這篇文章認為發展中的無人地面載具（UGV）將比無人飛機（UAV）更對現代軍隊具有革命性的意義。他的論點是，性能提昇有兩種，數量上的、性能上的，而只有性能上的提昇才是「革新」。
UAV能提供以下三種提昇：
1.滯空時間長：數量上
2.便宜：數量上
3.不會死人：性能上
其中只有第三是性能上的 而其實有人戰術偵察機也可以有更高的生存性。
相反地 UGV提供的是城鎮戰的能力 這是目前完全缺乏的（當然這是很有爭議的） 所以他認為提供下一波軍事科技將會是「機器戰警」？！
美國海陸將發展出一種12磅，可以上下樓梯的Dragon Fly（美國海陸的無人戰具計畫似乎都用Dragon開頭，例如護航V-22的無人戰鬥直昇機Dragon Fly，120公釐無人迫砲Dragon Fire，70噸重，15公尺長，擁有一口陶瓷利牙的Dragon Rex.....嗯...如果夠無聊的話）以擔任逐屋搜索（臨檢？） 以及先進紅外線/電視的偵察（照相舉發？）以淘汰人類警察....嗯...如果夠無聊的話
Transformational Stars: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Unmanned Ground Vehicles?
(Source : Center for Defense Information; issued June 11, 2002)
(by Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst, CDI ; Reproduced by kind permission of CDI)
WASHINGTON---Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) garnered tremendous positive coverage during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The media used them as a poster-child for the new high-tech U.S. way of war and the administration cited them as key tools of military "transformation."
Until the technology is much more advanced, however, UAVs will not be very "transformational" -- as transformation is defined below. The attention devoted to UAVs, however, has overshadowed a similar area of technology development that may well be far more transformational in the near term than UAVs: unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs.
The definition of transformation used here is: qualitative change in the way forces fight, rather than mere quantitative improvement. Under this definition, a new artillery piece that fires somewhat farther and faster than the old one, and drives faster, is unlikely to be transformational. But one that uses computers to integrate a network of sensors on separate platforms for targeting might well be transformational.
Currently, until UAVs become far more numerous, capable, and reliable, they add mainly quantitative improvements to operations. Their principal advantages over occupied aircraft are (1) they can have long "loiter" times -- ability to fly for long periods without in-flight refueling, over 24 hours for Predator, 36 hours for the Global Hawk; (2) they can be cheaper to buy and operate; and (3) if they are lost, no pilot is killed or falls into enemy hands.
The first two elements are quantitative improvements. The UAVs have a reconnaissance capability similar in concept to small or large manned aircraft, although not as well developed yet, but can do it for longer, particularly if manned aircraft are not refueled in flight. Their cost advantage exists in theory but must be carefully preserved or it could evaporate as the acquisition bureaucracy almost inevitably turns to more powerful, larger, more capable -- and more expensive -- models.
Currently, cheaper UAVs like the $3 million Predator possess a key attribute: they can be used in higher-risk situations with less concern about losing a valuable asset. Once UAVs approach the cost of occupied aircraft -- Global Hawk costs have ballooned to $48 million each including the ground equipment, while F-16 fighters have averaged $19 million -- their expendability diminishes.
The third difference with occupied aircraft, however, is a qualitative change: the lack of a pilot to be killed or captured could, for example, enable a high level of reconnaissance to be undertaken in combat over well-defended enemy areas. But the advantage diminishes when, as in Afghanistan, there is a very low threat from air defenses and enemy air forces. UAVs will have limited self-defense capabilities for the near future and are vulnerable to hostile aircraft and ground-based air defenses, so they work best in conditions of U.S. air supremacy.
The most likely scenarios for use of U.S. forces in the near future is smaller-scale contingencies without the threat of advanced integrated air defense networks like those possessed by the former Warsaw Pact. When the threat to pilots is very low -- or has been destroyed in the opening phases of an operation -- manned reconnaissance aircraft can be used with low risk, which limits the immediate transformational impact of UAVs.
Unmanned ground vehicles, in contrast, offer a huge qualitative change in the way smaller-scale contingencies, which are likely to occur in urban settings, are fought: they may make U.S. urban combat more acceptable and thus more feasible.
Intense urban combat has inevitably involved extremely high casualties for the attacker and defender -- if it is not "fought" in the recent Russian style of simply leveling built-up areas with artillery, as was done against Grozny in the second war with Chechnya. Annihilation of cities is unlikely to be an available option politically for the United States.
Even during the Cold War, the U.S. military approach was to avoid offensive ground combat in urban areas wherever possible. The perception that a U.S. military operation cannot absorb substantial casualties without losing public support has sustained this approach into the post-Cold War era. Although that perception may have eased somewhat in the post-9/11 context of strong public backing for U.S. military operations, the very high casualty rates of urban combat still support urban-averse doctrines.
The Marine Corps, however, sensing a niche role, has taken an early lead in experimenting with urban combat. Among other initiatives, the Marine Corps conducted a series of high-level experiments on Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) called Urban Warrior starting in 1997.
The high casualty counts of urban warfare are caused by the concealment and protection that city blocks offer defenders -- every window, door, room, stairway, and building can contain enemy soldiers and must be painstakingly cleared at close range. Unmanned ground vehicles, such as remote controlled devices with video and other sensors, offer the possibility of checking rooms and corners without having to peer around each door or throw a grenade into each room. The addition of weaponry to the UGVs further reduces hazards for the infantry. UGVs could also be extremely useful in certain non-urban settings, such as the caves and tunnels that were prominent in Afghanistan.
The Services have already begun work on the new technologies. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has appropriately focused its unmanned vehicle work on the tactical level in urban combat. Rather than build a heavy 30-40 pound UGV able to climb stairs but too heavy for an individual Marine to handle well, it has developed a simple 12 pound UGV called Dragon Runner with video and infra-red sensors. It can be thrown up stairs. In the summer of 2002 the Army is scheduled to field a tracked robot called Matilda with sensors and a payload and weapon capability.
UGV technology is still in its infancy -- and UGVs can be more difficult to design than UAVs, given the variety of terrain they have to cross. Nonetheless, more than UAVs in the near term, they offer the possibility of bringing fundamental transformation to U.S. strategies and ways of fighting -- making crucial operations in urban areas possible that the nation would otherwise be loathe to conduct.
