If the destroyer action in Narvikfjord was a bayonet fight then I guess sending in the Warspite would have been the equivalent of bringing a tank into a bayonet fight.

It is worth noting how Warburton-Lee did exactly what Mikawa failed to do at the First Battle of Savo Island and Kurita failed to do at Samar - namely get the transports. You have to know what is the critical objective of any mission and do what it takes to achieve it - everything else does not matter.

事實上, 寫這些東西是小弟的自我挑戰, 老戰史比較少有人注意...
做做拋磚引玉的工作^^

個人看法, 派重戰車(HMS Warspite)進入小巷子(峽江)打巷戰, 太冒險了...
派中戰車(CA)或輕戰車(CL)可能更有效,
更何況重戰車的HE不足, 用AP打DD...效果肯定不佳

的確, 三川(?)未能在薩沃島夜戰中痛扁美澳聯軍後,
趁勢橫掃幾乎毫無保護的美國運輸船團......是極大的失策, 只拿到戰術性的勝利
(據說後來他被山本五十六責備......)

同樣的, 栗田未能趁勢橫掃美國的護航航母群, 再攻擊脆弱的登陸船團......
也是極大的失策; 致使小澤的自我犧牲誘敵變成白白犧牲

就個人看法, 栗田應該是經數天的極大壓力後, 忽然於戰鬥中裹足不前(崩潰???)
(他的旗艦被美國潛艇魚雷擊沈, 他好不容易才慶得生還...)

至於三川...個人不太瞭解他當時在想啥??? (害怕天亮後被空襲...?)

英國海軍的中低層軍官, 的確是相當的積極進取,有時甚至於可說是膽大妄為...
記得1982年英阿福島戰爭時,一艘22級巡防艦的艦長(忘記是哪艘了...)
曾說: 打仗就是要狂狷進取, 保守持重是低能!!! ^^

Sending Warspite into Narvikfjord was risky but achieved absolute surprise and overwhelming force - two critical things for victory. As the SAS motto goes - who dares wins! There was an so-called time critical opportunity that may not last and they went in with what was available. Actually, the risk was mitigated somewhat but Warspite having her own air cover. Her Swordfish floatplane was able to scout ahead and actually sank a U-boat in the fjord.

Mikawas excuse was his formation lost coherence in the confused night action. USS Quincy also hit the Chokai with two salvos, wrecking a turret and the chartroom. Did he lose his nerve? Maybe. Clearly, he was more concerned about preserving his force than achieving the ultimate mission. Daylight would have brought US air attacks. However, had the US transports been wrecked, the Guadalcanal campaign would have been very different - especially for the U.S. Marines. The Japanese had one chance and they blew it. Tactical consideration of force preservation got in the way of the strategic objective. Even so, Mikawa did lose one of his cruisers - to Dinty Moore in the old submarine S-44.

Certainly, the dunking Kurita had from the Atago courtesy of McClintock and the USS Darter has been cited as a reason for his lack of aggressiveness. However, credit should also go to the tenacious attacks by Capt Thomas destroyers and destroyer escorts screening Taffy III as well as the escort carrier aircraft. The sacrifice of USS Hoel, Johnston and Samuel B Roberts demonstrated great courage and initiative - again at a lower level. The greatest damage was done by the escort carrier aircraft which sank three heavy cruisers. Such was the ferocity of the action, Kurita thought he had run into the fleet carriers and heavy escorts of Halsey s Task Force.

I think the Royal Navy officer you were referring to was Capt. Hart-Dyke, co of HMS Coventry. He was a little too aggressive and lost his ship. It didn t help that he called off the Sea Harrier CAP when attacked just so that his Sea Darts could get a chance to score kills. He only got off one missile - it missed and two Argentine A-4s sank his ship. The Sea Harriers would have had a better chance of downing them.

確實如此!!! ^^

那幾艘美國DD及DE的勇戰, 我想連對驅逐艦運用極為自負的日本海軍, 都不得不佩服!!!
衝到5吋炮打得到日本戰鬥艦的上層建築, 沒有膽識及決心是絕對做不到的
The Finest Hours of the US DD in WW II...Charge of the Light Brigade

USS Johnston 的艦長 Evans, 也是一條好漢

Lt Cdr Copeland and the USS Samuel B Roberts took on the cruiser line alone, disrupted it by inflicting damage with her two 5inch guns and evaded destruction for a long time. It is all the more remarkable because she was manned by reservists with only one years experience.

Cdr Hathaway of the USS Heerman deserved extra credit, he took on the whole Japanese battle line alone and survived. He probably fired the torpedoes that forced the Yamato to turn away to evade. At a crucial moment, Kurita had to turn north away from the American escort carriers to evade these torpedoes. That certainly disrupted the Japanese battle line.

The pilots of the escort carriers also deserved credit. Although trained mainly for ground support, they did great work in the antiship role - sinking three cruisers. Cdr Fowler leading 4 VC-5 Avengers from the USS Kitkun Bay, sank the Chokai with a daring glide bomb attack. Each dropped 4 500lb SAP bombs and scored a total of 9 hits from stern to bow. The Chokai was too busy shooting at USS White Plains to notice the TBMs. She was later sunk by a torpedo fro the destroyer Fujinami. Fowler then landed on USS Manila Bay in Adm Stump s Taffy II. After re-arming, Fowler led another strike on the Japanese fleet and scored another 500lb bomb hit on the Nagato.

TBMs from VC-68 of the Taffy III flagship USS Fanshaw Bay damaged the Suzuya with bomb hits while she was attacking escort carriers. The Suzuya was later sunk by Taffy II TBMs. Two from VC-81 of the Taffy II flagship USS Natoma Bay may have scored two torpedo hits that finished her. Other VC-81 TBMs also scored torpedo hits on the Chikuma while she was busy sinking the USS Gambier Bay. The Chikuma was finished off by TBMs from VC-75 of the USS Ommaney Bay (Taffy II),

Quite apart from sinking and damaging Japanese ships the US planes caused many others to evade when they could have concentrated on attacking US ships. Kurita knew that American reinforcement were on its way. In retiring when he did, he achieved the objective of protecting his force but not the more critical one of getting the transports. Adm Badger s surface action force including the Iowa and New Jersey could not catch up with Kurita before he escaped through the San Bernadino Straits - denying our battleship fans the ultimate Yamato vs Iowa duel.

If it happened, I have absolutely no doubt that the US would have won. It would have happened at night where the superior US radar fire controls would have provided the absolute advantage. At Surigao Straits, the US battleships with the Mk 8 fire control radar (USS West Virginia, USS California and USS Tennessee) did most of the shooting. The others with the older Mk3 - which was still superior to Japanese systems - either got off only a few salvos or none at all. The Iowa and New Jersey both had Mk 8. Both would have hit the Japanese from much further than they could return fire accurately. Adm Badger also had 8 modern DD equipped with radar that could have delivered accurate night torpedo attacks - as their comrades did at Surigao Straits. In contrast, Kurita s ships had already expended most of their torpedoes.

小弟只知道栗田(Kurita)在 Battle of Samar 丟了三艘重巡洋艦,不過還不知道是
『誰幹的好事』...您的詳細資料使小弟受益甚多, 感謝!!! ^^

BTW...小時後不用功, 現在日本二戰的CA中文名及英文名連不太起來...> <

Chikuma: 筑摩?
Chokai: 鳥海?
Suzuya: 鈴谷?

還有, 小弟認為派 Warspite 進入峽江太危險之因是:

第一: 事實上德國海軍的密碼破譯單位已破解英方電文,
知道 Warspite 將會進入那維克海域, 所以事實上BB的出現德方倒不會非常驚訝

不過就算德國海軍知道, 也沒有任何辦法可言...
可以支援的兵力, 除了U艇外, 大概只有那兩艘BC了; 而這兩艘BC是自己保命為上
(有傷在身, 又是當時德國海軍的鎮軍之寶, 投在那維克的結果可能是再丟2條BC)

第二: 當初派 Warspite 之時, 是針對峽江內只有1艘U艇的敵情所假設的...
事實上危險性遠大於此: 峽江內不只1艘U艇, 而是5艘!!

不過U艇在峽江內的戰鬥結果, 實在是不怎麼樣...拜那不可靠的魚雷之賜 > <

The names are correct.

I have no arguments about the risk of sending the Warspite in to Narvik. The fjord runs from west (Vestfjord) to the east (Oftfjord) where the town of Narvik was. Yes, U-25, U-46, U-48, U-51 and U-64 were in the area. U-64 was sunk by Warspite s Swordfish and only U-48 managed to launch torpedoes at Warspite in the Vestfjord. The Germans had as much trouble with their torpedoes as the Americans with their Mk14 early in the war. Magnetic exploders failed (just like the British with theirs on the 18 inch aerial torpedoes during the Bismarck chase). Depth-keeping failed ...

The RN did try to get a cruiser into the fjord earlier but the HMS Penelope ran aground in the Vestfjord.

War is about taking risks. There are many factors you simply cannot know or anticipate. If you do not act you are certain of one thing - you would not reach the objective; failure through <> is just as bad as taking a risk and losing.

Risk management is about balancing the risk and benefits using the probabilities as well as the potential consequences of failure. Note the word <> here. Mikawa and Kurita were clearly more concerned about the consequences of losing ships than the potential benefits of sinking enemy transports.

Warburton-Lee in the First Battle of Narvik and Adm Whiworth in the Second took risks. Warburton-Lee paid for the risk with his own life. But both achieved significant results. If you didn t use them, the big guns of the battleship are as useless as if you didn t have them in the first place.

This tells us something about the differences in command psychology between the British and the Japanese. One side views major units as assets to be used or risked - not national treasures to be preserved at the expense of potentially achieving strategic objectives.

No doubt, if the Warspite ahd been lost, there would have been people losing their commands. But, to balance that out, the RN rewarded aggressiveness through promotions and decorations. This atmosphere cultivated the healthy taking of risks and managing uncertainty amongst commanders down to lower levels.

Both sides had people who executed their basic functions - manevring warships, firing accurately etc. What often decided the outcome of the overall campaign was the strategic thinking AND risk taking but senior commanders. The dominance of the RN over the nuemrically superior Italians in the Mediterranean was another example.

Whitworth took the risk at the 2nd Narvik but also demonstrated excellence in planning and execution. There was scouting ahead by air - that netted the U-64. Destroyers were in first. Then there was the element of surprise plus overwhelming fire power using the Warspite. Without which the shore batteries would not have been suppressed and the town taking by landing troops so easily. Overall, there was success with strategic repercussions.