根據莫斯科國防資訊國際中心主任伊凡薩夫．蘭秋克所言，北京及德里乃俄羅斯在軍售的兩個主要戰略夥伴。不過，中印把俄羅斯僅當成一個出售價廉物美軍火的國家。中印長久以來缺少購買西方先進武器的可能性，但這不排除未來他們會改變自身戰術利益，改向西方採購軍火。在此情況下，而俄羅斯將被迫提供所有可能性，以挽回他們對俄製軍火的興趣。
中印兩國購買百分之六十至七十俄出口軍火。不過，俄對中印有不同的戰略考量。俄官方並不掩飾，印度不會在日後可能與俄羅斯出現軍政衝突，但俄羅斯則非常害怕北京日漸成長的軍政及經濟力量。

戰略及技術分析中心主任魯斯蘭．庫霍夫指出，中國在購買大批俄製先進武器後，從原先使用第二代武器，轉變成擁有第四代武器的國家。在傳統武器領域，共軍的力量甚至已超過俄羅斯部隊。因此，兩國若發生衝突，很明顯地，將立即進入動用核武嚇阻的層次。在此背景下，俄羅斯參謀總部及國防部乃是俄羅斯大規模與中國發展軍售關係的主要反對者。
中國明顯地也瞭解此點。所以，先前所購得的俄製軍火都部署在南方，象徵自己有其他的戰略利益。但俄羅斯的恐懼仍然表現在對中軍售武器的性能上。例如，俄出售中國九五六型驅逐艦，使得中國可在太平洋佔一席之地，甚至直接與美國競爭。但隨後，俄羅斯又建議印度購買一一三五．六型驅逐艦。一一三五．六型驅逐艦正係取代九五六型的設計。就動力裝置、主要飛彈武器、該船引擎動力，以及航行聲音小等性能來看，都超過中國購得的九五六。為此，中國也要求，在第二批現代級驅逐艦的軍購契約上，要求俄方提供更完善的防空飛彈系統及長程巡翼飛彈。

俄對中、印出售的蘇愷三十性能，亦有不同。印度購得之蘇愷三十擁有更先進的相位陣列雷達、早期定位預見雷達，具備向量操縱桿的AL31FN引擎(印度甚至獲授權生產)。中國購得的蘇愷三十則無上述性能。因此，在飛行性能、發現及摧毀敵方目標的能力上，都遜於印度的蘇愷三十。

俄出售中印的基洛級潛艇亦不同。中國購得較老舊的華沙型，而印度購得較先進的阿穆爾型。此外，印度想購買更先進的第三代核子動力潛艇及聲音更小的九七一鯊魚型潛艇。相對而言，中國購買俄製核子動力潛艇的可能性則不高。

即使如此，印度今日並不急於向俄採購新的軍火。印度現在的採購清單上只剩太空領域的產品，例如：遠距地面定位衛星，也就是間諜衛星。此因美國新安全學說指出，願與印度及巴基斯坦同時進行平等的軍火合作。換言之，印度將有取得美國、以色列及西方國家軍火的可能性。在競爭壓力下，莫斯科將被迫提供印度更先進的武器。例如：俄印聯合企業BraMos生產超音速反艦巡翼飛彈「寶石」、提供印度T90S戰車，以及邀請印度參與研發加第五代戰機的財源挹注。

目前俄印軍售契約值為三十五億美元，雙方合作案為三百五十件，其中包括：維修及重新裝備郭爾什科夫將軍號巡洋艦，提供及授權印度生產新一代柴油動力潛艇阿穆爾-1650、研發及提供印度購得之蘇愷三十所需無線電子設備、提供龍捲風齊射火箭系統，以及海軍所需彈藥。印俄也正在談判採購俄製A50偵察機，維修及提升印度陸軍先前所購俄製軍火及設備，總值達一億一千萬美元，改善印度軍隊、重新裝備印度軍工業，以及兩國共同進行武器方面的科研工作等。

薩主任指出，與印度做生意並不容易。印度要求「寶石」飛彈在太平洋只能由印度擁有，俄羅斯不可出售給其他國家。而在其他武器研發上，如第五代戰機，印度也可能要求研發中所製造的技術，不可由其他國家取得。這都讓俄羅斯可能喪失其他生意。此外，印度也想向以色列及美國購買軍火，以彌補購得的俄製軍火之缺點。

中國也瞭解到與俄國進行軍售的極限所在。即使中國與美國處於軍政及經濟競爭態勢，但中國也開始與美國談判軍售。此對俄軍工業乃係警訊。不過，目前美中軍售仍有客觀限制，未能突破。

中印會想與西方合作軍售原因為，俄製軍火之間的協調性不佳。例如，T90S坦克雖然先進，但缺少作戰電子管理系統，而無法與其他武器配合，以致於摧毀空中及地面目標能力打折扣。而俄羅斯也並非不願提供整合型武器給中印，原因則在於自己的軍隊也未擁有這樣的武器。俄軍工業目前雖有一堆這樣的武器整合計畫，但欠缺財源。換言之，只能是計畫而非成品，或最多也僅是開發出一個樣品而已。

必須指出，印度已經不想等待俄羅斯，而直接與以色列洽談戰鬥電子管理系統。例如，去年俄印軍售為十億美元，但印度與以色列的軍售額則為二十億美元。換言之，即使印度與莫斯科將簽署A50契約，但電子設備仍將係採用以色列製品。

在此情況下，普丁訪問中國也具象徵性。中國新領導人上台，有可能重新審視與俄軍售關係。例如，專家不排除未來中美可能就台灣達成協議，由中國以港澳模式和平接收台灣的可能性。若然，中美則有可能開展軍售關係。

不過，上述情形可能性不高。例如，先前新加坡電信公司Asia Pacific Mobile Telecommunications與美Hughes Electronics的四億五千萬美元、採購衛星通訊設備的契約即未成功。美國發現該公司百分之五十一股份為共軍所有，而封鎖該契約。
日前參加中國珠海二OO二航太展的俄羅斯方面人員指出，中美仍存在歧異，而此對莫斯科有利；而中國仍然想購買俄製軍火。不過，中國也開始對俄要求印度規格及合作條件。例如，共同研發及購買更具前景的軍火。

普霍夫主任認為，中國也透過其他方式，取得俄製技術，避開俄軍火出口管控系統。例如，中國不一定會購買俄製先進坦克，而採取自製的作法。北京經常要求莫斯科，由俄專家領導中國工程師，以研發類似於對俄採購的武器。在這種研發過程中，中國工程師可能在向俄籍老師詢問中，獲得遭俄羅斯官方管控的技術知識。畢竟，俄籍專家在教導基礎知識時，很難不會講出超過對方所詢問之問題範圍。目前，很難判斷有多少俄羅斯重要技術概念因此模式而流失。

AL31FN引擎的一些介紹可參考
http://rcaam.milparade.com/paid/229/5-01.shtml

The AL-31FN was created using the plants own funds in less than a year.
The compressor and the associated TVC nozzle were built within a record
short time

所謂具備向量操縱桿是指TVC(Thrust Vector Control),向量推力控制
AL31FN引擎有個向量推力控制噴嘴﹐以進行向量推力控制

咦﹖雖然說 BrahMos 必會用些移植技術，
但真的確定 BrahMos 只是 Yakhont 的複製品嗎﹖

我是聽過這種說法…

>>印俄也正在談判採購俄製A50偵察機

這篇也在講相關的東西， Bramos 部份的說法就不同
可看看文末的提到的解放軍側衛接收數量

Copyright 2002 Agency WPS DEFENSE AND SECURITY December 16, 2002, Monday
SECTION: MILITARY COOPERATION LAST ORDER Expert, December 9, 2002, pp. 71-73

Alexei Khazbiev

BEFORE PRESIDENT PUTINS VISIT TO CHINA AND INDIA, ALMOST ALL EXPERTS HAD
BEEN SURE THAT THE ARMS TRADE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THESE COUNTRIES WOULD BE
THE KEY TOPIC OF PUTINS TALKS WITH THEIR LEADERS. HOWEVER, IT TURNS OUT
THAT RUSSIA IS LOSING THE ARMS MARKET IN INDIA AND CHINA.

Before Vladimir Putins visit to China and India, almost all experts had been sure that the arms
trade between Russia and these countries would be the key topic of Putins meetings with Jiang
Zemin and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The boldest members of the Russian delegation had even predicted
the signing of new major contracts in the sphere of military-technical cooperation, worth
billions of dollars.

Our officials really had some reasons for being optimistic. China is the largest importer of
Russian weapons: it spends over $1.5 billion on weapons every year. India is the second largest
customer for Russian arms: it spends $1 billion a year on them. Overall, these two countries
account for over two-thirds of the exports of the Russian military-industrial complex.
Furthermore, India and China are preparing for probable military conflicts now: India is
getting ready for a conflict with Pakistan, and China may face a military conflict with Taiwan.
Therefore, both the countries are rearming their armies, and the whole situation seems
prepossessing for new contracts with the Russian military-industrial sector. However, not a
single new contract has been signed in the course of Putins visit to these countries.

The main problem of the military-technical cooperation between Russia and India is delays of the
sale of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier. The negotiations over this deal ground to a halt
three years ago. The Admiral Gorshkov, of 45,000 tons displacement, designed by the Nevskoe
design bureau, rusted through in the early 1990s and was placed in dry-dock. India needs this
vessel like it needs oxygen. According to Indias military doctrine, India needs three
aircraft-carriers, while now it has only one: the Viraat, which is to be removed from the fleet
in 2007-09. Meanwhile, India has alternatives. First, it may try to build an aircraft carrier
by itself, although this alternative is the least realistic. Second, it is possible to accept
the UKs offer to buy two aircraft carriers Invincible with Sea Harrier fighters. But these
vessels may be withdrawn from the Royal Navy no earlier than in 2006, which is unacceptable for
India. Thus, India does not have a serious alternative to the Admiral Gorshkov.

Therefore, Ilya Klebanov and General Director of Rosoboronexport Andrei Belyaninov have been
aspiring to get as much as possible for the ship. At first, the matter concerned $2 billion.
This sum also included payments of 25 MiG-29K deck fighters and five Ka-28 and Ka-31 helicopters.
However, India is ready to pay only part of this sum, approximately $1 billion now, which does
not suit Russia. As a result, Klebanov has made a decision to discuss the issue of the price of
the aircraft carrier with Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez.

Russias persistence has enraged the Indian authorities. It has been made clear for Russia that
its place on the Indian arms market may be taken by the US and other countries in some time.
President George Bush has eliminated restrictions on 20 items of military products for export
from the US to India imposed after Indias nuclear test in 1998. Besides, India has requested
the French government to sell a batch of Mirage-2000 light fighters to it, while it could buy
MiG-29SMT instead. The Indian Defense Ministry has joined in the project of elaboration of the
American F-35 fifth generation fighter, having rejected an analogous proposal made by Russia.
Besides, India has made up its mind to sharply activate the development of its national
military industry. At its first stage, it arranges licensed production lines setting up joint
ventures together with Russia. Over the past three years, India has bought licenses from Russia
on manufacturing 140 Su-30MKI fighters, several hundreds of T-90 tanks, and has placed an order
for three frigates of the Talvar type.

Within the framework of the Bramos joint venture, India and Russia have started to develop a new
anti-ship supersonic missile, which is to be placed on the international market next year.
Currently, Indians are elaborating the high-precision targeting system and software system for
this missile. The second stage of this program implies cloning of Russias developments by the
Indian military-industrial sector. So far, the scales of this cloning are not large: only
destroyers and frigates are being intensively developed. Indias most successful project was the
D-61 Delhi destroyer constructed with Russias assistance in 1997. This is a mixture of the
Soviet destroyers of the projects No. 956 and 1155, but it is better than either of them taken
separately. It has a Shtil-1 anti-aircraft missile complex and a Fregat-MA radar installment, as
well as an Uran-E anti-ship missile complex.

Since the start of the 1990s, India has been actively constructing improved Godavari frigates.
Which will be equipped with Uran-T complexes and the first national anti-aircraft missile
complexes Trishul.

Thus, Russia is already losing the market of platforms, and soon may lose the market of weapons
proper. The exceptions here and anti-aircraft defense systems, fighters, and submarines.
Fernandez may discuss purchases of these weapons with Klebanovin the course of his upcoming
visit to Moscow scheduled for January 2003. However, experts assert that only the Admiral
Gorshkov project may be implemented in the near future.

Official Kremlin Intl News Broadcast
December 17, 2002 Tuesday

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH RUSLAN PUKHOV, DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIES
AND TECHNOLOGIES ANALYSIS CENTER, ON RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY $

訪談 「戰略及科技分析中心」主持人﹕俄國軍業

Moderator: I am glad to welcome you to the Russian Press Institute. Our topic today is
The Challenges of Globalization and the Russian Defense Industry Complex. I am glad to
introduce our guests, Ruslan Nikolayevich Pukhov, director of the Strategies and Technologies
Analysis Center and Maxim Alexandrovich Pyadushkin, chief editor of the journal Export
Vooruzhenii (Arms Export). And Ruslan Nikolayevich will be the first speaker.

Pukhov: Thank you for coming. I would like to thank Natalia Alexandrovna and the Press
Development Institute for the opportunity that they give us to speak to you. Our titles are
sometimes not easy to understand, but hopefully, the content we have to convey to you will be
easy to understand.

The topic of the press conference is The Challenges of Globalization and the Russian Defense
Industry Complex. And let me explain to you what we mean by that. This is why we have laid out
some materials that contain some numbers that present in a more laconic way the message that we
are going to try to convey to you now.

When the defense industry complex is discussed in Russia one frequently mentioned fact is that 80
percent of the financing of the Russian military-industrial complex comes from export earnings
and only 20 percent from domestic orders. This puts high on the agenda the issue that is called
military technical cooperation in Russia. Actually, it means arms trade. It has to be noted that
Russia is perhaps one of the few remaining countries with a developed defense industry which is
geared to the buy and sell paradigm, rather to sell, indeed. Most developed countries have long
adopted a different paradigm of military-technical cooperation and arms trade. And that is
inter-state transnational alliances when a corporation seeking to consolidate its position in
this or that market buys into or allows another countrys corporation to buy into itself. There
are many such cases and we will tell you about some of them. For example, the formation of a
common defense industry in Europe.

Another very interesting project is the wholesale purchase of the most attractive military assets
of the Republic of South Africa by the British military-industrial complex and so on. We thought
that considering the position in which the Russian military-industrial complex finds itself at
present, Russia should also look for partners in developing weapons systems and in breaking into
markets.

We have carried out some studies and we would like to present them a little later when not only
quantitative but qualitative trends become apparent. But the Presidents visit first to China and
then to India and the debate that followed have prompted us to come forward a little earlier.
Another push was given by the announcement of the results of arms trade made last week by Deputy
Defense Minister and head of the Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation Mikhail Dmitriyev.
I will now turn the floor over to Maxim Alexandrovich who will make the main presentation. I will
then wrap it up and we will then take your questions.

Pyadushkin: As Ruslan Nikolayevich has said, the original topic of our press conference was to be
the presentation of a methodology for identifying potential partners of Russia in defense
industry cooperation. But I would like to start with something else. Last week tentative results
of the military-technical cooperation of Russia with foreign countries this year were published.
So, I will briefly speak on that, especially since these results are connected with the
methodology that we are going to present. The numbers are scarce, but they do indicate trends
this year in the field of arms trade. On the whole the first conclusion is that this year another
post-Soviet record of arms sales abroad was set. It is a little over 4 billion dollars. As for the
shares of the special exporters, the first notable change is the increased share of
Rosoboronexport (it has diminished in percentage terms, but in absolute terms it registered a
growth on the previous year). As usual the second place is contested. And we may be in for major
changes. It is possible that for the first time in the past two years the KBP (Instrument
Building Design Bureau) will be the runner-up. According to their data, their sales in the first
9 months amounted to 400 million dollars.

But this is preliminary information. I hope that the main special arms exporters will announce
more precise figures later. One can note the increased share of independent special exporters,
especially KBP and RSK MiG which this year started filling the 1 billion order book it put
together last year. Tentative figures show that the shares of KBM (Machine Building Design
Bureau) and NPO Mash have remained at last years level. Speaking about Antei, this year it
completed its only export contract by supplying the remaining four Tor anti-aircraft missiles to
Greece. After that Antei and Almaz merged. Thus, the share of what used to be Antei was about 120
million dollars this year.

But this is just one side of military-technical cooperation which is the trade and mediation
paradigm. But we believe that in the present-day conditions of globalization of the economy and
globalization of the processes of military-technical cooperation the most important aspect is not
this paradigm, but a different paradigm, the production cooperation paradigm. This is the
paradigm Russia should seek to develop. There exist a good many international projects in which
the Russian defense industry takes part. Ruslan has named some of them. At the same time the
multiplicity of projects and partners indicates that the process of transition to the cooperation
model is somewhat spontaneous and there is no definite government policy in this field. But there
again, the Russian defense enterprises, like the government bodies, face the problem of correct
identification of the best foreign partners. So, we are trying to develop a methodology for
identifying such partners.

So far we only have preliminary studies and I think the methodology will be presented in more
detail in our future issues, the issues of the journal Arms Export. For the time being I will
give you a brief overview of what we are planning to do.

Speaking about identification of optimal foreign partners, we interpret optimal in terms of two
main characteristics, first is desirability, that is, whether such partnership meets the
interests of Russia. And the second characteristic is possibility, that is, whether potential
partner is ready for such cooperation. We are trying to work out a formalized method. In the
first place we are trying to determine the factors that will influence the development of such
relations.

We propose the following factors. First, the impact of the growth of the defense industrial
potential of the partner on the national security of Russia. And another remark. The point is
that by identifying these factors we try to assess each of them both qualitatively and
quantitatively, that is worked out, on the basis of these factors, some sort of rating in order
to understand with which partner we should develop cooperation.

As I said, the first factor is how a partners potential affects national security. This
influence may be positive, neutral or negative. Another factor is a partners financial
potential. We proceed from the assumption that given the weak investment status of Russia, a
partners greater cooperation potential is a positive factor. A comparable potential will be a
neutral factor. Insufficient investment will have a negative impact on the rating of a country to
be evaluated. The third factor that affects the development of partnership is the quality of
corporate management in a potential partner country. The higher the quality of corporate
management, the more preferable a partner country will be. If the quality of corporate management
is low, this factor will have a negative impact.

Another important factor is whether a potential partner has entered into competitive relationships
with Russia in the international arms markets. Again, if the level of such competition is high, it
will have a negative impact. If there is no competition, it will have a positive impact. The next
parameter is the quality of government bureaucracy in a potential partner country. By government
bureaucracy we understand first of all its competency, level of corruption, and its readiness to
serve national interests.

The last, but not the least, parameter is the sovereignty of potential partner. If he has such
sovereignty, I mean his independence in making foreign policy decisions, we consider a
partnership as a possibility. If there is no such sovereignty, the possibility of developing such
a partnership will be limited.

So far, we have tried empirically to identify the most probable candidate countries with which
Russia can develop or already develops military-technical cooperation. We have identified five
possible partners:
India, China, the European Union, Ukraine and Israel.

All of these political and economic entities either buy Russian weapons and military equipment or
participate in the production and modernization of weapons, or in R&D; projects.

In our view, China and Israel are unlikely to ever become our partners in big projects. Chinas
capability to invest heavily in joint programs has been devalued by high military-political risks.
One can speak forever, and quite convincingly, about the resolution of territorial disputes and
strategic partnership between Russia and China, but the Russian military remembers Chinas big
demographic supremacy and the deteriorating military infrastructure in Siberia.

The main obstacle to full-scale partnership is that China may remain the only country that can
afford not to join any military-economic alliances in the future. In other words, it will be
self-sufficient from the military-economic point of view.

As far as Israel is concerned, it should be pointed out that Israel does not have considerable
available financial resources because it is heavily dependent on US economic aid. However, in
many cases the Russian and Israeli defense complexes supplement each other, which makes their
joint products quite competitive. However, this makes Israel an unacceptable partner.
But most importantly, this country does not have sovereignty in the military-technical field. As
I said, it is heavily dependent militarily and economically on the US. As an example, I could
name the Lavi fighter project that was closed, and a recent deal to supply Israeli Falcon radars
on Russian airborne platforms to China. The decision to annul these deals was made, as is known,
in Washington.

Again, we must not forget the fact that Israeli-Palestinian conflict creates tremendous political
risks for any military-technical project that is implemented jointly with Israel.

Ukraine. We assessed its financial potential as comparable with that of Russia, but only in
sectors where real partnership is possible, namely, engine-making and the production of military
transport planes. I want to remind you that the sales of Ukraines Motor Sich corporation exceeds
the sales of any Russian engine-making enterprise. Likewise, we think that the level of Ukraines
technological development is higher than Russias in these two sectors. However, we think that
Russian-Ukrainian defense and industrial cooperation involves military-political risks because
Ukraine has officially announced its decision to join NATO.

The recent Kolchuga scandal showed the Ukraine may serve as a channel through which Russian
technologies may leak to the West. Besides, we think that Ukraine is the only country of the
potential partners where the quality of government bureaucracy is lower than that in Russia.

Close to the ideal military-technical partner is India. As we know, relations with this country
are free of military-political risks, which gives it some advantage over China. The level of
government bureaucracy is comparable with Russias. Besides, we already have a good deal of joint
programs covering such areas as aircraft-making -- SU-30 MKI -- the development of a transport
plane, the creation of rockets -- project Bramos. The most attractive Russian company for
international cooperation is EAPO and it maintains the closest contacts with India. However,
there are some constraints in relations with New Delhi. The first one is Indias relative
financial weakness. Another one is that the Israelis and the French have been actively trying to
enter Indian market, and lately the US too, following the lifting of certain restrictions.

We think the fundamental reason for Indias attempt to reorientate its military-technical
cooperation toward the West is that it does not believe in Russias future as a high-tech
country. Russia will have to destroy this image of a technologically and educationally degrading
country. This is why it is very important to implement at least one big national project of
creating new weapon systems, primarily new generation aircraft. In order to preserve the stable
dynamics of Russian-Indian relations, they need to get a new strong boost. In our view, this
boost should come from Indian investment in the Russian defense industry and from Russian
investment in the Indian aerospace industry.

According to our preliminary assessments, the second most attractive partner of Russia in the
field of high technologies is the European Union. As we know, military cooperation with Europe
does not have good prospects at the moment. There have been several projects with a European
partner, namely, the development of the Mi-38 helicopter with Eurochopper. Research and
development was done for French anti-aircraft missiles Aster. Everybody has heard about a joint
project between the Yakovlev design bureau and AeroMatch to develop the training plane Yak-130.
There has been a similar project with France to develop the training plane MiG-AT.

In principle, one of the possible reasons for the failures is that all of these projects were
launched in the early 1990s when there was no common defense-industrial system in Europe. We
think that now this system has been created with the aerospace and defense concern EADS. Now that
the system has been created, it is possible that Russian-European defense cooperation will
develop more successfully.

As is known, already now the EADS is negotiating cooperation with EAPO and KASKOL. This
cooperation so far covers mainly civil aviation, then SAPO is the production of the individual
components for the airbus, including A-320. In the case of KASKOL, it is the establishment of
an engineering center for attracting Western standards into Russia. The Western engineering
standards into Russia.

In addition, as you all remember, in the middle of last year the EADS and the Rosaviakosmos
signed a strategic partnership agreement which provides for Russian-European cooperation in the
aerospace area, the volumes of which for the coming ten years are assessed at 2 billion euros.
In our opinion, Russia can and must participate in the European projects, above all, in regard to
the transport aircraft A-400 and the civilian liner of super capacity -- A-380. It can do so as
a producer of individual buildup components and systems. In other words, it is the realistic
level so far, of Russias involvement in these projects.

Pukhov: I will add something. The fact is that we did not adopt such a potential partner as the
United States because in our view, cooperation with the United States, despite some individual
ad hoc, successful projects, it has never brought Russia any long-term advantages. Say, the
shipments of target missiles, carried out in the middle of 1990s -- in the amount of several tens
of them -- can hardly be regarded as a good debut for long-term relations.

Also in the case of the Khrunichev center, which upon assignment from NASA manufactured some
components for the international space station, is also something quite local and we can see
that along with China, which is likely in the future to develop autonomous defense industry, we
still have the United States which will either develop a fully independent program or admit to it
such most dependent and at the same time most loyal partners such as the United Kingdom or Israel.

Concerning the UK, I have in mind the project JSF and concerning Israel, I am talking about
developing the Tkhat(?) system. Now I am ready to take your questions.

Q: The military editorial board of TASS. Now in Russia there are the high guests from Yemen and
yesterday the high guest expressed readiness to purchase from Russia the SU-27 and the SU-35, a
total of three contracts of high price may be concluded. Based on your methodology, which you
have developed, and I regard it magnificent and if it provides practical guidance, it will just
be remarkable. Will it not so happen that Yemen has not yet paid for the machines produced in
the Soviet Union, and 90 percent of the armed forces were using that equipment, and now we give
it to them and we ourselves again remain penniless and without anything.

Pukhov: I would like to say that our rationalizations we shared with you orally and in writing,
they pertained to being operational in terms of the production paradigm. As to cooperation with
Yemen, as also cooperation with most of the countries, takes place within the framework of the
trading and mediation paradigm: we give you iron, you give us money or: you give us products, we
give you the money. That is why the risks built into the cooperation with Yemen, they must be
parried by the state go-between, by Russias competent authorities, insurance companies. I must
say that these problems are the problems of today. We tried in some way to look into the future
to see what lies in store for us within the next 10 to 15 years. It is perfectly obvious that if
we do not cooperate with some particular partners, the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC)
will degrade. There is no such MIC in the world -- the Russian MIC is an exception -- which lives
only off the export orders.

That is why when I associate with, say, managers and directors, it is commonplace for them to say
that the State Defense Order is a myth. It is a myth, we dont believe in it, and to this I always
tell them that if the state defense order is a myth, then that means that Russia as a country is
also a myth. Because a country must buy arms for itself. But the only country that is in a state
of war is for us a pretext for disarmament. We have a war going on in Chechnya and we dont have
the purchases of new arms. Any other country, take the United States which was not a target for a
massive attack, is arming and rearming its own forces and so on. Europe which faces no principal
threats -- the Europeans talk about the fact that the main threat to them is that of terrorism or
the Albanian prostitution.

However, this does not prevent them from rearming. We for some reasons are disarming. This was
the message we tried to get across. As to the problem with Yemen, I think it could be settled
somehow.

Moderator: Thank you very much. Any more questions?
Q: I have this question: you are talking about cooperation with the European Union. We know that
in Eastern Europe there is one third of the cheap arms produced in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
Europe is in no hurry to engage in modernizing is military equipment, in renewing the equipment
which exists. If we cooperate with some high-tech enterprises, we do that for shared participation
and for pumping out the technologies. How can this process be regulated?

Pukhov: Concerning this question, there seem to be two answers. Firstly, we spoke about the
civilian cooperation with Europe. After the rejection of the An-70 project, which was a
semi-military program, we can hardly talk about the prospects of creating, say, a joint missile or
something else. But this does not prevent us from cooperating on the civilian range of products.

If I am to talk about Eastern Europe, most of the East European countries, for instance those
that have acceded to NATO, in the first wave and in the second and are striving to get into the
European Union, they still -- at least in their foreign policy -- and the arms trade largely
depends on the nature of foreign policy, follow the United States.

In reality, having left the Warsaw Treaty, they have just changed their status of vassals. First
they used to have one Signor, now they have another. That is why those heavy arms that they have
-- they will either be modernized by them with the help of Western partners or they will just give
them up as Czechia in the past gave up MiG-29 planes. Like in the case with Yemen, it is some
quite interesting problem. But we will not even recall the problem ten years from now. This
problem will be history. In my opinion, we must look into the future, what will happen if we do
not make correct steps and what can we do to keep the potential that we still have. Did I answer
your question?

Pyadushkin: I would take issue with the statement that the East European countries are not
striving to modernize their arms. The fact is that there are quite many programs of modernization
of the accumulated Soviet arms. I think there are such programs almost in all countries, such as
Poland, Czechia and there are the national modernization programs and as far as I know, in this
year the RSK MiG made a certain breakthrough in the market of modernization of Soviet aviation
technology in Eastern Europe by concluding several contracts to modernize MiG-29 fighter planes.
I think they included contracts with Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and if I remember
correctly, Bulgaria. But of course, in terms of our methodology when we refer to Europe we dont
mean Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is a separate market. The defense industry in Eastern Europe
is not an independent player.

As these countries join the EU they will become at best a production shopfloor for the West
European defense concerns. At worst, it will be converted to civilian purposes or will cease to
exist.So, our methodology is geared mainly to West European concerns, such as EADS and BAE
systems. Technologically, they are a cut above the industry of Eastern Europe so, we should seek
to have them as our potential partners.

Q: Golos Rossii. In connection with Eastern Europe it was reported today that the director
general of the Russian Munitions Agency, Zinovy Pak and the Polish Foreign Minister are planning
to sign an intergovernment agreement on cooperation in chemical weapons disposal on Tuesday.
Honestly, I do not quite understand at what stage it may take place. Who will provide the money?
Or is it just about exchange of technologies?

Pukhov: We are not experts on these issues. It would be reasonable to assume that there are a
number of countries, beginning from the United States and ending with our neighbors, such as
Finland and Norway, which disburse project-tied sums of money ranging from several hundred
thousand dollars to several tens of millions, for disposal of our submarines and clean-up.

Q: So, they are going to foot the bill?
Pukhov: I think you are right, but I dont think that we are talking about large sums. This
belongs rather to the area of inter-state environmental cooperation and not military cooperation.

Q: Delovoi Petersburg, Pyotr Shumov. You say that the Russian defense industry must become
integrated in international production cooperation. How fit is our defense industry for such
cooperation in terms of management and structure?

Pukhov: The standard of management in our defense industries varies greatly. It may be very
high at some enterprises, comparable to the highest Western standards, but at some enterprises
it is very backward. The pattern is that management is typically more advanced at private
enterprises and the enterprises that are state-owned, or State Unitary Enterprises, management
is very rigid and it is hard to sell to them the need for international alliances.

So, I think that regardless of the position taken by these managers, it would depend more on
the legal framework. Because if the plan worked out under the supervision of Ilya Iosifovich
Klebanov is implemented -- and the plan is to create several holding companies in which the state
will have a 51 percent state -- I dont think that Western investors and potential partners would
rush to invest in them because they wont be able to control these enterprises.

Partnership in some cases may even include a surrender of the controlling block of shares. So,
this question belongs to a different realm. It is not directly connected with the good or poor
management of this or that individual enterprise. If we take the Sukhoi design bureau which forms
the core of the emerging holding company Sukhoi, how can you talk about cooperation if its
accounts are classified, even though it is a joint stock company? If you want to look at the
balance books you have to produce a permit and you will then be led to a secret room where you
can look at these accounts. At the same time the balance sheets of Lockheed Martin, Thales, or
any other company are available on the Internet and are issued every year in March and April.

By the way, the table that we have taken from Defense News has the biggest European producers
marked out in red. Obviously, the US is at the top of the list, but we are also marked out. I
must say that all our enterprises are dwarfs in terms of output and in terms of revenues and
turnover compared with the others. This cannot last long, they will simply be squeezed out. Or
else they will cease to exist or they will confine themselves to dealing with the third world countries.

Pyadushkin: I would like to add something. It was a good question. We have presented to you the
requirements to foreign partners. But speaking about the development of such cooperation model,
one should work out a methodology to requirements to Russian enterprise or Russian players that
would like to take part in such cooperation.

In my view one can tentatively single out three requirements that any Russian company must meet
if it wants to be involved in large-scale international cooperation in the defense sphere. First,
it should be an integrated structure, not an individual production facility or design office but --

Pukhov: Not an industrial park.

Pyadushkin: No, not an industrial park, but a vertically integrated structure that can really
take part in a large-scale project rather than fill out small individual orders that are not
connected with each other.

The stability of management may become a second criteria. So we can assume that a non-state or,
in simpler terms, a private defense industry may have the greatest potential for such cooperation
because in Russia most private enterprises are controlled by the management. This creates certain
stability, while at state-run enterprises the head or the general director may be dismissed at
any moment.

It is also very important for a foreign partner to know that he will be able to do business with
the same person in a year, two years, or three years. As Ruslan has already said, the level of
management is also important so that partners could speak the same language. But now
unfortunately we know of a very few examples of good management or organization of work at our
enterprises. Perhaps, EAPO is the best example.

Q: Have you looked at Brazil or South Africa as a prospective partner?

Pukhov: As for South Africa, we have one project with it -- the modernization of Mirage-F1
aircraft -- that was successfully implemented.

Russia was supposed to supply RD-33 engines and R-27 and other rockets there to modernize those
adopted by South Africas airforce earlier. But then it was decided that South Africa would not
modernize its aircraft and would instead buy the British-Swedish Gripen planes. So, the question
is now in limbo.

Then there was this idea to supply these planes to third world countries, for example, Latin
America, complete with the new Russian engine and new rockets. This was actively discussed at the
previous aerospace show MAKS when South African officials were here. But as far as I know, no
new contracts were signed. So, I think that it is either too early or already too late to speak
about this project.

As for other projects, as I have already said, the Britons have bought most interesting assets,
and we cannot join simply physically. Regarding Brazil, the sides have considered some
possibility of supplying equipment there. In particular, they have talked of some tender to buy
new interceptor planes for the Brazilian air force. Rosoboronexport, Sukhoi, and KnAAPO took an
active part in these discussions but following the election of the new President in Brazil and a
major economic crisis in this country, authorities if not canceled then at least postponed this
tender. Therefore, we cannot try this out in practice. Perhaps, it is good because we got the
impression at the last stage of the tender that it could be won by the French and their
Mirage-2000-5 because they had a very strong local partner, the company Embraer.

The Russian side garnered the support of its local partner, the company Vibras. But the Vibras
was not as heavy weight as Embraer in terms of technology and hardware.

So, some mixture will most likely benefit us.If Brazil chooses the Russian plane, then we will
consider giving Brazil a license to make it. Judging from the information that was available
from open sources, the Indian version is more probable than the Chinese one. In other words, it
will be a more advanced license, less truncated than the one given to China. But at the moment
this is just talking separated from real life.

Q: In addition to what you said about the results of your work and conclusions, do you have
anyone else in mind to whom you could give these --

Pukhov: This is a very good question. Perhaps, this is the most important question that has been
raised here today, and that is, why have we done all this? There is an opinion in our center that
there is no discussion in the Russian public service, and particularly in the bodies that are
responsible for international industrial cooperation, and no vision regarding where Russia should
move and with whom. Perhaps, it should not move anywhere.

Let them tell us as the taxpayer how we will benefit if we will keep our military-industrial
complex in an autonomous mode as the US and China do. This is why we wanted to make this known to
the press and to have a broader discussion that would go beyond a narrow circle of experts or our
magazine, which again is an expert magazine, in order to prompt Russian decision-makers to think
about this.

Moderator: Are you going to send it to the government by any chance?

Pukhov: No, not the concept. Those who read our journal, they can ask us but we dont have orders
from the government and thus we will not get off the ground in the autonomous mode.

Moderator: And you yourselves will not get off the ground. Any more questions?

Q: One more question. How do you assess the idea? I take it that the idea is not from the
industrial science but the state property is an intellectual product produced in the Soviet time?

Pukhov: It is not for me to criticize the high state authorities. In my view, it is a very good
instrument for deprivatizing. One can say that it is an intellectual property worth the following
amount. Correspondingly, they will require that private enterprises give up their shares or
correspondingly dilute the controlling interests or the blocking package.

This idea does not seem to be good to me and I dont think it will bring something positive for
the Russian defense industry.

Q: And in terms of international cooperation.

Pukhov: In terms of international cooperation I think that, if experience is any guide, the
private enterprises are more transparent and mobile and thus they are more acceptable partners
for international companies than the state entities. It is because generally, the private
companies try to provide the maximum information while in a state-owned company practically
everything is a state secret and thus if something is a state secret, nobody will invest
money into something he knows nothing about or is not in a position to verify.

Moderator: Thank you.

Q: Thus, in the first channel Mikhail Leontiev in his own program expressed his position that
only privatizing the military-industrial complex will ensure a modern development of the sector.
What do you think?

Pukhov: Yes, I share the view of Mikhail Leontiev. I believe that the process that is at work now
in Russia is a certain process of either deprivatization or a possible start of deprivatizing and
it will have a deleterious effect on the Russian defense industry, including its segments that
produce high-tech products, rather than low-tech, like a platform or something. That is why in my
opinion, the privatization must be continued.

Only this will provide the basis for restructuring the defense industry, because the state in the
person of particular ministers or departments -- and we have been doing this for seven years --
demonstrated its complete incompetence and impotence regarding the pursuit of a restructuring at
least of one sector, for instance the aviation industry.

Pyadushkin: I would add that in principle the privatizing of defense industry will remove the
extra burden from the state itself because, to put it crudely, now it is funding half of the
1,600 defense enterprises and in the process the bulk of those enterprises are not working, they
are simply functioning with the budget money. In this way, privatizing will generally rid the
state of these problems.

Again, the world experience, including the US experience, demonstrates that in the 1970s-1980s
the defense industry, state-owned, was privatized and thus the state got rid of the burden and at
the same time retained control over the processes at work in defense industry.

Pukhov: But it should be noted that even if the state withdraws from the capital of a private
enterprise, it still retains a large number of possibilities to control the enterprise, doesnt
it? This is the quality check for military products, this is the state defense order, if it
exists, it is keeping ones representatives at the enterprise, and it is also the legislation
and the export license. It means a lot of instruments with which one can control the capital
without necessarily participating in the capital.

Q: It seems to me that there is still a huge lobby of managers and some state departments who
live off the state-run military-industrial complex.

Pukhov: I would put it differently. Most likely, it is not a question, it is a comment. To you
comment I can say this: the main problem of restructuring Russias defense and industrial complex
is that it is not inside this system, it is rather on the outside. The main factor that blocks
the development of restructuring is the terrifying quality of Russian bureaucracy. It is the
state service, a huge number of low-paid officials actually in all the sectors, and defense
sector is no exception. From traffic police to officials in the Rosaviakosmos. Thus, in order
that the MIC reform be successful, there must take place a successful administrative reform. It
should take place in quite a foreseeable future, at least for the MIC. If the state service is
not reformed within the coming three or even four years, it would mean that the military-
industrial complex will simply die having failed to get the means and the international
alliances, because the structures and the schools get old, people tend to die and the new ones --
the new management and money -- do not come.

不會啊！越多資料越好！

小滬尾：

>>具備向量推力控制的AL31FN引擎

印度的蘇愷三十有這個裝置，那為何會比中國的蘇愷三十強？

請教一下﹐這應該不是slot array天線吧
難道是拋物面天線嗎﹖