、陸戰隊）間非凡的協調合作
、特種部隊。但是這些要素以及其獲致的成功在過去戰爭中是前所未見的，甚至
在12年前的第一次波灣戰爭中也不存在。從那時以來，在軍事上已經有三個主要
的改變──新的作戰準則、先進的數位科技、以及較不狹隘的軍種文化。

這個新的準則是在1983年，「沙漠風暴」行動的約十年前，開始逐漸成形。當時
位於堪薩斯州李文沃斯堡的美國陸軍指參學院成立了一個為期一年的菁英高級研
究班，稱為「先進軍事研究所」。這個研究所的創始人是修巴•法斯底沙加上校
（後晉階准將），他在越戰時是親臨前敵的低層軍官，親眼目睹了那時軍事上的
災難，立志要改變陸軍的作戰思想。

1982年時，法斯底沙加已經對陸軍作戰手冊 FM 100-5 做了重大的修正，這手冊
是陸軍準則的正式文件，也是有關戰略、戰術、訓練等各種決定所依據的基礎。
這手冊的前一個版本，是在1976年由威廉•迪布以將軍修訂的，仍然使用一種消
耗戰的策略，以靜態防線對抗敵人最強的進攻矛頭，以正面突擊和優勢火力將其
擊退。法斯底沙加的版本則引進新的策略，強調靈活、速度、運動、以及對敵人
陣線後方深入打擊。在李文沃斯堡的高級研究所正是被設立來將這個新的策略引
進到陸軍各部成為緊密的信條。

到了「沙漠風暴」的時候，有一小群法斯底沙加的學生已經升到了諾曼•史瓦茲
可夫將軍中指部高層幕僚的位置上。這群自稱為「傑地武士」的軍官，設計了第
一次波灣戰爭中的地面戰策略，幾乎就是直接從法斯底沙加書中直接引用一樣──
中央正面佯攻，同時以裝甲部隊迂迴伊拉克軍隊的西面側翼，然後以多路並進從
四面八方包圍伊軍，讓它們陷入混亂，最後將其圍困並消滅。

在此同時，陸戰隊也經歷了類似的轉變。位於關第科基地的陸戰隊學院副院長麥
克•威利上校，使用一名退休的空軍上校約翰•波伊德在1979年所作的一份名為
「衝突模式」的簡報為基礎，修正了陸戰隊的作戰準則。波伊德同樣地也認為成
功的作戰需要出奇不意、欺敵、從側翼快速席捲、並且迷惑敵人行伍、製造混亂
。當時陸戰隊司令阿佛列德•格雷將軍認為自己是波伊德私淑學生，命令手下指
揮反攻科威特的軍官們，避免正面突進，以運動戰從側翼進攻。

對空軍和海軍來說，「沙漠風暴」時引進了可命中目標附近幾英呎內的精靈炸彈
。不過在「沙漠風暴」裡，投下的彈藥中只有不到十分之一是精靈炸彈，這類武
器很新又很貴（一發價格在十二萬到二十四萬美金之間），所以數量不多，而且
它們也還有不少技術問題有待克服。但是到了1999年，在科索夫行動時，精靈炸
彈已經更可靠，也更便宜（一發約兩萬美金），它們佔所有投下彈藥裡約百分之
三十。在阿富汗戰爭中，這個比例上升到百分之七十，根據這種數學推算，可以
想見在第二次波灣戰爭中這個比例會是多少。

不過在阿富汗戰爭中，有三個改變美國作戰方式的革新作法出現。首先，高科技
的精靈炸彈和高科技的指管通情真正結合起來。新一代的「獵食者」無人飛機在
戰場上空盤旋，用數位攝影機掃瞄地面景象，同時馬上將影像傳送回指揮部。指
揮官可以檢視影像，找出目標，然後命令目標區附近的飛機攻擊目標。飛機的駕
駛員會將目標座標輸入精靈炸彈的GPS接收器中，炸彈投下後會自動導引到目標
。這整個作業過程只要約20分鐘。在「沙漠風暴」時，整個發現新目標、指定攻
擊武器，然後執行攻擊的程序要花到三天之久。

美國在阿富汗使用的策略中的第二種新特點是它的確是個真正的「聯合軍種」作
戰──國防武力中一個軍種以上，同步同時被使用的作戰計畫。這方法在從前未
曾真正地被用過。在許多狀況下，在地面上的陸軍部隊，使用高科技的現代無人
飛行載具作為中繼，直接呼叫空軍飛機進行空襲。這些飛機裡面，像是B52和B1
轟炸機，原來都是在30或40年前製造來對蘇聯投擲數百萬噸級的核子彈用的。現
在它們被用來投擲2000磅級的傳統炸彈以支援地面部隊，如果讓老一代的空軍將
領看到一定會十分震驚。

在過去十年中，以寇蒂斯•李梅和戰略空軍指揮部為首的那一代將軍都已經凋零
，戰略空軍的主要敵人──蘇聯──也是一樣。同時，在90年代中，新設了一個
聯合軍種指揮部，負責推動新的準則、手冊、兵棋推演，目標在於將所有軍種整
合起來一起作戰，由一個聯合或至少「互動」的指揮結構來管制。一份在2000年
六月出版的「2020年聯合遠見」的文件強調一種「全方位控制」的策略，以便「
聯合太空、海上、陸地、空中、資訊各種戰力，以迅速、持續、同步地執行作戰
」──一種「各軍種的核心精華間的共同協力，整合成為一支聯合隊伍……構成
比各部分的總和還更優異的整體。」

紙面上的準則是一回事，實際上的行動又是另一回事。不過，新的結構和準則的
確產生了一份聯合軍種指揮部文件上宣稱的「共同的聯合作戰文化」。各軍種間
的對抗甚或憎惡產生的組織障礙逐漸地消除。當新的方法讓聯合軍種協調變得可
行，同時阿富汗戰爭的經驗顯示出聯合協調可以產生莫大效益時，各軍種的抵制
就徒勞無功了。

「沙漠風暴」作戰其實是兩場作戰──空中戰和地面戰──各自分開按順序進行。這
第二次波灣戰爭是個整體戰，同時在地面、海上、空中同步地進行。空中轟炸的
絕大部分任務──不論是空軍的轟炸機、攻擊機，抑或是海軍的戰機──都是針
對伊拉克共和國衛隊，以便替美國陸軍和陸戰隊開闢北向進攻巴格達的通路。

另一個從阿富汗戰爭開始、延續到伊拉克戰爭的新作法是有系統地將所謂的「影
子戰士」──特種部隊包括在作戰行動裡面。1986年的高華德─尼可斯法案，除
了眾所周知地給予三軍參謀聯席會主席新的權力外，也把特種部隊獨立出來成立
指揮部，有自己的預算。（在這之前，每個軍種有自己的特種作戰部門，在經費
、設備、和其他事務上都要仰人鼻息，只能接收一些殘羹剩菜。）

史瓦茲可夫將軍並不重視特種作戰，所以在「沙漠風暴」中並沒有怎麼使用他們
，只在戰爭後期派他們到伊拉克西部沙漠搜尋飛雲飛彈。在阿富汗戰爭中，這些
特種部隊是行動的重心，他們以小部隊跳傘到鄉間，設立機場，並和反抗軍領袖
接觸。經「獵食者」無人飛機傳送回司令部有關塔里班目標的情報，往往是來自
帶著一部手提電腦、以馬代步的特種部隊軍官。

我們或許將永遠無法知道在這次伊拉克戰爭中有多少特種作戰行動。很顯然地，
這些部隊在戰前數天甚或數週就已經在伊拉克首都活動，開始調查目標，跟某些
人員接觸。他們也在西部沙漠搜索飛雲飛彈並準備機場。他們也在北部出沒，訓
練庫德族戰士、確保油田。他們也可能伴隨、甚或擔任第三步兵師和第一陸戰師
的先鋒，一路從科威特打到巴格達，偵察目標並將目標位置傳送給後方司令部的
空軍指揮官們。

我們現在還無法完全知曉這次戰爭的教訓，一部份是因為它還沒結束，另一部份
則正如戰略及預算評估中心一位前陸軍軍官詹姆斯•卡拉他諾說的，「這場戰爭
百分之九十的行動都在我們可見範圍之外。」這百分之九十中的大部分都是由特
種部隊（沒有配置附屬的記者）和座落於卡達操作手提電腦的聯合軍種人員（配
有少數記者，但是他們不能接近指揮中心）所執行的。他們從戰前到戰爭中所做
的，雖然外界看不見，卻是讓這場戰爭如此驚人和新穎的主要因素。

【譯註：波伊德是美國空軍「戰機黑手黨」的核心人物，他本身是戰鬥機學校教
官，外號「四十秒波伊德」，意思可在四十秒內咬住任何敵手的尾巴，編過第一
本空戰戰術教本，後來發明「運動─能量理論」，是現代戰機設計與空戰運動的
理論基礎。「衝突模式」是他退休後轉入戰爭理論的作品，以長達六小時以上的
簡報形式來呈現。上文裡沒有提到的是，他跟法斯底沙加也很熟，「先進軍事研
究所」早期的學生也都聽過他親自上的「衝突模式」的課；還有就是在波灣戰爭
時他擔任國防部長錢尼的秘密顧問，史瓦茲可夫將軍最早的作戰計畫是正面強攻
，他發揮相當影響力將其否決，後來才有左鉤拳的出現。】

NO:254_113
flak 　於　2003/04/20 14:24
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>是在1976年由威廉•迪布以將軍修訂的，仍然使用一種消耗戰的策略，以靜態防線對抗敵
>人最強的進攻矛頭，以正面突擊和優勢火力將其擊退。
Active Defense
>法斯底沙加的版本則引進新的策略，強調靈活、速度、運動、以及對敵人
>陣線後方深入打擊。
Air Land Warfare
NO:254_114
flak 　於　2003/04/21 22:31
那個伊拉克農夫

可能使用23公釐土製超大獵槍...
At almost the same time, Williams was piloting his Apache southwest of
Baghdad, with Young manning his guns, when a 23mm cannon round split
the leather on the toe box of his left boot, burning his foot and
forcing him to land.

Many POWs saw no hope
BY JUAN O. TAMAYO
Miami Herald
April 14, 2003

NO:254_115
雪風 　於　2003/04/25 08:57
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美國現在於伊拉克正全力搜索線索希望能發現1991波灣戰爭中F-18座機被擊落失蹤的海軍
少校Michael Scott Speicher ，依據前幾年美國得到的資料及至墜機現場研判分析，當時
Speicher應該成功彈射跳傘並安全落地，而非伊拉克宣稱其已陣亡掩埋其遺體，美國政府
相信其仍被拘禁在某處。Speicher一直被美軍列為MIA(Missing in Action)，這段期間其
資歷仍繼續纍算，目前已是上校。
NO:254_116
VOR 　於　2003/04/28 15:53
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20030422-7145280.htm
Apache operation a lesson in defeat
By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-20-cover-usat_x.htm
Why U.S. casualties were low
By Dennis Cauchon, USA TODAY

NO:254_117
小毛 　於　2003/04/28 16:19
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)


>http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20030422-7145280.htm

>When the regiment from Gen. Wallaces Germany-based 5th Corps took inventory after the failed raid, at least 27 of the 34 Apaches on the mission were not flyable. The 11th Aviation Regiment, the Armys most advanced Apache unit, was no longer combat-ready.

出擊一次後幾乎全部都受傷,看來直昇機在沒有空軍支援的情況下還是很難獨撐大局.

NO:254_118
flak 　於　2003/04/28 16:36
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>出擊一次後幾乎全部都受傷,看來直昇機在沒有空軍支援的情況下還是很難獨撐大局.
反過來說，直昇機可以逼那些躲給空軍找的敵軍暴露出來。所以是可以互補不足的。
NO:254_119
吱吱鼠 　於　2003/04/28 17:37
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

＞出擊一次後幾乎全部都受傷,看來直昇機在沒有空軍支援的情況下還是很難獨撐大局.

但是有沒有被敵火摧毀？沒有。
所以那些以為直昇機無用的人可以封口了。
直昇機怕的不是有導引的防空武器，反而是無導引的防空武器。
也就是說，空軍因為區域防空飛彈看守而進不去的高強度戰場，直昇機還是能擔負起危險任務。
空軍支援直昇機是相對的，而不是絕對。

NO:254_120
小毛 　於　2003/04/28 18:04
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

>It also temporarily lost two aviators as prisoners of war. The men eventually were rescued by Marines north of Baghdad and returned to their Texas base on Saturday.

應該就是號稱被農夫打下來的那一架吧!駕駛員被俘,後來又被救出.

NO:254_121
小毛 　於　2003/04/28 18:14
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

直昇機受傷多應該就是高度與速度所造成的吧.

高度低-->所有人移的動的直射武器都可以拿來攻擊....防不勝防.

速度慢-->讓敵人可以充分捕捉到直昇機的位置與動作....無所逃於天地間.

不知道地形的影響有多大?因為不知道麥地那師所在地的地形是否也是純粹沙漠?

或許下一代的攻擊直昇機都必須要有準確的行進間攻擊的能力.

NO:254_122
小毛 　於　2003/04/28 19:20
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

從文章中說,指揮官第一次採用純直昇機攻擊的方式無功而返,第二次有了A-10相助,所以得以一舉殲滅敵大部分裝甲部隊.似乎沒有用到F-16/F-15/B1/B2/B-52等.固然伊拉克在此次幾乎是毫無空優,英美聯軍幾乎沒有空中威脅,所以A-10可以趴趴走(但是還是戰損一台).

純就這個部分來說,A-10與攻擊直昇機的搭配似乎是很理想的組合.

NO:254_123
VOR 　於　2003/04/30 15:53
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

解放軍的看法﹕

http://www.pladaily.com.cn/big5/pladaily/2003/04/30/20030430001179_World.html
伊拉克戰爭美軍操演新戰法

　　●彭光謙　鄭艷平

　　2003年3月20日，美英對伊拉克發動了軍事打擊，至4月12日攻
占巴格達，其 主要作戰行動已基本結束。在伊拉克戰爭中，美軍發
射了750枚巡航導彈，投下了 2.3万枚炸彈，其中70%是精确制導炸
彈，精确打擊達到了前所未有的程度，作戰 上呈現出与以往不同的
新特點。

　　多維一體的閃擊戰

　　在伊拉克戰爭中，美軍在先進的信息系統的支撐下，空中力量
、情報信息、 特种部隊和常規地面部隊快速行動，其作戰效能成倍
提高，以前所未有的高速度 ，對伊拉克實施了多維一體的閃電式突
擊。在這次戰爭中，美軍放棄了海灣戰爭 的做法，大幅度縮短了空
襲作戰与地面行動之間的時間差，原計划空襲開始時間 与地面行動
之間相差9小時，后由于臨時調整，地面行動反而比大規模空襲提
前了 15個小時。在地面，机械化部隊不顧翼側暴露、補給線拉長、
孤軍冒進等兵家之 大忌，以空前的高速度向前推進。擔任主攻的美
軍第3机械化步兵師長驅直入，一 天之內便推進150公里。配合地面
部隊向巴格達閃電式進擊，美軍每天出動1500架 次飛机，在使用精
确制導彈藥對伊拉克縱深實施打擊的同時，對地面部隊提供近 實時
的近距离支援，在地面部隊之前形成一道唍醑怳鶪O打擊牆㷍A既
減少了地 面部隊的傷亡，又不給伊軍以喘息之机。

　　与1991年海灣戰爭相比，這次美軍行動的要旨就是突出進攻速
度，以多兵种 ，几乎于同一時刻在空襲、地面戰和敵后的三個舞台
聯合進攻，對敵進行迅雷不 及掩耳式閃擊。美軍在伊拉克戰爭中的
唍醑怜{擊戰㷍A是美軍最近提出的𩣪� 速主宰圲@戰思想的一次
具體實踐，是美軍以信息技術為核心的新軍事變革成果 的實際應
用。它的基本內容是建立一個滿足聯合作戰需要的戰場信息网絡，
通過 這一网絡使陸、海、空、天和其他作戰力量在作戰中實現准确
的協同，以壓倒性 的速度分割、癱瘓敵作戰體系，以壓倒性的力量
實施快速決定性打擊。

　　火電一體的癱瘓戰

　　在伊拉克戰爭中，美軍把先進的信息力与強大的火力密切結
合，以高度一體 化的信息火力戰，迅速癱瘓了伊軍整個作戰體系。
早在開戰之初，美軍就把伊軍 的指揮控制系統列為首選攻擊目標。
据媒體報道，在戰爭開始前數周，美軍就用 直升机把特种部隊的精
銳小組空降到巴格達附近，任務就是對薩達姆的指揮和控 制系統實
施𢲡棜�式破坏。3月19日晚，美特种部隊潛入巴格達和薩達姆
的家鄉 提克里特，借助手提電腦入侵并關閉伊拉克的通信系統和電
力設施，切斷薩達姆 与其他高級指揮官的聯系。在開戰之后的前6
天，美軍將伊拉克的核心首腦人物、 伊軍的指揮控制系統、共和國
衛隊等列為主要打擊目標，以平均每天近300枚巡航 導彈和3000枚
精确制導炸彈的精确打擊，企圖一舉癱瘓伊軍的整個作戰體系。大
規模精确打擊使伊拉克的指揮控制系統等遭到了毀滅性打擊，伊軍
的整體防御體 系被打破，成為一個個孤立的點，根本無法頂住美英
聯軍的長驅直入。而薩達姆 為了避免電訊聯絡暴露目標和意圖，不
敢使用現代通信技術指揮作戰，并被迫采 取㨩ⅹ蒗偎s㷍B㨩⑶x
為民𡡤瑣堀N，將權力層層下放，以連、排、班為單位 各自為戰。
結果在美英聯軍強大攻勢的曎_懾𤧅U，多數人臨陣脫逃，少數的
游 兵散勇也只能進行零星抵抗。而薩達姆也因指揮和控制系統被摧
毀而失去對巴格 達的控制，最終使美軍最擔心的巴格達城市巷戰成
為一場虛惊。

　　奇正一體的特种戰

　　在伊拉克戰爭中，特种作戰与地面、空中作戰一起成為主要作
戰樣式，并表 現出小部隊打大仗的某些特征。美軍方宣稱，美特种
部隊正在伊拉克進行一場有 史以來規模最大的行動：發動影子戰
爭。特种作戰和正面戰場密切配合，這是� 自越戰以來，對特种部
隊最有創新意義的使用㷍C在2001年的阿富汗戰爭中，美 國大約部
署了6000名特种部隊，擔負著為空中精确打擊引導目標等任務。而
在伊 拉克戰爭中，美投入了上万人的特种部隊，擔負多樣化的任
務。實際上，早在開 戰前，美軍特种部隊就已大量潛入伊拉克開始
秘密的作戰行動，并磮O薩達姆政 權內有可能成為告密者的官員建
立關系㷍A搜集伊拉克各种軍政情報。來自美陸 、海、空三軍的特
种部隊遂行的主要任務，一是搜尋并摧毀伊拉克的揑舅羃L� 導彈
發射器；二是查明伊軍的防御部署情況，特別是查明、摧毀伊軍指
揮、通信 中心；三是對巴格達市內伊拉克重要領導人目標進行𢬢~
科手術式𤣳替說A并搜 集伊政府重要目標的情報；四是參与打擊伊
北部庫爾德地區一個与护穧a睻梒� 有聯系的恐怖組織，并為美英
攻打巴格達開辟北方戰線，配合對巴格達的戰略合 圍。另外，美特
种部隊還擔負著一項至關重要的任務：保護伊拉克油田。几乎在 地
面戰開始的同時，美軍特种部隊多個突擊隊即在基爾庫克、魯邁拉
等地實施机 降突襲，以阻止薩達姆縱火焚毀這些大油田。在戰爭進
入第23天后，美特种部隊 即控制了伊石油重鎮基爾庫克，几乎完整
無損地拿下了這個伊拉克最重要的石油 產區，令美高層大喜過望。
此外，在4月1日午夜，美軍𤧣拕\𥈡蟪辣丰H迅雷不 及掩耳之勢攻
入薩達姆醫院，傳奇式地營救出女兵林奇。這一消息立即傳遍全美
各地，給開戰以來士气低落的美軍和一度沮喪的美國民意打了一劑
強心針，并引 發紐約道-瓊斯指數上漲2.7%，使美特种部隊聲威大
振。
（解放軍報 2003年04月30日 第12版）

------
http://www.pladaily.com.cn/big5/pladaily/2003/04/30/20030430001072_World.html
伊拉克戰爭影響世界新軍事變革

　　●李宣良　王經國

　　据報道，美國總統布什將于近期宣布伊拉克戰爭的結束。我軍
事專家認為， 伊拉克戰爭的結局沒有出乎人們的意料，但是戰爭過
程中，美軍的戰略思想、用 兵特點、武器裝備的發展卻有許多令人
深思之處，這場戰爭將對世界范圍內蓬勃 發展的新軍事變革帶來巨
大而深刻的影響。

　　軍事科學院專家胡文龍認為，伊拉克戰爭再一次展示了美國新
軍事變革的成 果和高技術戰爭的新形態、新面貌。我們的視線現在
應該集中到這場戰爭對世界 新軍事變革的影響上來。他認為，這些
影響主要體現在以下几個方面。

　　首先，伊拉克戰爭再次証明：綜合國力是決定戰爭胜負的根本
因素，也是推 動新軍事變革的基礎。決定戰爭軍事層面胜負的因素
很多，包括戰略、戰術是否 得當，武器裝備、兵員素質、士气是否
占优等，但根本性的因素是交戰雙方綜合 國力的對比。美國的國內
生產總值約占世界的四分之一，去年的軍費預算為3000 多億美元，
相當于其他15個軍事強國的軍費總和；這一實力遠非伊拉克可比。
所 以，美英聯軍在短期內取得軍事上的胜利，也就不足為奇了。

　　胡文龍指出，這場戰爭再次証明，當今戰爭，綜合國力优則易
胜。此次戰爭 必將促使世界各國更加高度重視發展綜合國力，并在
此基礎上倡導新軍事變革， 加強自身的國防和軍隊建設。

　　其次，伊拉克戰爭再次反映了信息化戰爭的特點，將可能促使
世界新軍事變 革朝著信息化的方向加快發展。胡文龍認為，此次戰
爭是美軍的一場信息化戰爭 的試驗，美軍的信息优勢在戰爭中得到
了進一步發揮，整個戰場對美軍來說几乎 是敫璁V透明𡡤滿C在此
次戰爭中，美軍攻擊行動的目標信息獲取—傳輸—處理 —反饋作戰
平台—完成火力攻擊的整個過程只需要10秒鐘左右的時間，几乎做
到 實時。在指揮作業方面，美軍使用了數字化地圖及戰況顯示系
統，實現了大屏幕 前指揮，指揮員可以在大屏幕前及時觀察戰場動
態，實施指揮，組織協同。這些 事實充分証明了信息技術在軍事領
域廣泛應用的巨大价值。

　　他認為，就當前和今后一段時期看，信息技術將處于戰爭形態
發展的主導和 核心地位，信息化國防、信息化軍隊將是世界新軍事
變革的主要特征和各國國防 和軍隊建設的必然選擇。伊拉克戰爭使
人們進一步認識到了信息戰爭的地位和作 用，各國必將更加注重以
信息技術為先導，加強高科技在軍事領域的廣泛應用， 努力實現國
防和軍隊的現代化。

　　胡文龍認為，此次戰爭美軍雖然取得了胜利，但同時也暴露了
不少問題，世 界各國盡可根据自己的實際從中吸取教益，創新作戰
理論，建設各具特色的信息 化國防和軍隊。這些特色將集中表現在
以下三個方面：

　　一是選擇多种戰爭樣式，制定多种作戰理論。冷戰后美軍所發
動的戰爭几乎 每次都采取不同的作戰理論。1991年的海灣戰爭，突
出反映了𢬢𦴥聾丰替說B后 地面突擊、以空中打擊為主𡡤�非線
式机動戰砞p合作戰理論；1999年的科索 沃戰爭，突出反映了以空
中打擊為主的撶D對稱、非接触砞p合作戰理論；阿富 汗戰爭，則
反映了全頻譜支援的特种作戰的聯合作戰理論；此次伊拉克戰爭，
又 實踐了以直擊要害為主的空地一體聯合作戰理論。這些說明創新
作戰理論對贏得 戰爭具有重要作用，制胜的理論可以是多樣的，可
選擇的戰爭樣式也是多樣的。

　　二是更加注重消除曎啋妍g霧㷍A強化信息系統。伊拉克戰爭
總體結局雖然 沒有懸念，但其進程卻一波三折，彌漫著濃厚的曎�
爭迷霧㷍C戰爭是雙方保守 秘密的對抗，信息化系統只有适應這個
特點來發展，特別是要發展戰爭謀略對抗 系統，才能對戰爭制胜有
所助益。

　　三是從正反兩個方向發展信息化武器裝備，形成自己的𢲡孆�
　㷍C此次戰 爭中，美國的太空信息支援系統對美軍作戰起到了關
鍵的支援作用，但也曾受到 過伊拉克方面衛星干擾裝置的有效干
擾。太空信息支援系統的發展如此，其他作 戰系統也未必不是這
樣。因此，信息化戰爭攻防對抗法則將滲透到更多的領域， 更加形
式多樣。
（据新華社北京4月29日電）

NO:254_124
VOR 　於　2003/04/30 16:18
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003Apr15551/index.htm
Iraqi Freedom Proves Transformation concepts
(Source: US Army; issued April 28, 2003)

WASHINGTON --- While Operation Iraqi Freedom shouldnt be considered a model for future warfare, it has validated several Transformation concepts, an Army official said.

That Army official gave journalists a Transformation update in the form of a background (no names used for attribution) briefing April 24 at the Pentagon.

If you look at the ways wars have been fought during the past century, most have followed the World War II model where you build up massive military might, invade at a single location and then clear the area of enemy forces in a linear fashion, the official said. While Iraqi Freedom did include a time-consuming military buildup, those forces invaded in two widely separated locations and attacked key objectives rather than clearing the country on line of enemy forces.

Multiple entry points and focusing on key objectives are among several Transformation concepts used effectively during recent combat operations in Iraq, the official said. Others include: closer working relationships between special and conventional forces; true joint and combined operations at lower levels; and conducting operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

Iraqi Freedom is the first time the Army has ever conducted combat, peace-keeping, humanitarian relief and ecological cleanup operations all at the same time, the official said.

Speaking about the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the official said it would have been ideal for operations in northern Iraq had it already been operationally tested. It could have been flown in and provided the northern front more mobility and lethality than current forces have there, he said.

The Armys first Stryker BCT -- 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, out of Fort Lewis, Wash. -- is fully equipped and will undergo operational testing at Fort Polk, La. in mid-May. While much media attention is focused on the equipment technology aspect of Transformation, there is much more to it, the official said. Technology is just a Transformation enabler, he said.

Under the Transformation umbrella, the Army is considering changing its Train-Alert-Train-Deploy model for units conducting real-world operations to Train-Alert-Deploy. The current model is based upon units training day-to-day for the high-risk end of the conflict spectrum. When those units are alerted for a low-end mission such as humanitarian relief or peacekeeping, they have to learn a new set of tasks.

Changing the individual replacement system with a unit replacement one that locks everyone in for two years might free up time for units to train other tasks than those needed for combat operations. The problem the Army faces now is that with the individual replacement system, you constantly have to retrain the same tasks over and over again because you have a constant stream of people coming and going, the official said. It takes time to build effective teams and individual replacement system means teams are always being broken up in the short term, he continued.

The Army is also looking at changing discreet, specialized, stove-pipe systems and processes into networked enterprise ones. For example, when a soldier gets deployed, the unit manning report will tell the personnel system where he is. However, unless someone gets the paperwork to finance, he may not get the danger pay he is entitled to for months, the official said. With a networked system, one stop tells everyone who needs to know what is happening with the soldier, he said.

A Transformation organization change might include combined arms teams organized from within during peacetime, rather than just being formed during combat operations down to the company level, the official said.

Comparing current Army systems with the Future Combat System, the official said that being the best equipped Army in the world does not necessarily mean being the best organization. Each system has its own discrete needs in terms of parts and specialized mechanics -- meaning a massive logistics tail. With FCS built on a common carrier, the logistics tail will be smaller than the current force -- meaning more tooth or combat troops available to carry the fight to the enemy given similar-sized forces, he said.

FCS met seven joint interoperability key performance parameters the end of April. It is scheduled for fielding by 2010.

-ends-
NO:254_125
併欄 　於　2003/05/01 17:20
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

Thalamus 　於　2003/04/29 23:30

Battle Damage A-10

Check out this website. A battle damage A-10 on April 7 of 2nd Gulf War.

http://www.aircraftresourcecenter.com/

NO:254_126
6810 　於　2003/05/02 16:04
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

M1A2和英軍挑戰者二型都是第一次上戰場 有沒有這兩型加上M2布萊德雷戰損或使用報告
出爐
NO:254_127
flak 　於　2003/05/03 23:54
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

上上週的AWST介紹了美國海軍陸戰隊的航空隊

海陸航空隊的攻擊火力有F-18、AV-8B與AH-1W，由於航程的關係，通常分配為遠程打擊、中程攻擊與近距支援的任務。不過由於F-18目前沒有標定莢艙（GW1時，記得是一個部隊用IIR小牛，一個部隊用沒有雷射的夜鷹標定莢艙），所以都用JDAM執行固定目標的轟炸任務，而AV-8B的Litening II則負責機動目標獵殺任務，另外其特異的資料鍵能力也兼當地面部隊的偵搜平台。

GW2中，海陸沿路建立了多個前進加油點，大部分是利用現有的機場設施。但不論是AV-8B或直昇機都發現，通常彈藥比油先用光，所以海陸的後勤單位不停地把彈藥往前送，前進加油點被擴充成為前進基地。

AV-8B通常攻擊地面部隊下一天行程景點上的目標，而將近接支援的任務全交給AH-1W。AH-1W可以攜帶兩種新型的地獄火飛彈：高爆彈頭與FAE彈頭，高爆彈頭是為了城鎮戰設計的，會侷限它的爆炸範圍不會超過一個房間，而FAE則是要摧毀密閉空間中的一切東西，所以通常不在城鎮中使用。AV-8B另有一種內裝混凝土的特殊LGB可以用在城鎮戰。

AH-1W使用創新的行進間射擊戰術降低了目視瞄準武器的命中機率，這種戰術在開戰前沒多久才開始發展。行進間可以發射地獄火或拖式飛彈（前面提過，這兩點我是覺得很詭異）。通常的攻擊戰術是傳統的兩機戰術，長機攻擊時，僚機警戒掩護，攻擊完一輪就換手。

海陸的CH-46與CH-53也負擔了重要的運補任務，由於沙塵的關係，兩者的引擎都嚴重耗損，常常需要更換。原本CH-46應該被V-22取代的，所以多年不受到重視，但如今V-22計畫延遲，海陸就必須重新研究CH-46的壽命問題。

NO:254_128
flak 　於　2003/05/05 17:52
豹二進入伊拉克？

http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030505-99737704.htm
Germans wanted for forces in Iraq

真是熱血啊！

NO:254_129
Ghostwolf 　於　2003/05/05 22:19
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

德國和丹麥很明顯的都是屬於反戰的「老歐洲」派系,
現在戰爭都已經結束了德國還要湊什麼熱鬧? 何況
美英目前都還不讓UN恢復武器搜檢及主持戰後重建工作
(人道救援除外), 免得讓那些黃鼠狼軸心國的成員有
機可乘.
NO:254_130
VOR 　於　2003/05/06 13:53
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003May15628/index.htm
Jamming Squadron Accomplishes Mission
(Source: US Air Force; issued May 2, 2003)

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM --- After more than 220 sorties, almost 2,000 combat flying hours and more than 6,000 jammed enemy signals in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the airmen of the 41st Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron can call it a day.

As part of the 64th Air Expeditionary Wing deployed to Southwest Asia, the 41st EECS played a key role during the war by disrupting Iraqi military communications to support many operations, including the rescue of Army Pfc. Jessica Lynch.

The 41st flies the EC-130H Compass Call aircraft, and its mission is to jam unfriendly communications, making it difficult for an enemy to command and control its forces, said Lt. Col. Don Bacon, the 41st EECS commander.

We were involved with almost every major operation that went on in Iraq, the commander said. It was very demanding.

Flying over Iraq took the squadrons maintenance crews to new levels.

I think the guys found new limits in themselves because they got pushed beyond the exhaustion point, said Master Sgt. Daniel Johnson, the night-shift production supervisor. We worked 45 or 50 12-hour shifts in a row with no days off, and everybody held up really well.

The airmen held up, but maintaining some of the equipment was a challenge.

It just seemed odd that we were changing so many parts, said Senior Airman David Pazak, an aircraft propulsion craftsman. We started thinking about it and looking at the hours we were generating. We did six months of maintenance in a four-week period.

During the war, the unit worked 24-hour operations launching an aircraft approximately every eight hours, said Maj. Steven Weld, the maintenance flight commander.

It just didnt seem to end, he said. Constantly, maintenance had to be done.

We always had a plane to give them, said Senior Master Sgt. Duncan Tanaka, the maintenance superintendent.

Maintainers turned the planes over to the aircrews who then ventured into the not so friendly skies.

We typically fly (on) the friendly side, jamming deep into the enemy side, Bacon said. Here we flew way forward, and that was a little bit stressful.

We were seeing unguided missiles flying by... and thats not something were used to.

It keeps you on the edge of your seat knowing that there were people down there who would love to shoot you down, said Lt. Col. Brad Byrd, the squadron operations officer who flew during the conflict in what were typically 13-hour missions.

To add to the challenges, the unit also dealt with last-minute mission changes, such as one received April 1 diverting them to the Nasiriya area of Iraq from their original mission.

We werent told what the mission was, Bacon said. Just jam any Iraqi stuff in that region.

The next day we heard that Private Lynch was rescued in Nasiriya.

A senior official at the combined air operations center later contacted 41st EECS officials and told them you guys did a great job, you had a direct impact on the mission, Bacon said.

After a nearly six-month deployment that started in November, airmen from the 41st EECS are proud of their accomplishments and are happy to be returning home to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz. (ends)

---------

Gauntlets Put Hussein Regime Assets In HARM𠏋 Way

(Source: US Navy; issued May 3, 2003)

ATSUGI, Japan --- The Gauntlets of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 136 aircrew returned to USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) after a successful combat mission that included firing their High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) in defense of coalition forces.

This was the first employment of a HARM by the Gauntlets in seven years. Despite the long absence between live fires, the expertise and professionalism at the heart of the successful HARM shot came through.

VAQ-136 flew more than 500 hours and 105 combat missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom. They launched a total of six HARMs before their work was done in the Arabian Gulf.

㜁e put our game faces on,� said Aviation Ordnanceman 3rd Class Ricardo Ramirez, as he described the serious response the squadron had to the demands of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Gauntlet aviation ordnancemen (AO) loaded �84 HARMs, performed 725 arming and de-arming evolutions, and 232 chaff and wire checks,� said Chief Aviation Ordanceman Randall Mills.
Mills also noted the contributions of Aviation Technicians and augmenters in loading operations, as the 700 pound missiles were transported from Kitty Hawks 弎omb farm� to numerous Gauntlet𠏋 EA-6B aircraft several times a day.

Each Gauntlet aircrew member became HARM shooters during Operation Iraqi Freedom and appreciate the outstanding work done by the AOs.

孏here was never any doubt in my mind that the missile would work successfully,� said Lt. j.g. Brendan Stickles.

Although a HARM is the most visible offensive portion of a Prowler AO𠏋 job, their work with numerous defensive systems, such as chaff, flares and generic expendable decoys, was equally important to mission success.

VAQ-136 aircraft were repeatedly engaged by Iraqi rockets, anti-aircraft artillery fire, and surface-to-air missiles during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and relied upon their defensive systems to return to Kitty Hawk safely.

Despite the long hours and extraordinary demands, the Gauntlet ordnancemen responded with teamwork and dedication that exemplifies Sailors of the forward-deployed naval force.

NO:254_131
VOR 　於　2003/05/07 12:36
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

美國官員說的話頗有孫子兵法形篇的味道﹕
「古之所謂善戰者，勝於易勝者也。故善戰者之勝也，無奇勝，
無智名，無勇功。故其戰勝不忒。不忒者，其所措必勝，勝已敗
者也。故善戰者，立於不敗之地，而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先
勝而後求戰，敗兵先戰而後求勝。善用兵者，修道而保法，故能
為勝敗之政。」

對照某欄一些人對美軍勝利嗤笑的態度，倒是形成一個
很有趣的對比。

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/04283iraq.xml
The Pentagons Force-Transformation Director Comments On What Worked And What Didnt In Iraq
By David Fulghum

Despite a stunningly incompetent defense by the Iraqi military, there are important lessons to be drawn from the conflict, says the Pentagons top force-transformation official.

Clearly those Russian advisers that [worked for Saddam Hussein] thought he had the wherewithal to mount a robust defense, said Arthur K. Cebrowski, the Pentagons director of the Office for Force Transformation. Instead, major fighting was over in less than a month. We create the appearances of an incompetent defense by being good, he said. Its like watching a well-rehearsed football or basketball team. They make it look easy. Thats the phenomenon you want. The U.S. and British forces moved around a noncontiguous battlefield very much faster than anyone expected.

Lessons learned documents have yet to be compiled, much less analyzed and publicly discussed; however, areas of interest are already emerging.

There also are at least three lessons in the context of grand strategy, Cebrowski said. Great power politics are anachronistic. Instead, the world is divided among those who want to join in globalization and those who remain disconnected. Disconnectedness is emerging as one of the great signals of danger. The department is going to have to pay attention and posture forces near such areas.

The U.S. military will adopt a policy of continuous change and the broadening of capabilities and options. Other people study us and they adapt, Cebrowski said. The two Russian generals who apparently advised the Iraqis were posturing for something that would have looked like the first gulf war. Thats exactly what we wanted them to do. I dont mind generals planning for the last war so long as they are all on the other side.

The growing implementation of network-centric warfare--what is destined to be a very long process--is shifting the sources of power. Were going to see a new air-land dynamic. Its as if we discovered a new sweet spot . . . through the tighter integration of those. The process will be driven by better sensors, good networked intelligence, high-speed decision-making and the ability to exploit the noncontiguous battlefield, the battlefield without a front. You cant do the noncontiguous battlefield if you are not networked, he said. Most affected, he predicted, will be artillery support, close-air support and aerial battlefield interdiction. The comfort level for [the use of] all indirect fires is going up, he said. You see a new interdependency emerging.

Lessons in the tactical arena appear to include the lessening importance of helicopters on the battlefield, the increasing value of special forces skills, an absence of joint planning in several areas, the accelerating speed of command and control, a lack of strategic mobility and the growing importance of intelligence, he said. There are signs that military transformation is taking hold. The U.S. was able to surprise a foe that had about a year and a half to prepare for an attack and had hired Russian military advisers to restructure Iraqs defenses. Cebrowski highlighted other areas of interest:

* Special forces. The broad strategic thrust of the nation is to move from being reactive to being preventative, Cebrowski said. You have to be engaged around the world. The general rule is that small forces with a depth of local knowledge have more power than very large formations that come from [elsewhere]. Thats been a strength of special operations forces. SOF also has ease of insertion and specialized skills. The question becomes, do you buy more SOF, or can you pull some of those characteristics into the rest of the force? I think well find the [latter] is the preferred alternative. The summary answer to what the U.S. needs is more SOF-like forces, a higher ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] fraction and more focus on the weapons of mass destruction problem.

* Information operations. A dictator cant trust his information, said Cebrowski. Therefore, Saddam Hussein had to personally script the whats and whens of the war, and even then he doesnt know if people will carry them out. Knowing this, the U.S. ensured that Saddam Hussein had no feedback loop about what was happening on the battlefield or even the activities of his own troops. U.S. specialists had identified these weaknesses before the war and exploited them, he said.

* Network-centric warfare. Theres a large collection of programs that, when cobbled together in a useful way, are meant to yield network-centric capabilities, Cebrowski said. But there is a pronounced weakness in connectivity at the tactical level. What will be interesting [in analyzing combat in Iraq] are the differences in performance and tactics by people who were well connected at the tactical level, versus those who were not. Another question is who behaved differently and who reached for different tactics because they were well connected.

* Joint planning. The Pentagon will ask the military departments to identify their interdependencies as a way to ensure operational coherence. Theres a lot of work that has to be done [in codifying joint endeavors], Cebrowski said. We didnt find . . . such things as the joint operational concept, a joint transformational road map [or] a road map that integrates all the agencies. We didnt see a transformation road map for lift or for logistics that was integrated into an operational concept. Theres a lot to be unsatisfied about.

* Strategic mobility. There were few innovations in strategic lift. We think we need . . . to merge inter- and intra-theater lift, Cebrowski said. Two areas that look very exciting to transformation officials are very high-speed sealift (80+kt.) and airships. The latter is expected to lift 500-1,000 tons at speeds of more than 100 kt. The technology also is expected to have a major impact on the nations civil transportation structure.

Another missing element was the wholesale use of operational maneuvers from strategic distances or from the sea. The big moves were from forward garrisons in Kuwait. However, analysts did see strategic movement of smaller units directly to their objectives; these included the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit from amphibious assault ships and the 173rd Airborne Brigade from Italy.

* Helicopters. We didnt see a very vertical battlefield [in Iraq] in terms of heavy helicopter lift, Cebrowski said. In rougher terrain, it might have been a crucial factor, so we have to be careful to not learn the wrong lessons about tactical mobility, he said. Were going to watch very carefully the developments such as the Boeing [unmanned] canard rotor. Were going to be looking at very heavy-lift helicopters. As to the vulnerability of attack helicopters, the question will be whether it was a result of the aircraft, the mission or the tactics used. My guess is that its going to be the tactics, he said. Early reports from the battlefield say the Army used its gunships as an independent maneuver force and hovered to fire, which subjected them to heavy ground fire, while Marine attack helicopters suffered less damage by operating with artillery and fixed-wing aircraft support, and adopting the tactic of shooting on the move.

NO:254_132
VOR 　於　2003/05/07 12:44
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

此篇說明了共和國衛隊的下落
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030512-449441,00.html
What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?
A TIME investigation suggests most of the elite Iraqi forces survived the U.S. bombardment
By TERRY MCCARTHY I HINDIYAH

Sunday, May. 04, 2003
During their onslaught against the Republican Guard in the southern approaches to Baghdad, U.S. military commanders had grim words to describe what they were doing to the elite Iraqi forces. I find it interesting when folks say were softening them up, Air Force Lieut. General T. Michael Moseley, the air-war commander, said on April 5, the day the U.S. Army entered Baghdad. Were not softening them up. Were killing them. Later on, in its assessment of the damage the U.S. had wrought, the Pentagon focused on devastation to the Guards armor, concluding, for example, that all but two dozen of their 800 tanks had been destroyed or abandoned. But a central mystery of the war remains: What happened to the people, the thousands of Republican Guard soldiers arrayed outside Baghdad who were subjected to the full wrath of the most powerful military on earth?

TIME set out to answer that question by traversing the two rough arcs along which the Republican Guard were deployed south of Iraqs capital. Our reporters focused on seven battlefields: Hindiyah, Hillah, Kut, Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah, Suwayrah and Dawrah. They surveyed the aftermath of the fighting, inspected graveyards, visited hospitals and interviewed eyewitnesses. They also spoke to Republican Guard survivors about their escape and the fates of their comrades. The evidence that TIMEs team collected indicates that relatively few members of the Republican Guard were actually killed in the fighting. According to the accounts, the Iraqi forces for the most part survived aerial bombardments by keeping their distance from their armor, which U.S. pilots targeted with great precision. Then as U.S. ground troops approached, the Republican Guard generally fled. Many of them appear to have acted on their own, motivated by fear and self-preservation. In Baghdad, according to a high-ranking Republican Guard officer interviewed by TIME, troops were actually instructed to desert. This may help explain why the members of the Special Republican Guard, deployed within Baghdad as the Iraqi regimes ultimate defenders, put up virtually no resistance to the American takeover of the city, as they felt the entire elite-forces structure collapsing around them.

Saddam Hussein must have known that the Republican Guard could not stop the advance of the U.S. military on Baghdad, but he might have imagined it could slow the onslaught. As U.S. forces swept through Iraq from Kuwait, the Iraqi command deployed four divisions鍟he Baghdad, Medina, Nebuchadnezzar and Hammurabi珦outh of the capital in two defensive arcs. The outer arc, about 100 miles long, stretched roughly from Karbala to Kut. The inner one, some 30 miles long, extended from Yusufiyah to Suwayrah. Just how many troops this involved is unclear. On paper, each of the four divisions had roughly 10,000 men, but according to U.S. intelligence, all were undermanned. Pentagon officials and outside experts estimate that the Republican Guard forces arrayed south of Baghdad that clashed with invading U.S. troops totaled somewhere between 16,000 and 24,000 men.

For the most part, the U.S. hit these forces first from the air. In many cases, drones were used to locate Iraqi armor, then bombers were called in to destroy it. Of the 28,000 bombs and missiles that American pilots dropped during the war�70% of which were smart㻡bout half were directed against the Republican Guard. Judging from the look of the battlefields today, the bombing was largely surgical. In the open market in Mahmudiyah, five tanks were hit from the air while they were parked in alleyways so narrow that their gun turrets could not be turned. The storefront windows a few feet away were blown out, but otherwise the surrounding buildings are intact. In some cases, the Iraqis attempted to hide tanks and trucks from U.S. planes by parking them underneath freeway overpasses, and even though the vehicles were destroyed by laser-guided munitions that entered from the side, the bridges above were untouched. In other places, trucks lie demolished under scorched trees; the Iraqi soldiers apparently did not realize that palm fronds hide nothing from modern thermal-imaging devices.

These attacks surely killed some Iraqi soldiers who happened to be in or near vehicles when they were hit. But locals in the fighting zones say much of the bombed-out machinery that they came across had few or no corpses inside. Iraqi soldiers learned not to sleep near their vehicles and to construe any sign of a U.S. air raid鍟he appearance overhead of a drone, the sound of a plane or the sudden explosion of a nearby tank㻡s a prompt to take cover. In Mahmudiyah, for instance, the commander of a 150-man Republican Guard unit ordered his troops to leave their tanks in the market and prepare to confront U.S. forces on foot. The commander𤪔ed be dead if hed stayed in those tanks, says Hadi Abid, 47, a worker who watched the scene unfold from a nearby hill.

Not everyone got away. Outside Yusufiyah, five members of the Republican Guard had dug in to face G.I.s moving north. As soon as U.S. warplanes circled overhead, says eyewitness Mashan Shareef, the soldiers lost heart and bolted from their positions, but all five were killed in the bombing. Local residents buried them in shallow graves and hung their dog tags from sticks thrust into the mounds to identify them for searching relatives.

The Pentagon had made clear before fighting began that while it hoped to spare the lives of ordinary soldiers in the Iraqi army, since they would be needed to stabilize the country after the war, U.S. forces would seek to kill Republican Guard units that did not surrender. But the U.S. wielded its sword so deftly that relatively little carnage remained. The battlefields south of Baghdad are pocked with relatively few of the craters that would have been produced by the carpet bombing of masses of soldiers. Instead one finds blown-out tanks and other vehicles, usually standing alone.

The Republican Guard probably tried to keep its armor dispersed珦o U.S. pilots could not destroy it efficiently𨫎ith the idea of grouping it at the last moment to face U.S. ground forces. The Iraqi troops never had that chance, since their armor was destroyed before U.S. tanks arrived. The Iraqi commands plan to bog down the Americans in ground fighting was doomed from the start, says Karim, a colonel who spent 21 years in the Republican Guard and does not want to reveal his real name. They forgot that we are missing air power. That was a big mistake. U.S. military technology is beyond belief.

Despite the frightening display of American air power, many Republican Guard continued to linger in their assigned areas. One motivation: under Saddam, deserters, when caught, were typically punished by execution or by having an ear cut off. The final kick that collapsed the Republican Guard, according to TIMEs sources, was the approach of U.S. ground troops. In Mahmudiyah, Ali Mohammed, 50, an accountant, observed an officer ordering 20 of his men to head into town to confront the advancing Americans. As they marched forward, he stripped off his uniform, revealing civilian clothes underneath, and fled in the opposite direction. When the soldiers realized what had happened, they too turned and fled. Mohammed says he spoke to one of them later. He said they were not fighting for the country but for the regime, says Mohammed. He wasnt willing to risk his life for one man. In various cities, locals say soldiers who didnt have street clothes tried to buy or beg them from residents. Says Najah Mohamad, 29, a driver at the fire station in Hindiyah: One soldier called Ali came to me and offered his AK-47 in exchange for a shirt and pants. I told him I only had the clothes I was wearing.

Karim was part of a force sent to Dawrah, 10 miles south of Baghdad, to replace about 150 Republican Guard troops who had fled. He was horrified to discover that his troops lasted less than 24 hours. The morning after they were sent to Dawrah, he says, they heard the U.S. had two tanks in Yusufiyah. That is seven miles away. So they dropped their weapons, changed their clothes and ran. Out of 105 men, only four remained. You could see the collapse on each of our faces, he recalls. Embittered, Karim and the three others returned to their homes in Baghdad. In the first Gulf War, demoralized Iraqi forces surrendered to Americans en masse in Kuwait. This time they were in their own country and simply headed home. In many cases a lack of direction prompted the Republican Guard to call it a day. Azed, a captain who says hes too embarrassed by his performance on the battlefield to give his real name, says his unit of the Hammurabi division received an order to retreat from Suwayrah on the night of April 5, after two days of pounding by American planes. As Azeds men prepared to pull back, they waited for orders about where to regroup. But the orders never came. Their senior officers had disappeared. So Azed, along with his fellow soldiers, shed his uniform and began walking toward Baghdad, carrying a white handkerchief in his hand.

In Baghdad, according to a high-ranking officer in the Republican Guard, soldiers were even directed to give up. The officer told TIME that on April 6, three days before Baghdad fell, he was dispatched to resupply various commanders in the capital. During his rounds, he says, I saw with my own eyes a group of high-ranking officers moving through different units, asking them to leave their arms aside and go back home. He says he saw staff colonels and staff brigadiers whom he did not recognize telling antiaircraft units not to use weapons against enemy airplanes.

To some extent, it seems, U.S. psychological operations were effective. By dropping leaflets on Iraqi positions and calling and e-mailing commanders, the U.S. tried to convince Iraqs military that it was in their interest not to put up a fight. As we had access to leaders, we spoke with them and said, You need to make a choice here, says U.S. Army Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, chief spokesman for the U.S. Central Command in Doha, Qatar. Those that made the choices will have an opportunity to live another day. Those who did not did not survive the operations.

The landscape south of Baghdad bears evidence of fighting that never happened. Along the sides of roads are thousands of recently constructed earthwork bunkers, trenches and sandbagged gun emplacements, all facing south. Inspection showed that almost none have spent shell casings, cartridges, scorch marks or any of the other normal detritus of war. If they did hold soldiers at any time, the men had left before any shots were fired by or at them. In some places there are still signs of hasty departures: along the roadsides, discarded uniforms and berets; in buildings, scattered maps, manuals and gas masks.

That many Republican Guard troops had simply given up became clear to U.S. forces even as they marched toward Baghdad. For instance, the day after the Marines passed through the outskirts of Kut with unexpectedly light fighting, despite the supposed presence of the Medina division, they started running into long lines of young men walking on the road. There is no doubt these are the Republican Guard we didnt come up against yesterday. They all have military haircuts, Marine Lieut. Colonel Bryan McCoy told a TIME correspondent that day. After U.S. forces began arresting men wearing combat boots, deserters tended to sport bare feet or cheap new sandals.

The presence of Republican Guard survivors, of course, did not preclude the possibility that thousands of their comrades were lying dead elsewhere. But the accounts of locals do not suggest a high death toll among the Republican Guard. In many places, civilian fatality rates were higher. In the temporary cemetery that Dawrah residents had dug in a grove of palm trees, there are 34 graves, but only six to 10, locals say, are for soldiers. In Mahmudiyah, Daoud Jassim, the hospital deputy director, says 50 bodies were brought to the hospital from fighting on April 3, but more than half were civilians. In Hindiyah, Najah Mohamad, a fire-truck driver who also functions as the body washer at a local Shiite mosque, says the bodies of nine soldiers were brought to him on April 3. They were buried behind the mosque, but seven of the plots are now open because the mens families came to disinter the deceased and take them back to their hometowns.

U.S. commanders dont seem especially bothered by the notion that large numbers of Republican Guard have escaped alive. Many of them may, in fact, go home and rejoin society without any issues, Army Major General Stanley McChrystal, vice director for operations on the Joint Staff, said last month. Brigadier General Brooks has acknowledged that some members of the Republican Guard may return as guerrillas to harass U.S. troops. We dont think all thats going to just disappear, he said, but theres no way to account for how many made the decision to just walk off the battlefield and never fight again.

Those survivors who spoke to TIME are in anything but a fighting mood. They seem too occupied with absorbing their fate to plot a next move. Says Karim, the colonel: This is very bitter. I am 39. I was brought up with Saddams regime. I may not have liked it, but I had plans鍟o buy a house㻡nd suddenly everything changed. The future is dark. Azed, the captain who ran from Suwayrah, sits in his uncles house in Baghdad, smoking cigarettes and drinking tea. What happened shocked everyone, he says. We had heard about the resistance from the regular forces in Basra, and so we thought that surely the Republican Guard would be even tougher. But we never fought. I am ashamed of what happened, he says, waving a hand in front of his face as if to wipe away the memory.

𦂤ith reporting by Brian Bennett/Baghdad, Jim Lacey/Hillah, Simon Robinson/Kut, Mark Thompson/ Washington and Michael Weisskopf/ Mahmudiyah

NO:254_133
VOR 　於　2003/05/07 12:53
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

空軍觀點

Journal of Air force Association
http://www.afa.org/magazine/May2003/0503deserttriumph.asp
Aerospace World Special: Gulf War II
Desert Triumph
By John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor

-------

http://www.afa.org/magazine/May2003/0503road.asp
Aerospace World Special: Gulf War II
The Road to Victory
By Adam J. Hebert, Senior Editor

NO:254_134
VOR 　於　2003/05/07 13:01
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

真恐怖, 他的意思是有 98% 的妥善率嗎﹖
http://www.af.mil/stories/123004760.shtml
Focus yields 98 percent mission-capable rate
by Master Sgt. Scott Elliott
Air Force Print News

--------
有趣﹗原來英國人反對 Shock & Awe
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,5944-666389,00.html
Britain reined in US military𠏋 shock and awe strategy
By David Charter and Michael Evans

-------
最近常看到的傳聞, 滿誇張的﹕叫空軍老鳥去管陸軍﹖
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2900-2003May1.html
Air Forces Roche Picked to Head Army
Surprise Decision Is Viewed as Continuation of Rumsfelds Attempt to Revamp Service
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, May 2, 2003; Page A29

NO:254_135
VOR 　於　2003/05/07 13:06
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

此篇有不少有關空軍的具體數據及描述

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/f1602283.xml
F-16s Attacked From Jordon, Despite Denials
By David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall

A large number of U.S. strike missions to suppress military activity in western Iraq were quietly launched from an airbase in eastern Jordan, despite that governments denial that U.S. forces there carried out offensive military operations against Iraq.

Publicly, Jordans leaders said they were not a party to the conflict and there was no activity from inside their country against Iraq. The U.S. presence was limited, they said, to several hundred troops, most of whom manned Patriot air defense missile batteries.

Of particular concern to U.S. planners were moving targets around or in the Scud boxes along the border with Syria. Scud boxes are pre-measured launch areas in Iraq from which a Scud could be fired with some hope of hitting Tel Aviv or other large targets in Israel.

A total of 24 F-16s, equipped with advanced Litening II targeting pods and GBU-27 laser-guided bombs, along with their pilots and ground crews, were pulled from the Colorado, District of Columbia and Alabama Air National Guards for the assignment, according to one of the pilots involved and a senior Air Force official. Such amalgamations are called Rainbow units, and this one served as the 120th Expeditionary Fighter Sqdn., under the 410 Air Expeditionary Wing. Officials of the D.C. Air National Guard would only say that pilots and ground crews from their 113th Wing were at a classified location in the Middle East.

Pilots and ground crews have begun returning home after flying 700 sorties. In addition to preventing Scuds from being fired into Israel, they supported ground operations in the occupation of the H-1, H-2 and H-3 airfields in Iraq as well as participating in the battles for Baghdad and Al Qaim. The latter, near the border with Syria, was one of the last strongholds for organized Iraqi defense. During the fighting, an associated HH-60-equipped combat search and rescue unit shifted its operational site forward from Jordan to Iraqs H-1 base much nearer Baghdad.

The Pentagon also went to its bag of tricks to more rapidly translate reconnaissance imagery into targeting data. A highlight was the use for targeting of the lone Global Hawk unmanned aircraft operating out of the United Arab Emirates. Global Hawk missions were controlled from Beale AFB, Calif., the home base for the unmanned aircraft. Beale also provided analysts who undertook detailed studies of the imagery.

A unit of the Nevada Air National Guard, however, took the lead in identifying time-sensitive targets. Its members translated the information into targeting-quality data. Using Internet chatroom communications, coordinates derived from Global Hawk imagery were immediately provided to planners at the Coalition Air Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, who directed the air strikes. Air Force officials were able to complete the process from intelligence collection to strike in less than 15 min.

One group of targets found by the high-altitude UAV was the Medina Republican Guard division. The units vehicles were still in their revetments. Air Force strike planners were able to direct a wave of B-52s and B-2s that destroyed much of the division. In another case, Global Hawk first spotted its targets and then remained overhead to provide post-mission battle damage assessment.

Global Hawks synthetic aperture radar was the primary sensor for targeting, in part because sandstorms and weather at times encumbered the performance of electro-optical and infrared sensors. Turn time for the single high-altitude UAV was often as short as 8 hr., although generally there was about a day between missions.

Navy officials are getting the first serious feedback on the performance of some of the new equipment they deployed to the Persian Gulf. For instance, the USS Nimitzs F/A-18Fs made their combat debut and operated the Sharp reconnaissance pod. The pod has been used extensively since Nimitz began operations. Reports from deployed forces indicate the system has been working well, with the infrared camera in particular performing better than expected. The one difficulty for pilots has been that they didnt have much time prior to deployment to familiarize themselves with the new reconnaissance tool, leading to instances where the equipment wasnt used correctly.

Other unsung participants in the Iraq conflict were the U.S. Air Force B-1 heavy bombers. Theyve flown only about 2% of the total sorties, but dropped about 50% of the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), a total of more than 2,100 bombs weighing more than 4 million lb. The bombers each carried 24 of the 1-ton weapons, usually split between penetrators with 25 millisecond delay fuzes and standard bombs that explode on contact. In the second mission to attack senior Iraqi leadership, a B-1 dropped two of each on two aim points within 12 min. of being notified of its assignment.

The bombing effort, at its height, involved 6-7 sorties per day over Iraq and one over Afghanistan. The aircraft, often described as flying artillery, could loiter over the battlefield for up to 8 hr. They were considered so important that the Central Commands air component commander, Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, personally managed the B-1s scheduling because of the limited number of them, according to those involved. With the halt of major attacks on Apr. 8, the sortie rate has dropped to two Iraq and one Afghan missions per day. The long endurance patrols are now being flown by a mix of B-52s, B-1s and F-15Es.

Out of a total of 36 B-1B combat coded aircraft, 10-12 were flown from Oman (Ellsworth AFB, S.D., contingent) to support missions in Iraq and Afghanistan while another 12 served as part of a forward deployment to Guam (Dyess AFB, Tex.) to support any possible military emergency in Korea. Another 12 bombers were used for training in the U.S. with another dozen involved in various inspection and modification programs. The rest are in the process of being retired, but budget talks are afoot to keep another 7-9 B-1s out of storage in order to beef up the force.

Currently there arent enough heavy bombers to support 10 air expeditionary forces without using the B-1s and B-52s interchangeably. Heavy bomber advocates say such a plan doesnt take into account the differences in aircraft capability such as speed and survivability. Operational planners recommend that six B-1s and six B-52s be assigned to each AEF. That would require roughly 96 of each bomber type, substantially more than the 67-69 B-1s that will be available.

B-1 operators expect the B-1 to fare well--particularly for persistence over the battlefield and responsiveness to time-sensitive targets--in the lessons learned studies done on the Iraqi conflict. Using the post-war goodwill among operational planners as leverage, they hope to gain funding in the 2006 budget for several upgrades to the B-1. They are:

* The Link 16 and Fully Integrated Data Link is needed to send complicated targeting and command and control data to the aircraft. During the Iraq fighting, coordinates were sent by voice. All four crewmen recorded the information and then compared notes for accuracy. The offensive and defensive coordinators then manually punched in coordinates and double-checked the displayed numbers for accuracy. Automating the process could slice additional minutes from response times.

* Radar upgrades are needed to improve the current system, which has only a 10-ft. resolution. The heart of the F-16 Block 60s electronically scanned array will be installed in the B-1s radar to give it a 1-ft. resolution.

* Defensive Electronic Countermeasures upgrade to replace the current IDECM (ALQ-161) with a cheaper, better system, possibly a derivative of the countermeasures package developed for the F/A-18. The Air Force recently terminated an effort to upgrade the bombers self-protection, but advocated its eventual revival. The enhancement would provide better accuracy about where threats are positioned or coming from and enable improved targeting of defensive weapons like the miniature air-launched interceptor or decoy or Joint Standoff Weapon that search out radar emitters.

* Forward Looking Infrared sensor that could be carried externally on the bomber for improved nighttime, target identification and laser-targeting capabilities. Crews are asking for the Litening II pod like that already installed on two B-52s that allowed them to designate for high-precision laser-guided bombs. The added capability would provide for an operational payload of 12 Joint Standoff Attack Missiles carried externally for penetrating well-defended targets and 24 JDAMs carried internally on three rotary launchers.

* Adoption of the 250-lb. small smart bomb (SSB) loaded in a four-pack canoe from the F/A-22 program or development of a B-1-specific SSB six-pack that can be loaded onto each of the eight weapons stations on each rotary launcher. The number of weapons involved (96 or 144) would mean the need to adopt automatic targeting or pattern management systems, for example, to strike moving convoys.

An initiative already underway as part of the Block E upgrades, to be fielded in 18-24 months, would allow the bomber to carry mixed loads of weapons and simultaneously launch them from different bays, for example, JDAMs, joint air-to-surface standoff missiles and wind- corrected munitions dispensers.

NO:254_136
VOR 　於　2003/05/07 13:14
Re:2003 波斯灣戰爭: 武器戰術討論 (5)

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