全防：颶風戰機的RBE-2雷達裝備有主動電子掃描天線.......

尖端：拜兩具總推力達18,XXXkg的M88-3引擎之賜，在會場上空表演的颶風戰機靠著先進的氣動外型設計與1.4以上的推重比，做出一連串超低空高機動不掉速特技飛行，狠狠地羞辱了各國現役第四代戰機（這應該是俄式戰機分代法）一番.........

雖然勝負早已分出, 不過一些形式上的儀式動作還是得完成; 南韓國防部將於本週五舉行完高層會議之後, 對外正式發佈F-X戰機競標案的最終勝出者...............

（在俺25大壽的前兩天發佈這種噩耗, 簡直是觸俺的霉頭....@!#$%^*~&?）

看完之後發現先潛看到的令一篇文章講到：美國一些主動陣列的雷達其實可以直接以現有的系統將天線換掉之後，更換一些硬體就是新系統了。APG-80是以APG-68換主動天線之後的產品，南韓的APG-63（V）1也可以換成主動天線。

Program Office Helps Make B-2 Stealthier

(Source : US Department of Defense ; issued Apr. 15, 2002)

TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, Okla. -- Air Force B-2 Spirit bombers will soon get a more precise radar-absorbing materials coating and have it done 80 percent faster. Radar-absorbing materials and how they are applied play a major factor in being undetected by enemy radar, officials said.

The amount of reduced energy, which returns to an enemy's radar, is directly proportional to the increase in stealth effectiveness, officials said.

"When applying magnetic radar absorbing material, it's critical to make sure the coatings' thickness and location are controlled, so we transitioned from a manual application technique to a robotics system to make sure we met tolerances and achieved the added benefit of reducing labor costs," said Brian Kilburn, B-2 system program office low observable integrated product team deputy director.

He said the joint government and industry team will use robots from a worldwide manufacturer of automotive robotics.

"We integrated four of them together and are choreographing applications of radar absorbing materials onto the B-2," Kilburn said. "This is in support of the alternate high frequency material low observable maintainability modification, a major stealth modification planned for the B-2."

The newly configured B-2 will improve mission capable rates by more than 8 percent and reduce maintenance man-hours per flying hour by 50 percent, a significant cost savings to the program, he said.

The robotic system was installed in the production depot maintenance facilities at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, Calif., and experts are validating the robot's performance on a full sized mock-up of the B-2, Kilburn said. The first application on an operational jet will be this fall.

"We're going to train a minimum of 12 people and operate with four to six people per shift," he said. "This will save 10,000 labor hours per aircraft install."

http://news.yam.com/cna/international/news/200204/200204191250126.html
韓國選定美製F-15K為國防新一代戰機

(中央社記者姜遠珍漢城十九日專電) 韓國政府已決定將美國波音公司生產的F-15K戰機，遴選為韓國國防新一代戰機，將至二○○九年為止，共計投資四十四億六千六百八十八萬美元，採購並實戰部署四十架F-15K戰機。

韓國「聯合新聞通訊社」今天報導指出，韓國國防部次官權永孝今天在國防部影像會議室主持了由外交通商部、產業資源部等有關部會司長級官員參加的跨會部擴大 (武器) 獲得會議中，作出了前述決定，並計畫於下午舉行記者會正式宣布此項決定。

據瞭解，韓國政府在選定新一代戰機機種時，是透過「空軍次期戰鬥機事業評價團」、「國防研究院」、「國防科學研究所」及「國防調達 (招商) 本部」四個評估單位，對於美國波音公司生產的F-15K、法國達梭公司生產的Rafale (狂風) 、俄羅斯蘇愷公司生產的SU-35，以及英德諸國聯合生產的European FighterTyphoon 2000等四種機種進行評估。

韓國國防部所設計的評價基準為：壽命週期費用 (佔35.33%) 、任務執行能力 (34.55%) 、軍運用適合性(18.13%) 、技術轉移及契約條件 (11.99%) ，於前述四個機種進行評估角逐後，已將選購機種範圍縮小到F-15K與Rafale之間，由於兩者之評估差距小於百分之三，而進入了第二階段的評估。

國防部高級官員透露，第二階段的評估，則以韓國政府與有關戰機的生產國家之間，在安保、外交及經貿層次的關係為考量，即，決定選購機種後，對韓國的國家安保、對外關係以及拓展海外市場等將會帶來何等影響與作用，尤其，當考慮到韓美同盟關係及協防體制等政治因素，而決定選擇美國波音公司生產的F-15K戰機。

據悉，當韓國國防部與美國波音公司就銷售金額方面完成議價，將於五月間經由金大中總統裁示後，雙方才能正式簽署F-15K戰機的採購契約。

在今年二、三月之間，以老美為首的西方聯軍對阿富汗塔利班政權所採取的一連串軍事行動之中，老法海軍最引以為豪的新銳航空母艦：目前配備十八架各式機種，四萬餘噸級的查理斯．戴高樂號中型核動力空母也正好躬逢其盛，於距離巴基斯坦八十多公里的阿曼灣海域上展開部署，成為西方反恐行動整體戰力中的一環。

然而除了支援響應老美的反恐行動外，查理斯．戴高樂號還另有要事在身，那就是利用這個難得的機會，對其艦上新近服役的七架新銳戰機：RAFALE M F-1進行實戰操作與多國海軍聯合作戰訓練。

目前配備於戴高樂號艦上的七架RAFALE M均屬F-1純空優構型，標準武裝配備為四枚MICA ER雷達導引中程AAM與兩枚魔法二型全向位短程AAM；由於老法國防預算吃緊造成RAFALE的服役時程延後，而法國海軍航空隊先前的防空主力機種，F-8P十字軍式戰機又於1998年全數退役完畢，因此造成在1999至2001年整整三年之間，法國海軍航艦上無長程區域防空能力可言的窘境，是故今年RAFALE M的正式服役對法國海軍而言，不啻是久旱逢甘霖，足以喜極而泣的喜訊；由於阿富汗塔利班政權沒有值得一提的空軍戰力，因此目前僅具備空戰能力的F1構型機在整個任務期間英雄無用武之地，並未正式介入這場行動，而僅是繼續進行自身的例行換裝訓練工作而已，不過艦上人員表示，目前配備於艦上的七架RAFALE M F-1已經具備完善空戰能力，如有必要的話，隨時可加入艦隊防空任務。

自1998年正式交機以來至今，已有八架RAFALE M F-1進入法國海軍航空隊服役，然而由於法國海軍將初號機暫借給達騷集團供研發F2構型之用，因此目前在戴高樂號上服役操作的實際數量為七架；其中二號機與三號機是在去年年底登艦，四、五、六號機則於今年二月登艦服役，而七號與八號機則是在今年三月十日，歷經四次空中加油，不著陸飛行約5500km之後，直接從法國南部飛至在阿曼灣海域服勤的戴高樂號上正式登艦服勤。預定在今年夏天之前，九號機與十號機也將登艦服勤，屆時第一個RAFALE艦載型戰機中隊（12F中隊）的換裝訓練工作也將告一段落，正式進入服勤操作階段。

目前正在如火如荼進行研發的F.2構型可望在2004年年底開始交機，因此預定於2007年正式進入服勤操作階段的第二個RAFALE艦載型戰機中隊（11F中隊）將使用此構型機種；和只能擔任空優作戰的F1構型相較，F.2構型增添了能使用SCALP-EG等對地攻擊武器的對地打擊戰力；至於具備完整區域空優、對地攻擊、反艦作戰、電子偵查和核子打擊能力的完整版F.3構型則將在明年進入研究發展階段，如果一切順利的話，將於2007年起開始交機；若一切均按照計畫的話，到2012年年底前，法國海軍所訂購的60架RAFALE艦載機型將全數交貨完畢，並於2014年之前全數達到服勤操作階段，在法國海軍航艦上服勤直到至少2027年以後；在最大搭載狀況下，戴高樂號核動力空母將可攜帶操作32架RAFALE，其餘未登艦戰機則將安放在Landivisiau後勤基地中。

法國海軍航空隊過去從未有操作過雙座戰機的經驗，然而受到1999年期間，西方聯軍南斯拉夫作戰經驗的影響：在低空、惡劣天候、高強度戰場執行對地打擊作戰任務時，無論是任務執行效率與安全性，雙座機型均比單座機型擁有顯著優勢。因此在去年，法國國防部長遂決定將海軍原先所訂購的60架單座RAFALE M更改為25架單座RAFALE M與35架雙座RAFALE N；雙座型RAFALE N的原型機於2005年出廠進行飛試工作，至於正式量產型RAFALE N的交機工作預定則將於2007年展開，從發展時程上來看，大概所有的F3構型機種均屬於雙座型RAFALE N。由於艦載機獨特的著艦衝擊與彈射起飛等問題，RAFALE N的設計工作無法直接照抄空軍型的RAFALE C（單座空軍型，空重約10000kg）--> RAFALE B（雙座空軍型，空重約10350kg），為了承受著艦衝擊與彈射起飛衝力，相較於單座型的RAFALE M（其空重已經比RAFALE C重上500至600kg），雙座型的RAFALE N的部份機體結構必須進行增加額外重量的強化處理，為了使RAFALE N的空重維持在合理範圍內以利艦上操作與維持飛行性能，RAFALE N將取消30mm固定機炮設計（連同彈藥重量，此舉將可以減省200至250公斤左右的機身重量。），此外其內載燃料箱也將比單座型略小些，使其作戰航程比單座型短上5%左右。目前法國海軍航空隊對於RAFALE N戰機上的後座飛官要如何“使用”仍有兩派不同的意見：單純的武器系統操作官（WSO），或是成為第二飛行員，能在緊急狀況下取代前座飛行員，直接操控整架戰機。

RAFALE 艦載型換裝時程表：

2002年：
＃第一RAFALE艦載型戰機中隊（12F中隊）正式進入服勤階段，配備十架單座防空F1構型。

2003年：
＃全功能F3構型進入研發階段。

2004年：
＃首架防空＋對地攻擊雙功能F2構型於年底之前交機。

2005年：
＃F2構型機在法國海空軍陸續交機。
＃第二RAFALE艦載型戰機中隊（11F中隊）陸續接受配備單座F2構型機。
＃雙座型RAFALE N的原型機正式出廠，進行飛試。

2006年：
＃艦載型RAFALE的交機速率將固定在每年六架，直到2012年為止
（2006~2007年：雙功能F2構型，2007~2012年：全功能F3構型）

2007年：
＃第二RAFALE艦載型戰機中隊（11F中隊）正式進入服勤階段。
＃第一RAFALE艦載型戰機中隊（12F中隊）所配備的戰機接受構型升級（升級為F2構型？）
＃首架正式量產雙座型RAFALE N交機。
＃首架F3構型量產型交機。
（RAFALE N＝RAFALE F3構型艦載型？？）

2012年：
＃法國海軍航空隊所訂購的60架艦載型於年底前全數交貨完畢。

雖然該篇文章並未明言，不過個人猜測，在2012年以後，法國海軍航空隊的疾風戰機中隊之構型編制應為：

1. 25架F2構型單座Ｍ型機，主司艦隊防空，必要時可使用SCALP-EG與LGB兼差對地攻擊，配屬於12F中隊（過去使用F8十字軍式戰機，專司防空任務）與11F中隊（目前使用超級軍旗式戰機，負責反艦／打擊／核攻任務）。

2. 35架F3構型雙座多功能Ｎ型機，主司對地攻擊（SCALP-EG, NSSM）、反艦作戰（空射型飛魚, ANF）、電子偵查和核子打擊（ASMP-A），必要狀況下亦可分擔艦隊防空任務，主要配屬於14F中隊（目前使用超級軍旗式戰機，負責反艦／打擊／核攻任務）與16F中隊（目前使用軍旗IVP式戰機，主司偵察任務），至於11F中隊在正式配備疾風戰機服勤的時程、作戰任務導向、Ｍ型機與Ｎ型機的相對數量等諸多因素影響下，說不定會混編使用Ｍ型機與Ｎ型機。

Eurofighter Program Officials Look Ahead To Future Developments

WARTON, Lancashire - With the four-nation Eurofighter program gaining momentum from the initial flights this month of the first production aircraft in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, and from the first service deliveries slated for this fall, plans for further development of this ambitious European program already are taking shape.

Leon Skorczewski, BAE Systems' director of product development and strategy, said in an interview last week that the company is seeking to further extend Eurofighter's operational capabilities, using the massive baseline European investment which already has been made.

"With a potential service life between 2003 and 2043, the Eurofighter is likely to be flown by three generations of pilots, about half of whom have not yet been born," he said. "Current production commitments [for 620 aircraft] are due to end in around 2015, but the Eurofighter has been designed with an enormous growth potential. Joint development would also be facilitated by the European partners from shared enhancement costs."

In May 2001, the program's European partners and industry groups endorsed a one-year Industrial Concept Definition Study (ICDS) to assess operational goals, future roles, engineering options, development routes and provision needs. Its four-phase program began with concept options, followed by concept solutions in 2-3 packages, for a mid-term review in October 2001. The next phase, to January 2002, was allocated to concept consolidation, to define the changes required in Tranche 2 Eurofighter production for each package. A costed plan for Tranche 3 alternative development packages emerged in the final phase, which was due to end last week.

The first enhancement concept was agreed to at a Madrid meeting last September. It involves equipment and systems upgrades, in several areas, including range extension; precision attack; weapons; survivability, deployability and affordability; interoperability; and air superiority improvements.

Initial production

Other enhancements considered included further development of the current Eurofighter design and build standard through architecture changes with the same external profile; external configuration changes to maximize air-to-air and air-to-surface capabilities; and a completely new aircraft.

Some technology enhancements already are programmed in the initial 620 aircraft four-country Eurofighter commitment, which is being ordered in three discrete five-year tranches. Tranche 1 involves an initial production of 148 baseline Eurofighters, for four-country delivery in several batches between 2002 and late 2005. These aircraft are optimized for air-to-air roles, using MBDA ASRAAMs, Raytheon AIM-9Ls, and Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAMs, with helmet-mounted sight/displays.

By 2004-05, Tranche 1 Eurofighters will incorporate Have Quick hopsets, an integrated approach and landing aid, and provision for delivering independently designated Paveway II or GBU-16 laser-guided bombs. They also will have an enhanced air defense capability with the addition of full direct-voice control and preliminary defensive aids (DASS).

Batch 2 contracts in Tranche 1 will be signed in early 2004, followed shortly afterwards by delivery of the first Batch 2 single-seat version (BS004) to the Royal Air Force.

Batch 1 RAF Eurofighters are expected to achieve full operational capability (FOC) standards in late 2004. Eurofighter's first real swing-role air-to-surface mission systems and sensor capability, however, is planned for the 236 aircraft of Tranche 2, for scheduled delivery between 2005 and 2010.

With new mission computer standards; updated radar processors; MIDS data-links; identification friend or foe; Global Positioning System and DASS upgrades; and forward-looking infrared/infrared search and track with laser designation and sensor fusion, Tranche 2 Eurofighters will be cleared to operate with such additional weapons as the IRIS-T, AIM-120C-5 and later MBDA Meteor air-to-air missiles.

Their air-to-surface armory will be expanded to include MBDA Storm Shadow or Taurus KEPD 350 long-range cruise missiles, plus laser- and GPS/INS-guided weapons.

These enhancements will be introduced progressively, resulting in block numbers within each of the three production tranches as an indication of their standard. Blocks 1,2 and 5 will be in Tranche 1; Blocks 8,10 and 15 will be in Tranche 2, and Blocks 20 and 25 will be in Tranche 3.

With additional four-nation options for another 90, Tranche 3 will comprise the final 236 Eurofighters from the initial 620-aircraft contract, due for manufacture between 2009 and 2015, a lead time that would allow the Eurofighter program to implement some of the options emerging from the recent ICDS. Further enhanced operational capabilities will allow such role extensions as extended air defense, against cruise missiles; suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD); and reconnaissance.

Although Euroradar's ECR 90 Captor multimode pulse-Doppler radar has an unrivalled performance for a mechanically scanned system, access to adaptive active phased-array technology is available with the European AMSAR program. A government-funded technology demonstrator is being integrated into Eurofighter, in accordance with Tranche 3 production program planning, said Achim Aehlig, the product development manager of Eurofighter GmbH.

Tranche 3 options

Other Tranche 3 options under consideration include Link 22 and Satcom communications for improved interoperability; conformal fuel tanks, in conjunction with inboard pylon wet stations and double capacity (528 USG) drop tanks; covert terrain following; advanced EW decoys beyond the current wingtip towed systems; lower radar cross section and IRS; plus two- or three-dimensional thrust-vectoring for Eurofighter's EJ200 turbofans, which are being developed in Germany and Spain.

Full care free handling clearance

Interest also has been reported from Germany and Italy in possible aerodynamic improvements by adding small inner-wing leading-edge strakes, in conjunction with flight-control system software integration, for improved directional and lateral stability in the high alpha regime. On the engine side for Tranche 3, Eurojet is looking at a larger compressor for the EJ200 for power or life cycle cost enhancements, plus a substantial increase in the initial 1,600-hour overhaul life.

BAE Systems' chief test pilot Paul Hopkins said the increased test sortie availability of instrumented initial production aircraft in three of the consortium countries, plus recent clearances for air-to-air refueling, have helped attain full carefree handling clearance of the Eurofighter.

2. 目前預定之交機時間與批次：
Tranch1：2002~2005, 計148架, 分為Block1, 3, 5三階段生產標準交機
Tranch2：2005~2010, 計236架, 分為Block8, 10, 15三階段生產標準交機
Tranch3：2010~2015, 計236架, 分為Block20, 255三階段生產標準交機

3. Tranch1以防空任務為主要工作, 主戰裝備為AIM-120 + AIM-9或ASRAAM + HMD; 不過在2004~2005交機服役的中後期生產標準型在略作修改之後, 將具有投射Paveway II或GBU-16等LGB的部份對地打擊功能, 另外DASS系統與DVI的所有功能也將於此時開發完成.

4. Tranch2可說是EF-2000大成階段, 在完成任務電腦, 雷達處理器, MIDS資料鏈, GPS導航系統, DASS電戰系統的升級工作與被動式偵搜系統的整合工作之後,EF2000方能真正達成目前廠商於宣傳上所宣稱的能力; 在空優方面, 其將陸續增添使用AIM-120 C5, IRIS-T以及隨後流星中長程AAM的能力, 至於對地作戰方面則將拓展使用風暴之影與KEPD350等距外遠攻飛彈和laser- and GPS/INS-guided武器之能力.

5. Tranch3將拓展extended air defense, 反巡航飛彈, SEAD和偵察任務等方面的能力, 目前其考慮中的升級改良方案選擇有：

a. 由AMSAR計畫所衍生發展而來, 改良自現有CAPTOR PD雷達之AESA化雷達.（這似乎是目前唯一已確定會被採用的改良方案）

b. Interoperability增進: Link 22 and Satcom communications

c. 燃料酬載的增加：使用適型油箱 + inboard 派龍改良以使用528 USG超大型副油箱

d. 戰場存活率提升：導入地貌追延能力, 先進EW拖曳式誘餌, 雷達截面積縮小與紅外線訊跡減訊

e. EJ-200引擎動力系統改良：使用新型壓縮器, 可使推力提升或維持現有推力但減少life cycle cost, 並延長引擎大修間隔（目前為1600小時)

f. 機動力提升：使用2D或3D向量推力, 增添inner-wing leading-edge strakes以增進戰機在高攻角狀態下的穩定性.

6. 更長遠的改進計畫：

a. Further development of the current EF-2000 design

b. Build standard through architecture changes with the same external profile;

c. External configuration changes to maximize air-to-air and air-to-surface capabilities

以下是老戰機：
F-15:應該只有Mountain Home的有JTIDS 其它的有地空Link4
F-14：D有JTIDS A型有自己的Link（與Link4相容的樣子)
F-16：都只有IDM（Have Quick無線電） 歐洲的MLU才有空戰能力
F-18：只有地空Link4
龍捲風F3:全配JTIDS
海鵟：照上文看來 也有JTIDS，不過也快除役了

文中可以看出新一代歐系戰機在未來國際軍武市場上的外銷前景會是何等慘澹：在政治與經濟等多重因素影響下，歐洲新世代戰機的發展時程迭遭延宕，較原先的預定推遲將近十年以上，且配備與功能完善的完成機型遲遲無法推出，以至於在目前的國際間軍機外銷競爭中，只有外表美觀，卻無實質內涵的紙面推估性能資料數字可以示人，根本無從和發展成熟，配備完善且擁有輝煌戰績的現役美系戰機競爭，而等到其發展完成時，卻又將遇上美製F-35系列這外銷魅力無與倫比的無敵對手............

在歐洲三大新世代戰機之中，JAS-39 GRIPEN 是成軍最早，發展完成度最高且最為價廉物美者，然而即便是如此，本文作者指出：JAS-39不僅缺乏實戰驗證，且在敵我識別／通訊／導航／資料鏈等重要系統上仍未能達成NATO規範標準，而在武器系統上也只能使用AIM-9L、AIM-120B、AGM-65A之流老一代的美系配備，而尚未能兼容使用最新的美系空用武器規格，例如AIM-9M/X, AIM-120 C-5, AGM-65G等等.....這對目前正打算積極融入NATO防禦體系的波蘭政府而言，無疑是令人無法接受的狀況；雖然JAS-39的生產商（SAAB與BAE）一再聲稱這些問題可經由升級改裝解決，然而任何的升級改裝都是得耗費額外成本費用、測試時間與潛在失敗風險的，和發展成熟，戰功彪炳並早已成為多數NATO成員武器標準規格之一的F-16系列相較之下，JAS-39的劣勢顯而易見。而如果連發展最為成熟，服役最為順利且操作成本最為低廉的JAS-39都是如此的話，EF2000與RAFALE的外銷處境之艱困就更別提了........

個人開始懷疑：在未來二、三十年間的新一代戰機國際外銷市場上，除了JAS-39會有難滿百位數的少許成績外，歐製戰機系列搞不好會徹底絕跡..........

[Article by Zdzislaw Dyrman discusses aspects that should be considered in making choice of the multipurpose fighter plane for Poland: "Fighter for Polish Sky -- Selected Aspects for Making Choice" ]

Persons interested in our national defense entertain differing opinions about the multipurpose combat plane for Poland. The opinions of experts on the advantages and disadvantages of the designs of the planes proposed by bidders for the Polish tender are divided. That is because to some experts certain issues matter more than others. For example, they consider the question of industrial co-production to be more important than technical specifications and combat potential. In the article below I intend to present selected but so far rarely discussed factors impacting the selection of a multipurpose fighter plane for Poland.

A major argument cited in favor of the F-16 is its widespread use and positive experience in its operation and in combat. It must be admitted that these two aspects are decidedly in favor of the American fighter plane. Altogether, more than 4,000 F-16's have been built and are used in several dozen countries around the world. Their production is ongoing and will be continued until at least the end of the present decade [as published]: As ensues from the orders placed so far the total of the F-16's built will reach nearly 4,600 in 2020. The F-16 will still account for more than one-third of the combat plane fleet of the US air forces for the next 15 to 20 years. Whatever the region of an eventual conflict in the world, the infrastructure for operating this plane is already in place there. This may prove very helpful, but this fact, while it should not be ignored, does not in itself tip the scales for selecting that plane.

The F-16's extensive combat experience in various kinds of conflicts, including the famous Israeli-Syrian air battle in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, in conditions close to a tactical scenario for a full-scale conflict, is a much more telling argument in favor of this aircraft.

As for the Gripen, it is true that it has had no opportunity for demonstrating its potential in combat, because its currently sole user, Sweden, is a neutral country. But from the military point of view this is not significant. What matters is that a particular plane take part in combat operations and emerge from them successfully.

Both the aforementioned arguments in favor of selecting the F-16 are essential, but still they cannot be considered decisive. The really decisive aspect of this question is something else that has been generally overlooked. This precisely is considered in what follows here.

What Ensues from Membership in NATO?

This is one of the most fundamental issues, as well as a major requirement of the tender underway. Why? In joining North Atlantic Treaty Organization we expected to benefit from specific advantages in return for, "unfortunately," adopting highly important obligations. The advantages are indisputable, because we have joined a group of countries with an imposing military deterrence potential, and as a result we ensured for ourselves a fairly high level of security. We can moreover reduce (that is, cut the financial outlays on) our own armed forces, because collective defense is much more efficacious, not just from the military but also from the political standpoint. Therefore, our future multipurpose combat plane must be consonant with NATO standards.

What Does It Mean for a Plane To Be Compatible With NATO Requirements?

Participation in NATO operations is the price we pay for safeguarding our security, and therefore we must take part in them. Our aircraft must be capable of participating in such operations. In theory, any aircraft equipped with appropriate IFF [Identification Friend-or-Foe] gear and NATO navigational and communications systems can take part in such operations. But that in itself is not enough. If we rest content with that, we will have to provide on our own, at our own expense, at the site of operations, the entire remaining ground logistics, weaponry, and suitable sets of spare parts. In addition, we would have to attend to the logistics of our aircraft there, in the form of logistical supply units and personnel trained in operating a particular type of aircraft. Moreover, we would have to provide several (a minimum of two) transport aircraft for ferrying the needed equipment and personnel to other airfields at which our planes (or even a single plane) would be landing owing to inclement weather, damage sustained over hostile territory, or ordinary breakdowns of on-board systems. The question arises, how much will all this logistics cost? Moreover, a logistical and repair base established at our expense in a distant theater of operations would have to operate under differing climatic and geographical conditions. For example, on Middle East airfields plagued in the spring and fall by vexatious sand storms and for much of the time by scorching heat. It would be better to have aircraft which could benefit from a uniform logistical base, typical of NATO, developed by other countries--or jointly with us. Even then, though, our aircraft would have to meet the following basic NATO requirements:

Basic Requirements

For an aircraft to be at all able to operate within NATO air forces, it has to meet certain basic requirements. They include:

--IFF gear adapted to NATO military code ranges, Mode 4, must be present on board.

--The plane must be equipped with radio gear operating in the Have Quick II system (frequency hopping in accord with a particular sequence of the actually mandatory codes).

--The plane's communications gear must be additionally equipped with the KY-58 coding system, typical of NATO.

--The plane must include an information exchange system compatible with NATO Link 16 protocol.

--The plane's navigation system (extremely precise) must be equipped with a GPS system operating within the military code ranges (these codes are accessible to the Americans, who maintain a satellite network ensuring the performance of the system).

--Flight personnel must be trained in the tactical operation of their aircraft according to NATO procedures, day and night and in any weather.

When we consider the various makes of aircraft offered as the future multipurpose plane for Poland, the principal question is whether they meet the above requirements.

Unfortunately, the Gripen, that otherwise reliable and modern combat plane, does not meet any of the above requirements. Sweden is not a NATO country, and therefore it has no access to NATO identification codes in Friend-or-Foe terms. It also lacks the Have Quick II technology (it merely has the older Have Quick I system). Similarly, it lacks access to P-Code codes for military GPS receivers and to the KY-58 coding device. The Gripen consortium, represented not only by the Swedish Saab but also the British (and hence NATO member country) BAE Systems, vouches that the export version offered to Poland will be equipped with all these devices, and its bid price includes the cost of adaptation to the aforementioned requirements. But this does not alter the fact that performing all these adaptations will be costly (perhaps more than expected), takes time, and most likely will require the consent of the US Government to providing the attendant information to the company handling the integration.

These adaptations may be handled by BAE Systems, but in themselves they are not enough. Following the physical completion of this work the performance of all the additional equipment would still have to be tested in flight. This raises the question of whether BAE Systems has available Gripen-trained British test pilots or whether it as yet intends to train them. That is because it is hardly conceivable for Swedish pilots to test the new equipment in flight, since it is supposed to remain secret to them.

Since we are speaking of pilots, another question that arises is that of training Polish WLOP [Air Force and Air Defense Troops] pilots according to NATO standards and tactical procedures, on utilizing specific properties of aircraft. But for that we need instructors trained on the Gripens and having experience in NATO operations. The Swedish air force includes a group of Gripen-trained instructors, but they certainly have no experience in utilizing broadly the tactics of NATO air forces in any weather and in various combat applications. As for the British pilots, who do have such experience, and who have not infrequently taken part in actual combat operations conducted according to the concept of using NATO air forces, they are not trained to fly the Gripen. It is likewise quite certain that there are not any British Gripen flight instructors.

Armament

Regarding armament, the matter is even more complicated. It might appear that an aircraft carrying Sidewinders, AMRAAMs, and Mavericks is quite compatible with NATO requirements. In reality, what matters is a particular version of that armament. That is because the aircraft should be capable of carrying armament that is actually being manufactured. The reasons are two: While Polish aircraft are to operate in distant theaters of operation only modern armament ensuring NATO planes with top combat effectiveness in complex combat conditions over the region can be accessible. When an aircraft is integrated with newer-generation weaponry, as a rule it can also use older weaponry (with which integration had simply taken place in an earlier stage of development, as in the case of the F-16). The converse, unfortunately, is not possible. In the event that NATO aircraft have to operate from Polish bases, should the Gripen be chosen, the WLOP would have to maintain two separate stocks of weaponry, the older for Polish planes and the more recent one for the NATO reinforcement forces. That would be a rather curious situation.

In the case of the Gripen, it has been integrated with Sidewinder, AMRAAM and Maverick missiles. As usual, however, the devil lies in the details. That is because the Gripen caries the following versions of that weaponry: AIM-9L, AIM-120B, and AGM-65A. At present, however, the versions AIM-9M, AIM-120C-5, and AGM-65G, as well as older missiles adapted to the AGM-65H version, are being manufactured. Regarding the AIM-9M missiles, Sweden has obtained permission to acquire them, but so far that country has not requested the transfer of the data needed to integrate the Gripen with them. This also applies to the AIM-120C-5. But as regards the last-named missile, it is additionally heavier and longer than the AIM-120B and integrating the Gripen with this weapon requires additional test flights and obtaining appropriate certification. As for the AGM-65G/H, the situation is even worse, because Sweden has not obtained consent to acquiring these versions of the missile. Of course, this is merely a question of following appropriate procedures, but that has to be done yet.

NATO also requires of a multipurpose aircraft that it carry laser-guided bombs (for example, of the Paveway II or III family) and GPS-guided bombs (for example, JDAM). The Gripen does not at all carry weaponry of this type. As of the present, Sweden has not obtained permission to acquire Paveway II (or Paveway III, too) bombs. There is no need to add that the Gripen has not been integrated with these weapons, and such integration requires considerable work and flight tests. The situation with GPS-guided weaponry is even worse. That is because it requires the MIL STD 1760 data bus, whereas the Gripen uses only the MIL STD 1553B data bus. Installing the newer data bus is a big job in itself, because it would require, for example, altering the power supply system. Altogether, thus, the scale of these changes is considerable and they, too, must culminate in a specified cycle of flight tests and certification process.

It should be added that these are only selected examples. There are many more questions regarding the Gripen's armament. For example, there is such an important question as anti-air defense weaponry, if only to protect the aircraft against radar-guided air defense. As for HARM missiles, we have not mentioned them at all, but it is worth noting that the Gripen carries no missiles of that class.

The Version Existing "On Paper"

The version of the Gripen plane offered to Poland simply does not exist except on paper. To be sure, such a version will some day (perhaps) be built. According to the manufacturer, the Gripens to be delivered starting in 2005 will meet NATO requirements. But when we consider the details, it turns out that this concerns the requirements binding at present, that is, in 2002. Polish multipurpose combat planes will attain full combat readiness not earlier than in 2007. Will NATO requirements change by then? Most certainly. Hence, we do not know whether the Gripen version meeting the requirements of 2002 will be compatible with NATO requirements in 2007. Perhaps yes and perhaps not. In contrast, aircraft which are even now compatible with NATO standards and are being continually modernized in order to keep meeting these changing standards are a different kettle of fish.

Recently a tender for transport aircraft, culminating in the signing of a contract with the company EADS CASA, has been conducted in Poland. Consider that the offer to acquire the Spartan plane was rejected for formal reasons: The lack of certification of the version of the Spartan offered. At the time when this decision was taken the certification process had been underway and was completed in June 2001, whereupon the aircraft met the requirements. Were our government to be consistent, the offer of the Gripen consortium would have to be rejected for the same, formal reasons.

One could ask why the interest of other, bigger countries in protecting Polish sovereignty. Well, it is exactly the same as ours. In the course of achieving their political objectives in various regions of the world, these countries rely on the support and assistance of their lesser allies, because it is politically advantageous. At the same time it enables the big countries, even if they are world powers, to reduce their own armed forces and their outlays on defense. In view of this, they cannot leave their "little allies" in the lurch. Were they to act otherwise, other countries would see no point in continuing to maintain the structure of NATO and everyone would be the loser. This delicate machinery offers us a real chance to safeguard our national security, the basis of existence of our country.

For this machinery to perform irreproachably, we too must make our own contribution to the functioning of NATO. No one expects of us any excessive efforts, but meeting elementary NATO requirements is directly linked to our own national security. This also applies to our active participation in NATO activities intended to maintain peace and stability not only in the traditional region of NATO responsibility but also wherever the unfolding situation may create a real danger to the security of NATO member countries. After 11 September 2001 this problem has acquired a completely new importance. It could be said that the rules of the game have been tightened. The time of jokes is over.

NATO-Compatible Combat Aviation

If we accept the idea that our active participation in NATO operations wherever the need arises is directly linked to our national security, we have to choose between two options.

We could be a supplier of "cannon fodder" in the form of light infantry. Then it is enough to buy rifles, helmets, and backpacks, and eventually also radio sets, and send our "boys" to the mountains of Afghanistan or to the Iraqi desert. But at the same time we would have to invest in developing military hospitals as well as purchase a considerable number of wheelchairs and prostheses for war veterans with (in the best case) legs mutilated by land mines.

The other option is to turn our military into a source of elite, well-equipped units, for example, aviation units, which in present-day conflicts play a much greater role than infantry, which performs the "dirtiest" jobs in the absence of publicity and while suffering painful casualties.

Modern aviation is also the key to an effective repulsion of aggression by an eventual enemy, especially during the first, decisive stage--the struggle for air superiority. Therefore, our combat planes, and especially the future multipurpose combat planes, must be fully compatible with NATO requirements. This concerns extremely detailed requirements, precisely in order that NATO aircraft transferred to our air bases could utilize the existing logistical structure not only with the object of restoring combat readiness but also as regards the performance of repairs, inspections, and periodic maintenance. This may happen in the event that a prolonged crisis requires long-lasting presence of NATO air forces in our country. Otherwise, our NATO allies would be forced to set up their own logistical and repair facilities in our country at the moment a crisis or tension arises in our region and not before. That could be pregnant in consequences. On the occasion, it is worthwhile to consider just what aircraft will be flown by Americans, Belgians, Dutchmen, and Danes to our air bases?

Instead of a Conclusion

The F-16 is said to be a fighter used for many years already and therefore not a promising one. But that is not true. Although this plane has indeed been flown for many years, it still is being produced and will remain produced for many years ahead. Furthermore, the versions of the F-16 used at present have hardly anything in common (other than the characteristic shape of the fuselage) with the versions built in the years past. Not only is this plane fully adapted to NATO standards but even, considering its widespread use in NATO air forces, the fact is that these standards are established in accordance with its capabilities and those of similar aircraft (even in an informal manner). So far, more than 4,026 specimens of the F-16 have been built ("more than," because new specimens are continually being released from production lines, to this day, too). Given the number of orders placed until 2010 the output of F-16 planes will reach a total of 4,348, and in 2020, more than 4,570. In the next few years the F-16's will account for more than 40 percent of the entire combat air fleet of the USAF. The US Air Force expects to fly the F-16 until the year 2026. By 2010 a large number of planes of this type is scheduled to be upgraded, with the costs correspondingly apportioned (the so-called economies-of-scale effect). Poland could upgrade its F-16's in, say, 2015, that is after one-third of their operating life, more or less. Moreover, this plane has a successor, in the form of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35).

This also applies to the Mirage 2000, which has a successor, the Rafale. But as for the Gripen, it has no successor. The company Saab has admitted that this will be the last combat plane to be developed in Sweden.

As for the F-35, it is worth noting that this plane has also been chosen by Great Britain, both by its naval aviation (FAA) and by its air force (RAF). This is an unusually promising aircraft, designed with a thought to future transition to unmanned flying combat vehicles (see the article in Lotnictwo Wojskowe, No 1, 2002).