Financial Times批中國治新疆策略
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| 大青蛇 於 2002/07/30 23:58 | |
| Financial Times批中國治新疆策略 | |
星期日(七月二十八日)在飛機上看Financial Times, 週末版(Weekend)頭版文章是John Congreve批中國治新疆策略的長文, 中國人大力開發新疆地區,不但造成沙塵暴的污染,還造成種族問題, 漢人在新疆佔盡便宜,使得維爾吾族等回教民族受盡歧視, 不但言論自由被剝奪,流血衝突不斷,連工作權也被剝削, 新疆已有好幾次流血暴動, 但都被中國政府武力鎮壓下來,因為規模沒有天安門事件大,而且死的又是少數民族, 關心的人不多,但是John Congreve在這種恐怖害怕的情況下,深入虎口報導中國政府的暴政, 值得一看, 小弟無能翻譯成中文,請各位版上有興趣的大大親自到Financial Times的網址去看, 更希望如果有在報社工作的記者先生小姐們,多做做善事, 把這些真的值得讓台灣人知道的中國真面目的文章翻譯出來,不要老是說中國好 http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=020726004173&query;=XinJiang&vsc;_appId=totalSearch&state;=Form Enter the dragon Since the September 11 atrocities in the US, Beijing has used the so-called war against terrorism as an opportunity to crack down even harder on any sign of Uighur resistance to Chinese rule - what it calls splittism. The result is that today the Uighurs are afraid to talk, not just to foreigners, but even to each other. A wrong remark can mean the sack, or worse. People have been arrested for things said at birthday parties. Several times during a recent month-long visit I heard Uighurs warn one another at table not to say anything political. So deep is this fear that when a Uighur in a baseball cap and dark glasses came up to me outside the main mosque in Kashgar and declared that the Chinese were tourists in Xinjiang, that Uighurs and the Taliban were allies, I suspected an agent provocateur and moved away. Lawyers, journalists, teachers and schoolchildren are being sent on indoctrination courses. Its as bad as the Cultural Revolution, one Uighur professional said. A lawyer who dutifully wrote a dozen pages on the evils of separatism was told to go back and write more. Newspapers have been told to cull from archives all articles written since 1990 that speak of Uighurs as having a separate history and identity. Recently the authorities in Kashgar even resorted to burning books of Uighur culture - one of the titles was Ancient Uighur Craftsmanship - according to exiles interviewed by Radio Free Asia. Officials in Kashgar refused to comment, or denied the claims. If there is fear in Xinjiang, there is fear in Beijing, too. Chinese citizens are being told the region is dangerous to visit; some even believe a war going on. Western academics, who know the score and speak the languages, are being warned off. Tour groups and backpackers, who generally do not, or rely on Chinese guides, are allowed in. Entering Xinjiang at a remote border recently, I was interrogated for almost an hour. The police seemed particularly suspicious of the fact that one of my intended stopping points was Gulja (Yining) in the Ili valley, scene of one of the worst incidents of recent times. It was there, one freezing morning in February 1997, that hundreds of young Uighurs marched through the streets, demanding equal treatment and protesting about the arrest of leaders of a meshrep, a kind of religious youth club. They were confronted by the armed police, who reportedly used dogs and flamethrowers as well as rifles. According to local witnesses, hundreds of people were killed and thousands of arrests were made while the town was sealed off for two weeks. Previous riots in other towns, attacks on government buildings and two bus bombings - one of them in Beijing itself - have left the authorities in a state of permanent alarm. Usually such protests are covered up by the state-controlled media; but after September 11, the official Xinjiang Daily published a long list of allegedly terrorist acts committed over the past decade. On the other hand, Amnesty International has twice reported on the widespread use of torture and on other judicial abuses in Xinjiang. Since the attacks in New York and Washington, US support for the Uighurs has been muted, while protests from Uighur exiles in the west have become ever more vocal - a contrast with the enforced silence in their homeland. Xinjiang has become a second Palestine, says the East Turkestan National Congress, a Munich-based lobby. Careful not to condone violence, the ETNC claims it is the Chinese, not the Muslims, who are using terror tactics in Xinjiang. Like the Palestinians, the Uighurs are politically weak. They have no leader in exile to match the Tibetans charismatic Dalai Lama; they are disunited, and they are closely monitored (if not actually infiltrated) by Chinese intelligence. But they scored a minor public relations success last October when the Chinese embassy in Belgium failed to stop the ETNC holding a conference at the European Parliament in Brussels. The casual visitor to Xinjiang sees none of this, even if the presence of the army is obvious. What he sees is furious modernisation: city-centre skyscrapers rising above parades of expensive boutiques; policewomen wearing the latest fashion in shoes - black high heels with duck-billed toes - and Uighur girls flirting in mini-skirts. There are new hotels with hot water, and even the restaurant floors are clean. From Gulja to Urumchi, from Turfan to Kashgar, the Chinese are stamping their own vision of the future on Xinjiang. New towns have sprung up alongside or on top of Uighur villages, reducing them to depressed suburbs or ghettos where the people are left to sell kebabs and bric-a-brac to one other. At night, city centres glitter with neon lights and winking bulbs draped over trees. The architecture is gaudy, postmodern American, with blue-tinted glass and white tiles a popular motif, as if to reinforce Beijings vision of Xinjiang as the new California. Kashgar, the ancient Muslim city under the Pamir mountains, is being turned into a mini-metropolis, a pastiche of Las Vegas or Denver. Areas round the Id Kah mosque, the heart of Muslim Xinjiang, are being cleared and the inhabitants moved to multi-storey flats outside the city limits. Some Uighurs are happy to give up their old courtyard houses for the amenities of a modern flat, and to become entrepreneurs in the newly freed market. That is evident from the smart new villas among the cherry orchards and vineyards in the old quarter of Gulja, where a neo-classical mansion has been built as a school for poor children by a Uighur millionaire export-import trader. All this development, driven by a get-rich-quick capitalism and aided by World Bank loans and special grants from Beijing, is in the name of progress. Most of the benefits, however, are going to the Han Chinese. To many Uighurs, therefore, it looks like an artificial boom in support of a Han takeover that will break up their communities and destroy their way of life. Its most threatening aspect is mass immigration, the biggest colonisation in the regions history. When the Communists took control of Xinjiang in 1949, there were about 300,000 Han Chinese in a population of about 5m. Today the population stands at just over 19m, and the Uighurs number about 8m, the Han 7m-8m, with Kazakhs, Chinese Muslims and Mongols making up most of the rest. Accurate figures are not available. Settlers and migrant workers are pouring in from the east at such a rate - one estimate is 7,000 a day - that Uighurs are beginning to feel like aliens in their own land. The exiles call it ethnic cleansing, or demographic genocide. Most Uighurs are peasant farmers, who complain of high taxes and land rents, and competition from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, a paramilitary behemoth, with an almost entirely Chinese workforce. Now that China has joined the World Trade Organisation, they have foreign competitors to fear as well. In the cities, Chinese immigration has already put many out of work. At dusk you can see them, gathered under a towering Chinese office block or outside a state hotel where Communist party cadres come and go in gleaming Japanese-made four-wheel-drives. They have become street vendors, selling barbecued mutton, sheeps lungs, liver and tripe. The price of a meal has never been lower, even though the price of meat has gone up. Middle-class Uighurs complain that most new jobs and promotions go to the Han, however unqualified. To complain is to invite dismissal. Holding on to your job is the main thing now, said one. Silence is the price they pay to work. For some, like the former secret policeman I met on a train, that price is too high. They resign. Or, if they can, they emigrate. Discrimination, social and economic, only widens the gap between Uighurs and Chinese. Already divided by cultures as different as the mountains are from the desert, they inhabit separate worlds. They rarely intermarry. No Uighur will eat in a Chinese restaurant. They use different clocks: Beijing time, two hours ahead, being mandatory for all official business. They are divided by religion, language, diet and dress. Even their manners are distinct. The immigrants, especially the latest arrivals, can be as arrogant and boorish as any imperialist. The objects of their contempt, though far from saintly, are warm-hearted people still governed by old-fashioned courtesy. Leaked Communist party documents show that the authorities see no flaw in their treatment of Xinjiang. Perhaps they believe the official propaganda, that the region has always been part of China. If so, it is little wonder that they feel entitled to exploit and export the oil, gas, coal, precious metals, cotton and wool. And they need the room. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (to give it its official name) comprises one-sixth of the territory of the Peoples Republic, but has only one-sixtieth of its population and, according to one estimate, three-quarters of its mineral wealth. They are proud of their achievements, which are supposed to lift the Uighurs out of poverty, cure them of their reactionary habits, and put paid to separatist longings. But the claim to ownership is inaccurate, and the policy is not being carried out as advertised. For 1,000 years before its conquest by the Manchu emperors in the 18th century, the Chinese had little or no control over the region. That is made plain by the name the Manchus gave it on annexation: Xinjiang means new territory. In 1864 it became an independent kingdom under Yakub Beg. Reconquered in 1877, it was detached again, run as a private fiefdom by Han governors, by the Russians, or by Muslim warlords who rose in revolt in the 1930s. When the Communists recovered the Manchu empire in 1949, avenging the humiliations at the hands of foreigners, they treated the Uighurs with respect, as members of one big socialist family. Racial discrimination - so-called Great Han chauvinism - was condemned. Since then, but for a brief period after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong, they have kept them under the tightest control. They have always been afraid for their western border, first because of the Soviet Union, now because of Central Asian Muslim militancy. Chinas dubious war against terrorism seems designed to provoke the very thing Beijing says it fears - a Kosovo in Asia as a senior official once said. The policy of punishing the Uighurs until they crack, then punishing them even harder, is unlikely to make them keen citizens of China. These are hard times for the Uighurs, said a Uighur academic, one of the few who dared comment. Having been in control of our own affairs, it is hard to watch the Han taking over everything. Uighurs could not possibly win an open confrontation. But China would not come off too well, either: the effects on foreign investment, tourism and world opinion can be imagined. By now, some of the new men at the top in Beijing must be wondering whether a climate of fear is really the best way to run the autonomous region of Xinjiang. |
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NO:735_2
| 弦月之影 於 2002/07/31 02:21 | |
| Re:Financial Times批中國治新疆策略 | |
補充: 光是新疆的煤燃每年就燒掉幾十億人民幣。 煤在接觸氧氣會氧化產生熱量，雖然不及燃燒般激烈，但是如果此熱量積而不散就會使礦坑發生煤自燃現象，假設一個大煤層有一千個小礦坑，一個自燃後若處理不善會慢慢地擴散到其他小礦坑，一個個的小礦坑就像煙囪，最後就形成了地下火焰山，這筆鳥帳還不知怎麼算耶。 |
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NO:735_3
| 路過 於 2002/07/31 02:37 | |
| 轉貼--小參考 | |
新聞分析：種族矛盾衝突下的新疆獨立運動 劉奇峰 雖然目前無法得知維族中支援疆獨的確切比例到底有多少，但是可以 中國新疆自治區首府烏魯木齊市8日下午的大爆炸，迄今已經造成近90 目前，新疆獨立運動已經成爲中國境內最敏感的話題之一，每當新疆 走進新疆最西邊的伊犁自治區首府伊寧（維吾爾族慣稱爲「古爾加（ 但是在伊寧市街頭，老一輩的維族居民，甚至年輕的擦鞋童卻只能說 1997年2月5日，當時正值漢族農曆新年除夕，超過1000名維族青年上 建立「東土耳其斯坦共和國」 據中國政府統計，新疆目前約有1700萬人，其中有800萬人左右是維 維吾爾族並不喜歡外地人稱他們所居住的土地爲「新疆」，他們稱這 「東土」奉土耳其共和國爲正朔，連其「國旗」「藍色星月旗」都與 當時被解放軍擊退的疆獨勢力主要進入了同文同種的土耳其，主要分 目前流亡在外的疆獨勢力以建立「東土耳其斯坦共和國」爲主要訴求 種族問題嚴重成暴力導火線 信仰回教的維吾爾族以接近土耳其語的維吾爾語爲主要語言。他們不 不過與維族接觸過的人都表示，維族人民其實是一個沒有心機，但愛 另外，維族高居不下的失業率也是使當地人憎恨漢族的原因。一名在 中國政府在新疆所採取限制宗教活動的動作也引起了維族居民的反感 這種被歧視感加上與漢族不同的分別感造成一種「我族」意識不斷在 另一方面，中國鼓勵內地的漢人向新疆遷移，以「移民實邊」的方式 文革後，在鄧小平「改革開放」的旗幟下，第二批漢人進入新疆北部 走進烏魯木齊，若不特別注意街上維族裝扮的百姓，這個擁有140萬 相對於漢族認爲自己是「龍的傳人」，維族則認爲自己是「狼的傳人 雖然目前無法得知維族中支援疆獨的確切比例到底有多少，但是可以 南疆比北疆更爲嚴重 在伊寧事件後，疆獨方面立即展開了報復行動。1997年3月7日，在中 有鑒於暴力事件有向中國內陸蔓延的現象，中共中央政治局下發了「 疆獨運動主事者認爲，中國政府毫不注重維族人權，不斷于南疆的羅 石油資源的確使中國政府將新疆視爲戰略要地。據官方中新社最近的 東土「獨立聖戰」開打時機 疆獨組織認爲，與中國政府談判和平解決新疆問題毫無可能，他們也 他表示，疆獨勢力最大的希望在鄰近的哈薩克共和國，因爲當地的疆 疆獨組織也估計，2005年之時中國與臺灣將爆發戰爭，那時就是東土 以疆獨組織「青年之家」爲例，構成該組織的都是具有特種部隊水準 不過梁冬表示，如果東土之戰打起來，牽扯的勢力將非常複雜，會牽 中國政府對疆獨勢力多管齊下 爲遏止疆獨運動，中國政府也決定以多管齊下的方式意圖解決新疆問 在該方針之下，中國在新疆各地大肆逮捕疆獨份子，甚至出動軍方的 另外，只要當地勢力疑似與疆獨運動有所牽扯，便會立即被逮捕入獄 中國政府也以外交的手段來抑制疆獨勢力。針對同情、支援疆獨運動 中國國家主席江澤民在今年4月訪問土耳其時曾經警告土國政府不得 而中國近來頻頻宣傳的「西部大開發」戰略的一個重要目的，也是希 不過，依照政治學的革命J曲線理論，當一地人民由貧轉富的過程中 |
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NO:735_4
| 襠馬 於 2002/07/31 10:46 | |
| Re:Financial Times批中國治新疆策略 | |
不久前在政版有人留下一個地址，可看到一連串相關報導： 【 東土耳其斯坦信息中心（http://www.uygur.org/）EAST TURKISTAN INFORMATION CENTER, The World Uyghur Network News, 東土耳其斯坦信息中心, شبكة 】 |
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NO:735_5
| 阿里巴巴 於 2002/08/01 00:45 | |
| Re:Financial Times批中國治新疆策略 | |
還有「南蒙(內蒙)獨立」的網站: Independence for Inner Mongolia Free Inner Mongolia http://www.caccp.org/im/ |
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