（中央社台北四日電）中國國家海洋局確定將海濱城市青島列為國家深海潛水器基地。這是中國「八六三」計劃高科技項目主要內容，這項計劃目前正等待國務院審批。

香港大公報報導，中國正在研製下潛深度七千公尺載人深潛器，預計二00六年下水試驗並正式服役。這種深潛器可載三人，橢圓形，從海面下潛至七千公尺需時五小時，整個作業可延續十二小時。目前美國、日本、法國和俄羅斯都具備水深兩千公尺以上深水潛水器技術。

Janes Intelligence Review
October 2004

China Emerges As A Maritime Power

Surging domestic economic growth has provided funding for the long neglected Chinese navy. Dr. Lyle Goldstein and US Navy Lieutenant-Commander (retired) William Murray investigate the latest developments in Chinas drive to build a modern, potent maritime force.

A watershed in the evolution of Chinese maritime power occurred in May 2004 when it was announced that the head of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would be assigned a permanent seat in the Central Military Commission (CMC), Chinas highest national security decision-making body, which previously consisted solely of leaders of the ground forces.

Chinas emergence as a possible maritime power and its strategic orientation toward its maritime flank really only dates from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and recent progress is predicated on a very low level of maritime competency to begin with. However, it is Chinas exponential economic growth that is giving the PLAN an increasingly robust financial basis on which to build, aided by newly efficient extractive means for bringing Chinas new wealth into state coffers. The first fruits of
these efforts are now in evidence.

These people are building ships like nobodys business... Its mind-boggling, said a military attaché in Beijing, quoted in the Washington Post earlier this year.

Thus far, Beijing has opted to purchase much of its new fleet abroad, benefiting from the Kremlins fire-sale of advanced military technology. However, more noteworthy is the success that China appears to be having in fielding indigenous platforms to complement its foreign purchases. The latest generation of warships herald a new era in Chinese naval design and capabilities, while less tangible, but still significant, progress is also evident in the arena of military professionalism. Within the wider context of Chinas evolving prowess in basic science and engineering and the stunning growth of its merchant fleet and shipyards, the extent of Chinas maritime challenge is obvious.

Submarines at the centre

There are many indicators that submarines are the keystone of Beijings rapidly evolving area denial capability. In November 2003, there was a surfaced transit of a PLAN Ming-class submarine southeast of Japans Kyushu island and in July 2004 a new class of submarine, the Yuan-class, was unveiled.

Some analysts have dismissed Chinese submarine capabilities out of hand, citing the April 2003 Ming-class submarine 361 accident, in which 70 crewmembers died, as evidence of underwater incompetence. They argue that the PLAN submarine force has long suffered from antiquated and even dangerous platforms such as the Romeo-class diesel submarine and the Han and Xia-class nuclear vessels. Such doubts overlook the pace of progress that has become increasingly evident. More indicative of Beijings underwater trajectory is the accountability to which the PLANs leaders were held after the 361 disaster. The senior naval leaders deemed responsible were quickly sacked and replaced. Admiral Zhang Dingfa, a submariner, became the new commander of the PLAN, demonstrating a firm national commitment to the undersea force.

One of the most visible indicators of Chinese modernisation programmes is that the Song class submarine following a somewhat troubled design phase, has now entered serial production. Seven to eight Type 039A Songs have now been launched. According to one source, submarine production is being accelerated: China reportedly recently placed a large order for German diesel engines to power these vessels. Future Song-class submarines will likely feature air-independent propulsion technology, which PLAN publications discuss frequently.

According to photographs published on Chinese internet sites, including some from a Hong Kong port visit in May 2004, there appear to be three distinct versions of Song-class submarines, distinguishable by significant alterations to the submarines sail shape and the number and orientation of limber holes along the hull. Close-up photographs confirm that Song-class submarines, like the most recent versions of the Ming-class, have an anechoic rubber tile coating for sound dampening purposes.

Images thought to be of the interior of a Song-class submarine control room show flat screen control panels, one of which is apparently configured as a 360º digital waterfall broadband sonar display. This tends to confirm Western speculation that the Song-class is equipped with a copy of the French DUUX-5 digital sonar system - a major improvement over analog predecessors. There also appears to be a digital fire control system with
weapon presets or systems test options available for selection on additional flat screen monitors. Song-class submarines can reportedly fire the C-801 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) while submerged, as well as some of the PLANs most modern torpedoes. Other control room images depict a raised periscope, which features electrical or wave guide connectors near the eyepiece and handles that suggest the possibility of permanently
installed cameras, night vision enhancement, thermal imaging, laser range-finding, antenna systems, or other modern periscope capabilities. There also appears to be a flat screen for some type of satellite navigation system.

Complementing the Song-class programme is the PLANs ambitious 2002 Russian contract for eight Project 636 Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines. Along with 3M54E cruise missiles, delivery of all eight submarines will occur between 2005 and 2007. Battery problems with the Chinas first batch of Kilo-class submarines did not forestall this purchase, suggesting that the PLAN has developed confidence in the appropriate maintenance practices. Acoustically comparable to the most advanced US Navy (USN) Los
Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), the Kilo-class submarines will be a
force to be reckoned with.

Given the accelerating pace of Song-class submarine construction, defence analysts were surprised by the sudden and unanticipated appearance of the Yuan-class submarine in July. The photographs available show many similarities between this vessel and Kilo-class submarines, including the two-over-four torpedo tube arrangement, a larger and more rounded bow section that suggests an advanced passive sonar system and a flattened top of the hull. Unlike the Kilo-class, however, the Yuan-class features sail planes and an upper rudder, indicating that the Chinese have incorporated a host of Russian characteristics into their latest indigenous design. Although air-independent propulsion (AIP) cannot be ruled out, the Yuan-class is probably a conventional diesel powered submarine since there is little evidence of the PLAN actively experimenting with AIP
technology. Nuclear power can likely be excluded due to the vessels limited
displacement and also because all other PLAN SSNs have been built at the Huludao shipyard. The classs weapons systems are still unknown but it will likely carry advanced torpedoes and be capable of sub-surface ASCM launch. It is not clear when the Yuan-class might impact Song-class production or further purchases of submarines from abroad.

The long-anticipated Type 093 SSN represents the high end of the Beijings prospective underwater fleet. With the flagship launched in December 2002 and preparing for imminent sea trials, this class of second-generation nuclear submarines will likely replace the PLANs ageing and noisy Han-class SSNs. A second 093 SSN was reportedly launched in late 2003. Another 093 is said to be under construction, as is the first of the Type 094 second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the design of which is widely thought to be derived from the 093. The 094 will likely carry 16 8,000 km-range JL-2 SLBMs and sources expect two or three of them to be in service by 2010. Extended ranges for Chinese SLBMs implies the possibility of the PLAN adopting a bastion strategy to protect these emerging deterrent capabilities.

Long rumoured to be the acoustic and technological equivalent of Soviet Victor III - and Delta-class submarines, the 093 and 094 can only improve on the troubled legacy of Chinas first generation Han-class SSN and Xia-class SSBN. On the other hand, Western observers should not make the mistake of extrapolating from these earlier failures. The PLAN nuclear submarine fleet may be poised for revolutionary, as opposed to incremental, progress. With no 093 sea trials yet reported, the simultaneous construction of up to six
of these complex ships is a remarkable testament to Beijings newfound confidence in integrating advanced technologies in weapons platforms.

Further augmenting the submarine fleet, Russian state shipbuilding company Admiralteiskiye Verfi (formerly known as Shipyard No 194) recently announced that on 18 August it had launched the second of five diesel-electric submarines it was contracted to build for the Chinese Navy. The first had been launched earlier this year.

Gaining respect

The PLAN is aggressively improving its surface fleet with a robust construction programme of destroyers, frigates, amphibious vessels and patrol craft. Widely available photographs chronicle the construction and fitting out of two new PLAN Type 052C destroyers at Shanghais Jiangnan shipyard. These two 6500-tonne ships, both launched in 2003, appear to share the same hull design as the two brand new Jiangnan-built Type 052B guided missile destroyers (DDG, and the previous decades solitary Type 051B. Both of the 52B and one of the 52C destroyers have undergone builders trials. Unlike their predecessors, the 052Cs are optimised for area air defence. They have phased array or planar array radars - a first for the PLAN - on the four corners of the bridges vertical superstructure and as many as six sets of rotary surface-to-air missile (SAM) vertical launchers - also a PLAN first - located forward of the bridge and adjacent to the helicopter hangar. Sources speculate that this is a naval version of the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) HQ-9 air defence system, with a range of 120 km. The 052Cs helicopter hangar is large enough to carry two Z-9A or KH 28 helicopters. A pair of four inclined tube launchers oriented athwartships will house an as yet undetermined type of ASCM. Two of the new Type 730 Close In Weapons System (CIWS), said to resemble the Dutch Goalkeeper system and a 100mm main gun on the foredeck round out the apparent weaponry. Propulsion is probably provided by two imported Ukrainian gas turbines with two diesel
engines. It is not known if more type 052C DDGs will be built.

The 3500-tonne diesel-powered Type 054 frigate is another conspicuous PLAN construction programme. The Hudong shipyard in Shanghai and the Huangpu shipyard in Guangzhou have each launched one Type 054 since 2003. Both of these vessels have undergone sea trials. Sources indicate that both yards have at least one additional frigate under construction, although there is some debate about whether these newer ships will be further modified to include a 32-cell VLS system for SA-N-12 or comparable missiles on the foredeck, as a recently displayed design model indicates. Notable for their sloping, stealthy superstructures and superficial resemblance to the French Lafayette-class guided-missile frigates (FFGs), the two current 054s are thought to carry the HHQ-7 point defence SAM missile system, as well as two quad-launchers for the PLANs indigenous 120 km-range C-802 ASCM, a 100mm gun forward, torpedoes, four AK-630 CIWS, and a KH 28 helicopter.

Also noteworthy among Beijings indigenous surface programmes is the recent launch from Shanghais Qiuxin shipyard of the PLANs newest missile patrol boat. According to one analysis of available photographs, this vessel features a wave-piercing centre hull and two outer hulls that each house two water drives that look very similar to those that propel Swedens new Visby-class missile corvette. Armed with a 30mm gun forward, it also
has two enclosures aft that each appear large enough to house two ASCMs. This vessels superstructure is heavily faceted to provide a reduced radar reflection. Other photographs show this new catamaran moored next to a commercial wave-piercing ferry of similar design. It is not clear how many of these commercially-derived missile catamarans - seemingly the latest derivation of the classic Cold War fast missile patrol boat - will be built.

Another PLAN construction initiative is a marked increase in amphibious ship construction. As chronicled by photographs on the internet, in the past twoyears Beijing has built at least seven new landing ship/tanks (LST) that are enlarged upgrades to their 3,400-tonne Yuting-class, increasing their inventory of LSTs from 16 to 23. During this same period, the PLAN has launched at least six new medium landing ships (LSMs) that appear to be modernised versions of their solitary 1,400-tonne Yudeng-class. This
influx of new construction raises the PLAN inventory of LSMs to 42, most of which are quite modern. It is not known whether this rate of construction will be sustained. There is, moreover, credible evidence of ambitions to construct a 12,300-tonne amphibious transport dock (LPD) capable of carrying up to three landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and several helicopters. Finally, the relatively new PLA Marine Corps is now equipped with what is reputed to be the most advanced amphibious light tank in the world. Considering that the PLA rehearses the use of merchant shipping in military roles, the above building programmes imply a robust amphibious capability in the near term future.

In April and July 2004, observers in Russia reported the launch of the third and fourth of Chinas four Sovremennyy-class destroyers. The PLAN seems to be seeking to realise synergistic benefits for its surface fleet through parallel programmes of indigenous production and foreign acquisition, similar to the Song- and Kilo-class submarine and J-10/11 aircraft development efforts. It has been suggested that major investments in a surface fleet are wasted until the PLAN can develop a viable force to control the air in its operating area. However, incremental steps are already widening this potential area of operations - at least to encompass Chinas Economic Exclusion Zone. This area will expand in the future. Moreover, the PLAN surface fleet remains potent for threatening the smaller navies of some of Chinas neighbours. Perhaps most important, Chinas surface fleet enables Beijing to claim a seat at the table during any major crisis in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the mantle of the premier rising regional power. Even in the absence of conflict, the PLAN serves Chinas growing range of national security interests.

The human factor

As the PLAN fields a potent, new generation of surface and sub-surface platforms, there is also an overall Chinese recognition that the human factor remains decisive in warfare. At the broadest level, this amounts to a fundamental turn away from ideology and towards the objective study of naval warfare - a trend that has been two decades in the making. Capable institutions are emerging that have the potential to significantly increase the PLANs fighting effectiveness in the years ahead.

In 2003, the naval command expanded its recruitment programmes to draw in 1,600 university graduates as part of what appears to be a successful replication of the US Reserve Officer Training Corps programme. These technologically competent cadres will officer Chinas growing fleet. Salaries have been raised to retain personnel. The formation of a capable force of non-commissioned officers is another high priority for the naval command. In general, a climate of intellectual openness is spurring the military reform process.

A host of naval-interest publications such as Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) and Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy) serve as forums for debate and also acquaint naval personnel with worldwide naval trends. These and other Chinese military publications are engaged in a broad effort to inculcate officers and the broader public with a detailed knowledge of modern military history, emphasising campaigns at sea. Lacking its own indigenous naval history and quietly shelving the confines of Maoist strategic formulations, the PLAN appears to be engaged in the creation of a community of sophisticated maritime strategic thinkers.

The current atmosphere of relative openness is also evident within the PLANs educational institutions. This is clear, for example, from recent reforms undertaken at the Qingdao Submarine Academy. According to a 2002 report: All the traditional modes of instruction, including long-applied teaching practices and well-taught textbooks, were set to be scrapped within a short time. After an assessment that basic theories have often been stressed at the expense of operating skills teams from the Submarine
Academy set about undertaking thousands of visits to fleet units in order to reform the curriculum to better serve those who will fight under high-tech conditions. Internet images seem to show the new and powerful influence of computerised simulation technology on PLAN education and training facilities. These images, reportedly from the Qingdao Submarine Academy, show students developing their piloting skills in a surface navigation
computer simulator and operating a bank of digital sonar or fire control screens. Although the PLAN submarine force evidently receives priority focus, the reform spirit - in particular the zealous exploitation of new technologies - is likely to impact all aspects of PLAN operations in the near future.

The move away from rote, scripted drills toward more free play confrontational training, apparent across the PLA may culminate in revolutionary change with respect to the effectiveness of Chinese military exercises. Specifics remain sketchy and many Western analysts remain sceptical that the PLA is actually any more joint than before. However, some recent training innovations may be suggestive of a new training ethic. For
example, cross-posting, or the exchange of personnel from different warfare specialities, is commonly reported in PLAN routines, involving submarine, surface and aviation elements. Inter-theatre exercises involving elements from the three main fleets also appear to be increasingly commonplace. Several innovative exercises recently involved logistics operations from remote ports. Such exercises would appear to fuse technological and organisational developments to yield genuine doctrinal innovation. A
recent Chinese account of a Ming-class submarine sortie off the southeast coast of
Japan suggests a new and bold intention to operate beyond the first island chain. Recurring research activities of Chinese hydrographic vessels in waters near Japan are also strongly suggestive of this tendency, as are other recent PLAN deployments to the waters east of Taiwan.

Finally, it should be recognised that a firm foundation for Chinas naval modernisation has been laid with respect to creating the massive infrastructure for basic and applied research. Chinese universities grant nearly half a million science and engineering degrees each year. Furthermore, some of Beijings myriad labs devoted to naval weapons
research are led by Chinese holding PhDs from Western universities. A recent RAND appraisal of Chinas defence industry noted that shipbuilding was at the forefront of impressive industry-wide technological and quality-assurance progress. Beijings wide-ranging investments are starting to pay dividends, as demonstrated by the array of capable platforms described above.

Weak points

The emergence of China as a significant sea power is not a foregone conclusion. Many significant shortfalls are apparent in the PLAN modernization programme - especially if one considers its potential for blue-water operations.

The following areas could be substantial weak points in the evolving PLAN: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); area air defence and naval air; anti-submarine warfare; and mine warfare. ISR capabilities remain rather limited, suggesting potential difficulties in finding targets for Chinas newest stand-off weapons. The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) has long been the poor cousin of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), nor does much progress seem to be have been achieved under the last commander of the PLAN, Admiral Shi
Yunsheng, an aviator who was replaced in 2003. Aircraft carrier projects appear to be on indefinite hold. There are some signs of recognition that helicopter operations will have to be vastly expanded and improved to keep pace with other aspects of fleet modernisation. This would help rectify uncertainty over Chinese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. In this respect, the modest programme for maritime surveillance aircraft, akin to the P-3 Orion, remains a fundamental gap. There is also a clear
shortfall in amphibious lift - far less than what would be necessary to deliver the
requisite forces across the Strait of Taiwan. Finally, many analysts have noted that the PLAN appears to give short shrift to mine warfare, possessing mostly old-fashioned contact mines, one single dedicated minelayer and a not especially impressive fleet of minesweepers.

On the other hand, even in these areas of weakness bright spots are discernible. Concerning ISR, new reports suggest that China has, in fact, been aggressively pursuing development of an airborne warning and control system (AWACS)-type aircraft for early warning and airborne battle management. A number of aircraft, similar to the Russian A-50 Mainstay, are in various stages of testing. In addition, China already has as many as
three over-the-horizon skywave radars for maritime surveillance.

Regarding naval air defence, the new surface platforms described above represent a significant improvement over their predecessors. With respect to naval aviation, the PLANAF will receive its first batch of fourth generation Su-30Mk2s from Russia during 2004. Armed with Kh-31 supersonic anti-ship missiles and with a highly respectable combat radius of 1,500 km, these aircraft may herald a new recognition of the PLANAFs importance. Moreover, it may be significant that the PLANs new ranking political officer General Hu Yanlin is a transplant from the PLAAF. He reportedly retains
excellent ties with the current PLAAF leadership. Such ties could enforce a more rational future division of labour between the PLANAF and the PLAAF.

In terms of mine warfare, minelaying and clearing exercises are taking place, and there is a definite, discernible interest in technology associated with advanced deep-water mines.

Outlook

China has accelerated its programme of naval modernisation. Not only is the PLAN benefiting from a host of lethal systems purchased from Moscow, but for the first time in modern history, China is deploying respectable indigenous naval platforms, especially new diesel submarines, destroyers and frigates. While considerable uncertainty surrounds the momentous commissioning of Chinas second generation of nuclear submarines, given Chinas new technical prowess, it would be a grave mistake to simply extrapolate from the failed first generation of nuclear submarines.

Janes Defence Weekly
September 29, 2004

China Approaches Ukraine For Heavylift Aircraft

By Robert Sae-Liu, JDW Special Correspondent, Beijing

China has launched preliminary talks with Ukraine on the potential acquisition of heavy transport aircraft to address long-standing strategic lift requirements for the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), according to sources in Beijing.

Discussion centres on the Antonov An-124 and An-225 Mriya (Dream) outsized freighters. The former is the worlds largest production aircraft and can carry a payload of at least 120 tonnes. The latter is even bigger, with a payload capacity in excess of 250 tonnes, and Ukraine announced three years ago that it had resumed work on a second prototype.

Both aircraft are normally used as commercial transports.

In military configuration, the An-124 can carry 448 troops or 268 paratroops. Alternatively, it can accommodate 16 pallets of cargo for airdrops, each weighing up to 4.5 tonnes.

The Il-76 medium transport aircraft, which the PLA currently uses in limited numbers, can transport 140 troops or 125 paratroops.

Beijing has proposed to Kiev a licence-production agreement under which selected aircraft would be manufactured in China, suggesting a large-scale requirement.

Sources say that Russia has countered Chinas interest in the Ukrainian heavy airlifters by proposing joint development of a new aircraft. Such a programme should take 10 to 15 years to complete, they add.

Analysts have been watching for the PLA to develop its tactical and strategic lift capabilities in order to better deploy Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) units, but such efforts so far have been limited in scope. RRF units are thought to account for around 15% of PLA strength, which is currently estimated to be between 2.3 million and 2.6 million.

美國防部副次長勞樂斯日前指出，台灣準備承受中共以非傳統性攻擊、斬首行動等方式癱瘓台灣的政經社會，這是美方官員首次公開證實中共有擬定對台「斬首行動」。中共官方雖從未對此說法回應，然而從共軍加強信息化戰力的趨勢來看，共軍正積極加強對台精確攻擊能力，以達到首戰時癱瘓「敵方」的目的。

其實，從一九九六年以來，中共便屢屢透過非正式途徑釋放消息，聲稱共軍正在研發的飛彈，可以瞄準台灣總統府，甚至擊中總統辦公室。大陸學者指出，這種說法已經具備「斬首行動」的輪廓。大陸學界因此認為，自一九九六年前後起，中共便高度重視精確制導武器的開發與運用。

大陸「世界軍事」雜誌主編陳虎曾經在中央電視台專訪中指出，從軍事概念上看，「斬首行動」的目標不僅是國家領導人，也包括國家的指揮中心和機構。新華網也曾針對「斬首行動」指出，戰爭要首先攻擊對方指揮當局、聯合參謀部、戰區總部及各級部隊司令部；破壞敵方所有資訊傳媒，包括電話、無線電頻譜、電纜和其他傳輸手段；制止敵方使用第三方的通信系統，包括通信衛星。

經衛星確認證實
三萬中國人民解放軍於10月上旬開始陸續集結於鴨綠江
http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20041007-00000002-san-int

By Eugene Kogan for The Jamestown Foundation (06/10/04)

Investigating the degree of cooperation between the aerospace industries of Russia and China demands painstaking research. Chinese officials do not like to reveal details about their cooperation, while Russian officials will neither admit nor deny such information. In addition, Russian officials occasionally overstate the amount of cooperation that exists. Further complicating the matter is the fact that the Russian press and researchers usually present aerospace cooperation as military-technical cooperation, on which much is written. The latter is considered part and parcel of the business of arms deals, and as a result, military-technical and arms exports issues tend to overshadow aerospace industry topics. However, Russia-China aerospace industry cooperation has been gradually (but surely) improving the knowledge and skills of Chinese engineers and technicians, turning them into potential competitors in the world markets. Although it is true that since the 1980s the Chinese aerospace industry has expanded its activities, it has yet to reach a point at which it can compete with Russia and Western Europe. But continued improvement in design and development of Chinese military aircraft raises the possibility of competition with other manufacturers on an equal footing in the not so distant future.

Changing Chinese military priorities
The importance of the US and European aerospace industries, and the military accomplishments of their air forces since the First Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), have been noted by the Peoples Liberation Army Air Forces (PLAAFs) command and the highest echelon of Chinas political leadership. These factors have provided a much-needed catalyst to increase funding for the Chinas aerospace projects, including modernization of the Chinese Su-27 fleet that was purchased in the early 1980s. (Such funding had been diverted into space activities over the last twelve years.) These shifts highlight the vital importance that the PLAAFs command will play in any future war. This new PLAAF role has already been tested in the latest military maneuvers staged by the Chinese armed forces. The change in Chinas military priorities, namely, expected increases in funding for the Chinese aerospace industry, coincides with decreased cooperation with Russian counterparts. This reverses a trend of substantial increases in cooperation between both countries aerospace industries that began 1992. For instance, China had previously used Russian defense systems; Russian engines, radars and missiles had also been installed in Chinese aircraft (such as the J-8/F-8, FC-1/Super-7, J-10/F-10 and the next generation lead-in fighter trainers designated as the L-15); and Russia had provided basic training programs for Chinese workforce and aircrew.

Other shifts in China’s aviation programs
Potential civil aviation and space cooperation has also substantially decreased since China discovered that Russia is not such a reliable partner as, for instance, Airbus and Boeing. Meanwhile, the successful launch of the Chinese manned space shuttle has highlighted the progress that China has made since the early 1990s. In other words, Chinese aerospace engineers and technicians have learned a great deal from their Russian colleagues but, after their successful space launch, China has been less willing to cooperate with Russia on space issues. For instance, China declined to take part in improving the Russian Glonass system of navigation satellites. There have been other shifts in Chinas civil aviation programs. China recently decided not to purchase somewhere between twenty and thirty IL-76 military transport aircraft. However, there is a chance that a deal signed in September 2001 between China and the Cairo-based Sirocco Aerospace International and Russian export agency Aviaexport involving the sale of five Tu-204-120C freighters will not go ahead as a result of the Russians failure to deliver aircraft on time. The failure to deliver Tus to China might also affect potential sales of the ILs aircraft to China. The result has been that the financial problems of the Russian civil aviation industry, accompanied by broken promises and the failed delivery of freighters to China, have caused the Chinese authorities to become very apprehensive about any future cooperation with the Russian civil aviation industry.

Increasing interest in technology transfers
In redefining its relationship with Russia, China has increasingly become interested in technology transfers rather than in direct defense purchases. Currently, Russias share of technology transfers to China is about 30 per cent. China is interested in increasing this share to up to 70 per cent in a quest to be self-sufficient. Chinas desire to rely on its own capabilities support the view that the country will, in the long run, disengage itself from Russia. While this trend has not yet become obvious, there is little doubt that we are now seeing the first signs of disengagement. So far, the Ramenskoye-based (Moscow Region) Technocomplex Scientific Production Centre has been upgrading both single-seat and two-seat Su-27s for the PLAAF. The scope of this upgrade work is an example of the integrated thinking that surrounds Chinas future fighter program and the J-10/F-10 and Su-27/J-11 in particular. Having mastered basic airframe assembly, China currently controls an upgrade package that will allow it to integrate the weapons and systems under development. Although the Moscow-based machine-building enterprise Salyut has not yet delivered to China the AL-31 engine, which features a fully variable, rotating, thrust-vector control (TVC) nozzle designed by the St. Petersburg-based Klimov Corporation, when the delivery occurs, the AL-31 can be retrofitted during an engine upgrade, turning the J-10 into a highly maneuverable fighter. Furthermore, it appears that the Chinese-built WS10A engine that powers the J-10 fighter can match the performance of the AL-31 engine, despite differences in design and manufacture.

A look into the future without Russia
Russian defense industry sources have disclosed that Chinas engine makers are close to mastering the complex skills needed to build the Su-27s AL-31 engine – something that most observers had thought would be controlled by Russia. If this proves to be the case, then China will have used the Su-27/J-11 project to establish a total systems capability for advanced combat aircraft in little more than 10 years. Russian officials continue to believe that China will remain a long-term arms import partner. The events of the last decade seem to support this strong conviction. However, Chinas own domestic developments, such as the design and manufacture of their aircraft and weapons systems and their lack of interest in cooperating with Russia on the design and manufacture of fifth generation aircraft might ring alarm bells in Moscow. In addition to Chinas domestic developments, there are at least five Chinese aerospace industry objectives that Beijing would be able to achieve without Russian participation.

The main objectives
These are: Increased investment in the aerospace industry infrastructure – something which has sharply decreased since the early 1990s when China started to divert money towards space programs; Enhancement of the Russian-built air fleet inventory using Western/South African avionics and Israeli components. Although this trend is not yet obvious, the recent procurement by India and Malaysia of Russian-built aircraft without Russian avionics highlight this preference; Procurement of airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS). The failed delivery of the Israeli-built Phalcon to China has reinforced the importance of AWACS and confirmed the clear understanding within the Chinese government that such systems need to be acquired. The Russian-built Beriev A-50 is not a substitute for the Israeli-built Phalcon but merely a temporary solution. Thus, it is not surprising that the Chinese are trying to develop AWACS, although there is a strong possibility of them obtaining outside assistance, most probably from Russia; Enhancing domestic development and manufacture as well as the procurement of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). For the time being, Russia has failed to engage China in joint research and development and potential joint manufacture of these vehicles; and continued investment in space with an emphasis on military space in particular. Another Chinese objective is to design and manufacture a new military transport aircraft. This is not the An-70, which the management of the Antonov design bureau has discussed at length with the Chinese aerospace industry officials, but a new military transport aircraft that has preliminary been designated Y-8X. In this case, China turned to the Ukraine, which has a long history of design and manufacture of military transport aircraft. Whether the Ukraine will turn out to be a more reliable partner than Russia remains to be seen. There is, however, a clear understanding within the management of the Antonov design bureau that cooperation with China is vital to the future of its design bureau. In the final analysis, however, it seems that the significant achievements made by the Chinese aerospace industry have allowed Beijing the room to further develop its capacities without such heavy reliance on Russian imports.

據「解放軍報」報導，中共軍事交通運輸正規化建設工作會議九日在京召開，中共國防部長曹剛川在會議強調，要做好軍事鬥爭交通運輸準備。

2004.10.11　 中國時報
曹剛川要求共軍部署推動戰備運輸
中央社

　中國國防部長曹剛川九日在「軍事交通運輸正規化建設工作會議」中強調，共軍必須做好軍事鬥爭交通運輸準備，適應未來軍事需要，這場會議必須對推動軍事鬥爭交通運輸準備全面落實作部署。

　解放軍報引述曹剛川的說明指出，在軍事鬥爭準備需求的牽引下，共軍必須力求軍事交通運輸建設與經濟建設相協調，使中國交通運輸網路的佈局與國防建設的需要趨向一致，形成陸路、水路、航空運輸相銜接，裝載、運輸、卸載一體化，運輸、搶修、防護綜合實施的保障體系，適應未來軍事鬥爭的需要。

聚焦中國
【李志德╱專題報導】中國總理溫家寶上周五、六在越南出席亞歐高峰會時，大聲疾呼歐盟各國應及早解除對中國的武器出售禁令；此刻正在中國訪問的法國總統席哈克，推動軍售中國更是不遺餘力。武器俱全的中國究竟還要買什麼？其實解放軍需要的是可以制衡俄國系統的來源。

中國不滿俄售後服務
冷戰期間，中國的武器採購及技術轉移只有前蘇聯及以色列兩來源，但向以採購容易受美國干預，一旦美認為以出售的裝備可能威脅美軍，交易就胎死腹中。最著名的例子是解放軍和以談好的「費爾康」空中預警機，被美硬生生擋下，最後以只好轉賣給印度。
前蘇聯崩潰後，俄羅斯繼承大部分的軍火工業，就像美國對台的軍售，俄國對中國軍售長期存在「技術留一手」、「價格壟斷」的問題，讓中國愈來愈難接受。再者，根據加拿大《漢和情報評論》描述，俄國對武器的「售後服務」令中方十分感冒，例如解放軍廣為使用的AL31F系列發動機的維修程式、器械都得轉從烏克蘭進口。
《漢和情報評論》指出，更重要的原因是中國看到俄羅斯無意投資研發，只是吃前蘇聯的老本，一旦喪失現有優勢，解放軍的戰力將跟著被拖下水。這就是中國領導人為什麼每逢國際場合必定呼籲歐盟開禁的原因。
儘管歐盟龍頭德、法為自身利益積極推動解禁，但本案能不能通過的關鍵一在美國，二在以波蘭為首的中、東歐國家。

美向波蘭施壓反解禁
美國不願意看到解放軍利用歐洲武器在東亞與美軍抗衡，因而積極運用外交手段維持禁令，甚至揚言如果歐盟對中國開禁，美將對歐盟設限。美看準的施壓對象，是今年五月一日加入歐盟的波蘭、匈牙利、捷克等十個新成員國，位居東歐領袖地位的波蘭尤其是關鍵。「波蘭在歐盟內很可能爲美國人舉手」，中國社會科學院一位不具名的學者並不看好未來的情勢。

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
October 5, 2004

PRC Appears Ready To Field New Trimaran Fast Missile Warship

Analysis. By GIS (Global Information System) Naval Staff.

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has launched, and is testing, what appears to be a new “proof of concept” ship which employs a modified trimaran design.

The vessel is expected to grow into a larger more versatile platform, similar to the US Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. The use of advanced trimaran hull shows that the PLAN is able to incorporate advanced European and Australian fast ferry technology somewhat more rapidly than the US has done; US programs to use these ships and this hull technology are only in the design and experiment stage. Indeed, the US did use some Australian-designed fast ferries in the 2003 Iraq invasion, but the US does not have ships coming off the lines, while the PLA already has commence production. On one level, this new FAC is a PLAN program to replace old monohull designs, and to exceed Taiwans new stealthy FAC design. The trimaran hull configuration confers greater high speed capability in greater sea states, while allowing a large deck space for multiple uses.

This first ship of the 2208-class appears to be focused on the FAC mission, and likely will employ anti-ship missiles (ASMs) amidship. It should be assumed that the PLAN will soon make larger models that can carry UAVs and Spec.Ops insertion boats, as the US may soon be doing. The PLA will already have its version of the digital connectivity which lies at the heart of the LCS program. So here we have an area military technical competition in which the PLA is demonstrating creativity and a potential ability to match the US just as it is embarking on a new direction in naval combat modernization.

Given Iranian acquisition of earlier PRC-built catamaran designs, it is safe to assume that there have already been discussions between Iran and the PRC on acquisition of a variant of the 2208-class by the Iranian Pasdaran (IRGC) naval service.

2208-class PTG

Type: Guided-missile patrol craft (PTG), with modified trimaran hull design.

Manufacturers: No data available at this time.

Program History: No data available at this time. First images of this craft in the finishing stages of its construction appeared on the Internet in May 2004.

Variants: None known to date, but likely in near future. Note that this unit may be the proof-of-concept for other advanced marine vehicle (AMV) design warships.

Current Operators: Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

Dimensions: Length:, Beam:, and Draft: Characteristics data not available at this time.

Displacement: Light load: Standard: Full Load: and Overload condition: Displacement data not available at this time.

Performance: (Baseline variant): Speed: Maximum:, Patrol/Endurance:, Max. Endurance: . Max. Speed Range:, Typical Patrol Range: . Endurance: Performance data not available at this time.

Accommodation: Unknown at this time. It is likely that the crew size is greater now than due to need for personnel to run the various tests associated with sea trials and weapon and sensor system integration.

Power Plant (All entries are Poss.): Main engines (CODAG): Diesel engines. Two MTU 16V396 TB94 marine diesels for cruising. Gas Turbines: One or two gas turbines for boost power. Auxiliary engines: One diesel auxiliary motor for ships electrical load while pierside; one gas turbine auxiliary motor to provide pneumatic power to start the boost gas turbines as well as additional pierside peak power. Propulsion: Four KaMeWa waterjets. These are likely to be similar to those used on the Skjold-class PTGA unit.

Electrical: No data at this time. Notes: CODAG assessment based upon the size of the intake/uptake panels visible port and starboard on the 2208-class.

Navigation: Gyrocompass, log, GPS receiver, LORAN, Weatherfax. echosounder.

Communications: Radio: HF, VHF, and UHF communications systems each with dedicated antennae. The HF transceivers have whip antennae. There are two or three VHF transceivers and probably two UHF transceivers, with these probably having monopole or dipole antennas fitted atop the bridge or attached to the forward mast. Satellite communications (SATCOM): The 2208-class PTG does not appear to have a SATCOM system installed at this time. It is likely that a mobile SATCOM transceiver would be employed
as needed. Data link systems: The 2208-class PTG during its fitting-out and sea-trials time period has been fitted with data link antennas. These highly-visible data link antennae are related to probable telemetry links for the platform as well as for any missile-firing tests.

Mission Equipment: Radar: Air/surface search radar: One SR47C (PRC copy of Thales [formerlyThomson-CSF] DRBV-15A. If this warship is to be stealthy, the SR47C is not the optimal choice. The antenna of the DRBV-15A would act as a corner reflector. It is assessed that the DRBV-15A set is intended for use during the sea trials and integration tests. It is a projection that the set which will be fitted to production units of the 2208-class will be a low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) multi-mode radar set like the Thales Scout or Pilot. Navigation/surface search radar: One Type 765 navigation/surface search set is identified by one source, but the antenna mount and slotted waveguide do not appear to be the same as Type 765 radars seen elsewhere in the PLAN. Electronic surveillance (ES): Radiofrequency (RF) intercept antennas are mounted on the forward mast; this system is a probable radar warning receiver (RWR) with electronic intelligence (ELINT) receiver capability. The frequency coverage for an ELINT system is
typically between 0.5 to 18.0 or 20.0 GHz. Optronic: Fire control (FC) sensor:
The optronic sensor fitted atop the bridge area appears to be derivation of the unit fitted to the Type 730 30mm close-in weapon system. The optronic FC system (FCS) would be limited in its ability to direct the forward AK-630 30mm gun against inbound antiship cruise missiles such as the Harpoon, Exocet, or Hsiung Feng II. The optronic FCS would be far more effective against low-flying fixed-wing aircraft and ground-based attack or naval rotary-wing aircraft. Night vision devices (NVD): NVDs would enhance performance of the various littoral warfare missions of the 2208-class Countermeasures: Two offboard countermeasures launchers reportedly capable launching chaff and/or flares are fitted reportedly atop the superstructure.

Armament: Antiship cruise missiles (ASCM): The main armament of the 2208-class PTG appears to consist of four ASCM C-801 or C-802 launch tubes fitted in two housings atop the aft end of the superstructure. This arrangement provides each pair of ASCMs with a housing covered with radar absorbing material (RAM). No reloads are carried aboard the 2208. Each housing could be used to launch a single, large land-attack cruise
missile (LACM). Guns: Close-in weapon system (CIWS): Single gun mount associated with Russian AK-630 30mm CIWS. The gun fire control radar (GFCR) for the AK-630 is not fitted which reduces both the probability of detection (Pd) of in incoming threat missile and the probability of a hit (Ph).Lacking the GFCR, the AK-630 is not a true CIWS. Additional weapons: The 2208-class PTG has been designed with littoral warfare as a key task. It is likely that the 2208-class has at least one 12.7mm heavy machineguns (HMG), two 7.62mm light machineguns (LMG), and infantry weapons, such as assault rifles and
rocket-propelled grenades. Possible additions/options: Naval mines and wake-homing torpedoes launched over the transom.

Armor Protection: The 2208-class PTG does not appear to have any ballistic protection. Fitting of ballistic protection panels around the machinery spaces and at key spots around the combat direction spaces during construction would have been within the capability of the builder.

Survivability: The key to survivability for the 2208-class PTG probably comes from the reduced radar cross section (RCS), high speed, and maneuverability of the baseline design. The improvements in the 2208-class RCS are achieved by: 1. a substantial reduction in the number of corner reflectors on the deck, 2. the attention paid to the external finish of the ship, 3) the adoption of a wave-piercing hull form similar to that developedby INCAT and Austal Ships of Australia with a central hull, and 4. the
selective application of RAM to key areas to reduce the strength of radar signals painting the skin of any 2208-class PTGs.

Additional element of survivability for the 2208-class PTG is the warships small size. A sea-skimming ASCM might have difficulty locking on to the unit and, dependent upon the Sea State conditions at that time, might overfly the ship. During Operation Praying Mantis against Iranian naval forces in August 1988, several Harpoon missiles failed to engage damaged Iranian Kaman-class PTGs when those craft had settled too low in the water for a Harpoon missile to detect them as a valid threat. Another consideration is the fuzing of ASCM warheads; these weapons were intended to penetrate the hull plating or shell of a warship such as a frigate or destroyer and then detonate within the hull. As was noted in the missile attack on USS Stark, the two attacking ASCMs (Exocet) came close to exiting the hull of that guided-missile frigate. In the case of an attack on a 2208-class PTG, the ASCM would probably transit the hull without detonating unless it struck a piece of machinery such as one of the diesel powerplants.

Design Notes: There are a number of interesting design features in the 2208-class PTG:

The major externally-observable features on the 2208-class are: 1. a modified trimaran hull with two wave-piercing foils; 2. overall faceted external surfaces above the waterline; 3. a configuration of the central hull intended to provide useable internal volume, a common problem in AMV designs; 4. two missile launcher housings on the upper deck aft, each probably fitted with two ASCMs; 5. a single high rate-of-fire automatic
cannon on a faceted pedestal; 6. a bay mounted in the aft end of the superstructure. Note that this is not fitted flush with the transom; 7. two noticeable apertures aft of amidships on the superstructure, set close together; and 8. an extremely high degree of attention paid to the finish of the superstructure; note that the apparent smoothness of the external hull probably indicates an external coating of RAM.

Analysis:

1. The 2208-class appears to be an attempt to develop a stealthy fast-attack craft (FAC).

Importance: The 2208-class PTG design may be the proof-of-concept for anumber of advanced marine vehicle (AMV) designs. There are other applications for this PTG, especially in the rôle of an interceptor, using its low RCS to gain an advantageous firing position to launch cruise missiles at US Navy or ROCN surface units.

2. The 2208-class may be an attempt to develop a stealthy surface delivery vehicle to lay mines or employ torpedoes in the path of a US carrier battlegroup (CVBG) or amphibious ready group (ARG).

Importance: The 2208-class PTG design may be employed in other rôles. This does not constitute a technical leap in capability; all torpedo boats (PT) and most PTGs have had a minelaying capacity. A photograph of the 2208-class PTG while being completed showed an aft bay suitable for a wide range of missions. The 2208-class could be fitted with a pair of 533mm torpedo tubes pointing aft over the transom.

3. The 2208-class appears to have an extremely high degree of attention paid to the finish of the external hull; note that the apparent smoothness of the external hull may indicate an external coating of RAM over a metallic or fiberglass skin beneath.

Importance: The 2208-class may have an overall lower radar cross section (RCS). The selection of power plant is likely to be a means of hiding the platform acoustic signature as well. The 2208-class may be sufficiently quiet to permit it to get within striking range of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to conduct LACM attacks.

4. The configuration of the 2208-class PTG appears to have features of several craft, some deigned in the PRC and some elsewhere.

Importance: The designers of the 2208-class may have decided to take shortcuts in the design and reduce the timeline in developing the prototype. Additionally, the designers appear to have used the forward end of the Huchuan-class hydrofoil torpedo boat (PTH) and as a result the designers increased the useable internal volume.

5. The 2208-class appears to be a catamaran with a central hull which is kept elevated out of the water.

報導表示，這種曾經被西方媒體誤報擁有三百六十公里射程的火箭已經進行了多次成功發射，真正的WS2儘管沒有三百六十公里射程，但是最大射程涵蓋大部分台灣海峽。

報導首次公開了WS2更多的技術細節，並首次刊登火箭圖片。據稱，中國為WS2配備了多種彈頭，包括雲爆彈、破甲、殺傷子母彈及殺爆彈等。

漢和防務評論代總編輯平可夫表示，WS2顯然在設計之初就重點考慮到涵蓋台灣海峽；WS2與射程為一百八十公里的WS1B所不同之處，是WS2加裝了簡易的飛行姿態控制系統，命中精度因此提高0.3%的水平。931012

歐盟限武 利比亞解禁、中國不行
蔡筱穎/巴黎十二日報導

歐盟十一日宣布取消對利比亞的武器出口禁令，但針對中國，歐盟卻稱「須花更多時間來考慮相關情勢」，因此暫不取消對中國的軍售禁令。

歐盟外長會議十一日在盧森堡舉行，席間，義大利和法國針對解除武器禁令問題各有其考量。義大利希望利比亞從歐盟獲得吉普車、直升機和巡邏艇，以提高打擊非法移民的能力，阻止從利比亞到義大利的非法移民潮，而法國則強調總統席哈克在中國大陸訪問的立場，以禁運乃「偶一為之的舉措，純粹是為了對中國表示敵意」為由，希望歐盟能夠解除這個「過時」的禁令。

曾被視為恐怖主義流氓國家的利比亞，近年來以宣布放棄研製大規模毀滅性武器計畫和對「汎美航空公司」一○三號班機爆炸案罹難家屬進行賠償等作為，大力改善與歐美國家的關係。

歐盟解除對利比亞十八年的武器禁運，不僅意味雙邊關係的正常化，也顯示歐盟要利比亞重新回到國際社會的用心。

至於中國這個新興經濟國，歐盟各國很難不受其利益誘惑，所以有法德大力支持對中國解除武器禁運，不過，北歐國家秉持一貫對理念的堅持而關注中國的人權狀況，英國和一些剛入盟的東歐國家則顯然受到美國的壓力而持保留立場。基於對中國禁售令是在一九八九年對天安門事件做出的，而中國的人權狀況至今仍未改善，主持會議的荷蘭外長博特總結稱，歐盟「需要更多時間考慮眼前的情勢」。

大力施壓的法國則對暫不取消禁令表示，在歐盟與中國十二月於海牙舉行的高峰會議期間，法國將繼續敦促歐盟成員國就解除對中國武器禁運一事，「傳達正面的訊息」。

相對於中國的人權問題是無法解除禁令的主要原因，歐盟對利比亞的人權問題則採「關注」態度，歐盟成員國外長要求利比亞妥善處理歐盟關切的問題，包括人權狀況、儘早釋放因涉嫌向利比亞兒童散播愛滋病而被關押的保加利亞和巴勒斯坦醫務人員等。

（中央社記者張謙香港十六日電）首次在香港發行的加拿大漢和防務評論月刊報導，中國空軍即將裝備新製預警機。由於台灣向美國購買的兩架E2T也將於年底開始接收，因此，報導形容兩岸正式進入「資訊戰爭」時代。

報導表示，它根據中國、烏茲別克、俄羅斯的軍事合作狀況，判斷出中國預警機的生產數量和裝備時間；中國對預警機的需求非常急迫。

報導指出，台灣「空軍將領」早前曾表示，中國正在試飛的預警機是從俄羅斯方面獲得的，是俄羅斯製造的A50I，並且已經在南京軍區部署了兩架同型機，但這種說法是錯誤的。所以出現錯誤，是因為其使用機體與A50I相似。

據稱，中國空軍第一架預警機稱作「新預警」，去年十月前後在陝西飛機公司完成了裝配，現在已經進入試飛階級；機體使用Il76，雷達由南京14所研製，外形十分類似A50I。俄羅斯、以色列沒有直接介入這項計劃。

報導表示，中國的國產預警機的雷達研製在進口A50I之前就已經展開，只是因為中國空軍崇洋，才在中途把更大的力量花到了引進A50I的事情上。

報導表示，「目前的列裝計劃依然是4架，其中第二架現在已經在陝飛的生產線上」。根據中國空軍裝備發展計劃，全部四架「新預警」將在二零零五年之前到位。

(中央社記者曾淳良北京十六日電)中國首次向海地派出維和警察的主力部隊，將於十七日抵達海地太子港。屆時，這隻中國維和警察將按照聯合國的工作要求，在當地進行治安巡邏、重要人物保衛、培訓當地警察以及執行一些特別的任務。

中國外交部官員說，中國維和警察主力部隊九十五人，將於十月十七日下午抵達海地太子港，加上先遣隊的三十人，共有一百二十五人的維和警察，將建制為一支防暴隊伍。

記者劉永祥／台北報導
2004/10/17

國防部副部長蔡明憲昨天透露，「中國導彈試射過程我們有掌握」，目前中共二砲部隊至少擁有六百一十枚導彈，包括射程超過一千五百公里的中程飛彈，攻擊距離可達關島，其準確度甚高，攻擊目標時誤差不超過廿公尺。

蔡明憲昨天參加「亞洲安保的現狀與展望」國際研討會，發表專題演說，他指出，中國有意發展成為亞洲足以與美國對抗的軍事強權，解放軍的威脅不只是針對台灣，為維護台海安全，區域內國家應思考促成台海非軍事化及中立化，亞太國家也應研商建立共同的飛彈防禦系統，避免不必要的飛彈威脅。

他表示，過去三、五年來中國解放軍加強空軍現代化，也積極建立一個具有近海作戰能力的現代海軍，近年來中國監測艦前往日本及台灣花蓮外海調查水文，為將來的台海戰爭進行「戰場準備」。

蔡明憲說，中國致力建立現代化快速反應部隊，因為他們深知對付台灣、日本及美國不能靠傳統戰爭，要以快速首戰決戰取得勝利，也就是「首戰即決戰，決戰就要打敗敵人」。解放軍也強化空降及兩棲作戰能力，「東山島演習就是要加強兩棲作戰」。

【中央社香港十六日電】加拿大漢和防務評論月刊報導，中國大陸空軍即將裝備預警機。

據稱，中國大陸空軍第一架預警機稱作「新預警」，去年十月前後在陝西飛機公司完成裝配，現進入試飛階級。全部四架「新預警」將在二○○五年前到位。

記者盧德允／台北報導
2004/10/18

中共軍備專家平可夫指出，大陸四川航天工業公司研發的武士二型WS─二遠程有控多管火箭已完成，可能即將服役。我軍方將領指出，其射程應有二百公里以上，成本較M九、M十一短程彈道飛彈低，如果大量生產，將嚴重威脅台澎金馬。

平可夫在即將在香港創刊的中英文加拿大漢和防務月刊披露此消息。

軍方有關官員說，射程超過二百公里，則自大陸海岸，可以打到澎湖，如果裝在巨型輪船，只要駛離大陸海岸，就可以轟擊台灣本島。由於此型火箭建造成本遠低於M九和M十一飛彈，有人稱作「迷你彈道飛彈」可以視作六百餘枚瞄準台灣的M族飛彈之外，中共可以運用的更一種攻台武器。

國防部官員說，武士一型多箭火箭射程八十公里，彈徑三○二公釐、彈長四五二公釐、彈頭一百五十公斤。其改良型武士一B型彈徑相同，彈長增至六二○公釐，射程達一百八十公里，彈頭也是一百五十公斤。新式的武士二型，彈徑可能是三六○公釐，所以一度被外界誤指為射程三百六十公里，造成很大程度緊張，但實際可能是二百公里出頭。

漢和防務月刊指出，武士二型配備多種彈頭，包括雲爆彈（即油氣彈）、穿甲彈、殺傷性子母彈等。它與前身武士一B不同處，係武士一B沒有控制，而武士二型加了簡易的姿態控制系統，命中準確度因此提高百分之零點三左右。

國防部長李傑昨天在立法院首度透露，據軍方評估，中共只要用十三艘潛艦就可以完全封鎖台灣；而目前共軍擁有八十六艘潛艦，其中四十艘是新型潛艦。國軍獲得八艘潛艦後，可防止共軍潛艦進入台海，美軍航空母艦就可進入這些水域運用兵力。

立法院國防委員會昨天審查國防部九十四年度預算，李文忠在質詢時指出，台灣發展水下戰力，將有能力在一定程度上對中國形成局部封鎖的態勢，對嚇阻中國武力犯台具有相當大的正面效應。加上中方現役反潛戰力十分薄弱，具有現代化反潛戰力的艦艇才五艘，因此若中國為避免台海發生衝突時，台灣利用優勢的水下封鎖能力，破壞中國的海洋生命線，中國必須增加大量的軍事投資。

李文忠表示，中方若要有效提升反潛戰力，所需經費約我方採購八艘柴電潛艦的八點九倍，是我方投資十二架Ｐ-３Ｃ反潛機的七點七倍，需八十八架反潛機，共軍為因應我潛艦威脅，未來必須增添KILO級八艘，○九三型核子潛艦五艘，加十三艘自製新型柴電攻擊潛艦等包括水下監聽系統等設備。

對此李傑表示，軍方評估中共因應我方獲得八艘潛艦所需投資的金額更高，至於這八艘潛艦未來在美軍航空母艦協防時的功能，可以在我方在台海周邊設置的伏擊區中，嚇阻共軍船艦進入，美軍屆時就可以安全進入台海，順利運用兵力。

李傑在答覆國民黨立委廖婉汝質詢時也強調，台灣沒有資格和中共進行軍備競賽，但獲得三項特別軍購，可以讓中共「就算恨我們也不敢動我們」，否則就要付出慘痛代價，如果不是共軍武力威脅迫切，三項軍購是可以用一般預算編列放慢一點，但如果現在用一般預算編列，在面對共軍威脅的時間上會來不及。

兩岸緊張氣氛可否請美國當調人而不要花大錢買軍購。外交部長陳唐山昨天對此表示，即使美國願意當調停者，但若台灣不花錢軍購，而只是請美國政出面調停，中國一旦知道台灣的「弱點」，要談判也談不成。

新聞局昨天安排陳唐山、陸委會主委吳釗燮、國防部副部長蔡明憲與國際媒體進行座談。

媒體詢問陳唐山，台灣與其花大錢軍購，是否考慮不如花少許錢請美國前總統卡特、布希、柯林頓擔任兩岸調人。陳唐山回應指出，美國也希望維持台海和平，不過只願意擔任兩岸「促談者」角色，而不是「調停者」；因為二次世界大戰後，美國在國共內戰期間擔任調停者，結果得不償失。

陳唐山舉例說，就像美國在日本投下二枚原子彈後，六十多年國際上沒有國家敢再使用，可是許多國家還是致力研發核武，就是要展現這樣的實力和決心。因此台灣必須有足夠的防衛力量，然後再透過外交管道進行談判，才可能有效果。

蔡明憲也指出，兩岸軍力快速失衡，國防部購買「愛國者三型飛彈系統」、「柴電潛艦」、「定翼反潛機」等裝備，並非與中國進行軍備競賽，而是展現自我防衛的決心

在聯合國機制下，中國政府首次派遣了九十五名武裝鎮暴警察，包括十三名女性在內，前往海地。這批中國警察據稱是中國警察中的精英分子，在中國挑選出來後，另外經過三個月專門訓練與準備，並通過聯合國測試，才正式加入西方國家在海地的維和活動。

中國過去雖亦參與國際維和活動，但派遣武裝軍隊加入西方維和則屬首例，此間政治觀察者認為，這是繼中國主持朝鮮半島六方會談以來，另一重要突破，顯示中國有意在全球安全中扮演更重要的角色。

海地自去年九月發生暴動以來，已傳出諸多傷亡，海地總統則在今年二月受到美國和法國的壓力，被迫流亡海外。中國雖為聯合國安全理事委員會常任國，但由於海地和台灣的邦交關係，中國過去不但不支持聯合國派遣維和部隊前往海地，且數度威脅在安理會中動用否決權。如今，中國不但不再杯葛聯合國在海地的維和活動，且積極參與國際社會在海地的鎮暴。

報導指出，第二批次的J10A以及J10B將從明年開始陸續投入生產，用以裝備空軍的第二個殲擊機團。

據報導，中國空軍對第一批J10A的服役結果表示滿意。今年進入量產階段的J10A依然使用國產的1473雷達，全部為空軍型號，海軍也計劃裝備J10A。在訓練方面，漢和透露目前第一個J10A團的訓練、換裝準備工作已經完成。

關於外傳中國將向巴基斯坦提供J10A，漢和評論代總編輯平可夫認為，在未來六年內可能性不大，原因包括300批次的J10A主要是為中國空軍、海軍航空兵生產，俄制AL31FN發動機沒有出口許可權；其次巴基斯坦已經在FC1戰鬥機上進行了投資，而且根據巴基斯坦空軍、國力現狀，FC1對於巴基斯坦而言是比較適合的飛機，不太可能放棄FC1轉而進口J10A。

平可夫表示，至少在2010年以前，巴基斯坦沒有足夠的資金，且J10A遠比FC1技術複雜及昂貴。931019

JANES MISSILES AND ROCKETS - OCTOBER 01, 2004

China tests new land-attack cruise missile

China has test-fired a new land attack cruise missile (LACM) designated Dong Hai-10 (DH-10), or East China Sea-10, writes Wendell Minnick. A US defence source identified the DH-10 as a ground-launched second-generation LACM with a range of more than 1,500km. He said it is likely to be equipped with an integrated inertial navigation system/Global Positioning System, supplemented by a terrain contour mapping system and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system able to provide a circular error probable (CEP) of 10m.

China is also expected to field a second LACM within the next few years. The Ying Ji-63 (YJ-63), or Strike Eagle-63, is described by the source as a first-generation LACM with a range of 400-500km and the ability to carry a 500kg high explosive warhead at a speed of Mach 0.68. The missile is believed to be fitted with combined inertial and GPS mid-course guidance, plus some form of electro-optical terminal guidance. The latter is expected to provide a CEP of 10-15m, but it will probably be limited by weather. If it is a TV homing system rather than an autonomous scene-matching sensor, this will require a line-of-sight communications link with the launch aircraft or another platform.

The US source further pointed out that Harpy unmanned aerial vehicles obtained by China from Israel in 2001 are now operational.

These three sophisticated weapons pose new challenges to Taiwan, which has been engaged in extended debate over the ballistic missile threat from China. Taiwan has not met the growing LACM threat head on, the source complained.

The YJ-63 is likely to be launched from the Xian H-6 Badger bomber, a copy of the Tupolev Tu-16. The naval version of this aircraft already has two wing-mounts for anti-ship missiles, but China is experimenting with additional pylons. One H-6 (No. 81217) has already been modified to incorporate four wing-mounted cruise missile pylons.

Defence sources stated that China has the capability to convert up to 25 H-6 bombers, so it could eventually be able to add 100 air-launched cruise missiles to the force of 200-300 short-range ballistic missiles expected to form the first wave of missiles launched during any Chinese attack on Taiwan. Before too long, there will also be ship and sub-launched cruise missiles, stated one source.

Some within the US Department of Defence argue that Taiwan should procure elevated sensors, such as tethered aerostats, to counter the LACM threat. The aerostat sensor could cue Taiwans HAWKs. Taiwan could also acquire Surface-Launched AMRAAM.

Taiwans Patriots, both PAC-2 GEM and [the planned] PAC-3 can handle cruise missiles, but as long as you have got the sensors and early detection, HAWKs do just fine, the source said. Patriot missiles are too expensive for use against cruise missile targets, he added, and are more suited to engaging ballistic missiles.

The US source made no mention of Taiwans alternative strategy of developing a limited strike capability, a policy not favoured by Washington.

JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY - OCTOBER 06, 2004

China is in talks with Ukraine to obtain 42 Motor Sich AI-25TLK turbofan engines to power its NAMC JL-8 (K-8) basic jet trainer/light attack jet.

The talks follow up on 58 engines ordered in 1997 and since delivered.

To date, the AI-25TLK has been used to power JL-8s for the domestic market. The K-8 export version is fitted with the Honeywell TFE731-2A-2A turbofan with Lucas Aerospace FADEC. The former generates 16.87kN (3,792 lb st) and the latter 16.01kN (3,600 lb st).

It is not known whether the new engines would be used to power additional JL-8s for the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force, or whether these would replace the US-made engines on the export version. The Ukrainian engines are about 40% cheaper than the US-made model.

巴基斯坦是否會進口J10A
20日在香港發行的中英文版漢和防務評論聲稱今年中國從俄羅斯購買了新一批AL31FN渦輪風扇發動机用于J10A戰斗机的生產。因此J10A的生產進入了新階段。漢和透露 J10A初期的設計生產能力為每年20架，隨后逐步增加到年產50架的水平。成飛為此將建設第二條生產線。雙座型J10B已經從2003年開始研制。

今年開始得到的AL31FN發動机顯示第二批次的J10A、J10B將從2005年開始陸續投入生產。用以裝備空軍的第二個殲擊机團。

漢和認為由于已經擁有長達12年以上使用SU27SK第三代戰斗机的經驗，J10A裝備部隊之后，應該類似台灣空軍IDF戰斗机那樣，在技術消化、編寫教材、維修等方面更加順手。

空軍對第一批J10A的服役結果表示滿意。今年進入量產階段的J10A依然使用國產的1473雷達，全部為空軍型號。海軍也計划裝備J10A。在訓練方面，漢和透露目前第一個J10A團的訓練、換裝准備工作已經完成。

關于外傳中國將向巴基斯坦提供J10A的問題。漢和防務評論代總編輯平可夫認為在短期6年之內可能性不大。首先，300批次的J10A主要是為中國空軍、海軍航空兵生產。俄制AL31FN發動机沒有出口許可權。 300批次以后的J10A可能換裝中國產WS10A渦輪風扇發動机，但是巴基斯坦在處理對華軍事合作方面總是好高騖遠。巴已經在FC1戰斗机上進行了投資，而且根据巴空軍、國力現狀，FC1對于巴基斯坦而言是比較适合的飛机。巴不太可能放棄FC1轉而進口J10A。至少在2010年以前，巴沒有足夠的資金。
J10A遠比FC1技術复雜而且昂貴。巴多變的態度，才使FC1的研制周期拖延將近15年，這是主要原因之一。

上月下旬 大批共機逼近中線挑釁

〔駐美特派員曹郁芬╱華府二十日報導〕美方消息來源指出，中國人民解放軍曾在九月下旬出動了十多批、逾三十架次的各式軍機逼近海峽中線，數量之多打破九八年以來的單日最高紀錄，台灣的軍機當時曾起飛監控，情勢一度極為緊張。

可靠消息人士透露，當天中國解放軍共有包括蘇愷廿七、蘇愷三十和殲八、殲十等戰鬥機，加上各式轟炸機前後逾三十架次飛近海峽中線，頻率之高是九八年後少見的。

雖然沒有意外事故發生，但台灣國防部和民進黨政府相當重視北京的挑釁行為，次日立即告知美方，並表示台灣雖不樂見台海發生衝突，但也不避戰，不畏戰。

美國國務卿鮑威爾即將啟程前往日、韓和中國訪問，在北京期間將和中國談對台軍售以及陳水扁總統的雙十演說內容。

美軍太平洋總司令法戈上將上週在一次閉門會議告訴訪賓，台海近期並沒有危機，但美國一直高度關注這個區域的穩定。

關心美台情勢的人士指出，台海雖然沒有立即的軍事衝突危機，但是在沒有對話以及軍事互信機制建立起來前，兩岸擦槍走火的危險仍然很高。

事實上，部分美國學者最近走訪中國，對於國防部長曹剛川和外交部長李肇星等中國領導人，在言談間都流露出中國不惜在台灣問題一戰的態度感到不安。

由於中國國家主席胡錦濤才在中共十六屆四中全會接任中共中央軍委會主席，美台雙方研判，解放軍可能藉此宣示對台立場並無軟化之意。

美方評估 台海緊張未升高

美台雙方對北京的行動有不同感受。美方官員雖然知道此事，但因為中國戰鬥機沒有飛越海峽中線，且解放軍並未持續性地派出大批戰機到台海，所以美方認為台海緊張情勢並沒有升高，不必太嚴重看待。不過台灣方面認為，北京這種壓迫性的作為，讓台灣感到威脅。

美國傳統基金會副會長伍爾澤（Larry Wortzel）表示，中國獲得先進戰機後，作戰能力和訓練項目當然會跟著改變，美國最近和印度舉行演習，印度的蘇愷廿七與蘇愷三十戰機還以優越的戰術及表現勝過美國空軍的F-15，台灣對北京的空戰能力當然不能掉以輕心。

台海安全研析中心主任梅復興則表示，中國在台海對岸部署的戰機數量其實有限，保持少兵在前，多兵機動的策略，這些飛機可能在演訓結束後以轉場方式逼近海峽中線，造成某種震撼效果。但這種訓練方式可能變成解放軍的作戰方式。

共軍機種 殲十戰機也在列

〔記者許紹軒╱台北報導〕針對美方表示，共機曾於九月下旬不尋常接近海峽中線，我國空軍官員昨天證實確有此事，但對方並未逾越中線，我方派出戰機在中線附近警戒，嚴防對方挑釁。

官員研判，兩岸在空中相互試探的情況多少都會發生，較為特別的是殲十戰機，這型戰機至今仍未正式曝光，但在兩岸空中兵力較勁下，該型戰機已經擔負要角，加上中國日前宣布將出售殲十給巴基斯坦，顯見殲十在解放軍目前服役的數量可能遠超過外界想像。

據指出，解放軍戰機自一九九八年開始進入台海中線以西活動，一九九九年兩國論後，中線以西就成為共機活動空域，到去年底止，平均每年出海超過一千二百餘架次，二○○一年出海頻率最高，將近一千四百架次。

空軍總部表示，共機飛行演訓動向以及雷達攔截情資都在我方嚴密掌握中，並沒有逾越的挑釁行動，空軍基於維護台海和平及領空安全前提，都是以「不引發事端、不升高衝突、降低敵對行為」為原則，妥慎因應。

兩國論後 共機出海數暴增

軍方指出，一九九七年以前，台海仍是台灣空軍的天下，共機只要出海，幾乎就等於是在挑釁，因此直到一九九七年止，共機出海架次都是零，但在共軍陸續換裝蘇愷二十七之後，九八年共機開始大量出海，但當年出海架次僅四六四架次。

一九九九年兩國論發生後，兩岸開始劍拔弩張，共機出海架次暴增，達到一二二六架次，二○○○年也與這個數字相當，二○○一年達到最高峰，將近有一千四百架次，二○○二年次數稍減，略多於一千三百架次，二○○三年則又下降回到一千二百餘架次的水準。

中共解放軍總參謀長梁光烈上將訂下周率團訪美，除會見美方人士外，也將參觀美軍基地。依據中共作法，預料梁光烈屆時將談及台海議題。梁光烈曾在一九九至二○○二年擔任南京軍區司令員。台海議題是他的專長。

美國參謀首長聯席會議主席邁爾斯上將今年初曾應梁光烈之邀訪問大陸，梁光烈此次是回訪性質。他訂廿五日（周一）及廿六日在紐約停留，廿七及廿八日訪問華盛頓。在華盛頓期間，梁光烈等人將到五角大廈與邁爾斯會談兩軍交流等議題。至於是否會見其他美國軍、政要員，目前仍在安排。結束華府之行後，梁光烈等人將前往喬治亞州參訪美國陸軍基地。

由於以往曾經訪問過夏威夷等因素，所以梁光烈此次並未計劃參訪檀香山的太平洋美軍基地拜訪。美國訂十一月二日選舉總統，梁光烈將在投票日之前結束訪美行程。

美方預料梁光烈會提及台海議題，包括就美國對台軍售一事表達不滿。此外，剛在鳳凰城結束的美台國防工業會議，預料梁光烈也將再次表達不滿。美國除回應並說明美國的立場外，也可能向中方說明美軍在全球調整部署的背景，並希望推動兩軍低層級軍官交流。

華盛頓記者林寶慶／二十三日電 10/24 02:56

對報導指稱，中共人民解放軍曾在九月下旬出動卅一架次戰機逼近台灣海峽中線挑釁，美方高級官員廿二日回應指出，解放軍不時有類似的行動，台海軍事狀況並無異常，有些人將此事誇大了。

而太平洋美軍司令部廿二日則表示，太平洋美軍司令法戈說，他認為台海開戰可能性很低，不過美軍司令部仍隨時戒備，以作為有效的嚇阻。

台灣國防部長李傑，廿二日在台灣立法院針對此事答覆表示，台灣方面當時已按戰備規定處理，並派出戰機。他指出，解放軍當時是進行訓練，並沒有越過中線。

媒體報導，解放軍當時出動蘇愷廿七、蘇愷三十和殲八、殲十等戰鬥機及各式轟炸機，相當密集。

【大陸新聞中心／綜合報導】中共空軍運輸航空兵某師前前日進行多機型、大機群空投演習，模擬部隊在「藍軍」地面火力攻擊下，向千里外的敵方戰場快速空投大批作戰人員和物資。

中共軍方喉舌解放軍報報導，前日上午雲霧迷濛，天氣差，這個師十多架不同型號的運輸機，從三個機場同時起飛，飛向陌生空域。

2004.10.23　 中時晚報
兩岸電波戰 敵動我靜
李祖舜/台北報導

新聞局日前宣佈終止「遏制匪播政策」，計畫收回中廣、警廣與漢聲等多家電台頻道，進行廣播頻譜重整工程，但對岸的中共官方卻持續強力反制我方電波「登陸」，甚至向法國採購先進而功率強大的干擾天線，阻撓包括台灣中央電台在內的外國電台對大陸播音，使得兩岸的空中電波戰呈現「敵動我靜」的非均勢狀態。

新聞長林佳龍上午表示，新聞局只是反對以「遏制匪播」為名，將特定頻道發給少數媒體的作法，但「遏制匪播」的政策並未停止，不過我方不會惡意干擾中共電台對台播音，只會重整電波頻譜使用狀況，達到「遏制匪播」的效果。
中央廣播電台董事長林峰正上午指出，央廣對大陸地區的播音，目前在北京、上海與廣州等大型城市被中共採取「同頻干擾」的方式，幾乎無法突破中共的封鎖網，如果要突破中共干擾，必須加強電波的發射頻率，購置更先進的器材設備，但如此將引爆兩岸電波戰的「軍備競賽」，所以他呼籲中共能呼應我方「終止遏制匪播政策」善意，雙方進行協商，停止兩岸的電波大戰。

林佳龍對此表示，以大陸當前情勢，根本無法展開兩岸電波交流、避免電波軍備競賽的談判。

儘管中共當局嚴密封鎖台灣電台對大陸地區播送廣播新聞節目，不過，根據中央廣播電台引用英國國家廣播電台BBC的收聽率調查資料顯示，央廣在大陸地區，是僅次於BBC、收聽率排名第二的國際華語廣播電台，央廣估計，全大陸地區每天平均有超過1800萬人次在收聽央廣的節目，遠比日前新聞局長林佳龍在立院所透露，大陸官方宣稱台灣地區民眾收聽大陸電台節目的30到40萬人要高出60倍。

但據了解，央廣在大陸地區大型城市播音的頻率，近年來經常出現惡劣的干擾雜音，甚至會長時間出現死者出殯、吹奏鎖吶的哀樂，讓聽眾無法收聽，央廣就曾收到大陸民眾寄來錄音帶，透露中共官方這些惡劣的蓋台手段。林峰正無奈地指出，中共的作法根本是違反國際廣播協定，對於這種耍流氓、不講理的惡劣干擾行動，央廣感到相當無奈。

舉行演習的合同戰術訓練基地，是亞洲第一大、共軍第一個合同戰術訓練基地酖內蒙古朱日和合同戰術訓練基地，也是大陸最大的訓練基地。報導介紹，此基地自一九九九年成立起，就把「讓訓練基地與戰場貼近再貼近，讓實兵演練與實戰貼近再貼近」作為追求目標。去年八月，該基地首次邀請十五個國家的軍事觀察員觀摩北京軍區「北劍○三○八」裝甲旅縱深突擊作戰演習。

據報導，這次在該基地舉行的軍演，是共軍軍事演習實現革命性變革，軍事演習不再有「腳本」，更貼近實戰，以提升部隊作戰能力。

報導指出，過去共軍軍事演習，一般都要先有預案「腳本」，指定紅、藍軍，對抗雙方是平常很熟悉的兩支部隊，加上自導自演，自評自訓，最後幾乎都是「紅勝藍敗」，無法有效利用演習提高部隊戰鬥力、提高指揮員指揮水準。

而此次軍事演習，「藍軍」的部隊編制、武器裝備、作戰方式等，完全模擬未來戰場上的作戰對手。組織者沒有給這次演習設置預案，只給演習部隊提供一個簡單的戰場監控系統，以及伴隨在紅藍雙方營連以上作戰單元的現地調理員，迫使對抗雙方不得不主動進行戰場偵察，研究對方戰術。基地對組織的對抗演習，不再對雙方勝敗進行評判，而更側重於演習結束後，使參演部隊更真切地了解對抗過程中自身的得與失。

2004-10-25 07:39:09

　　中新网10月24日電 第五屆中國國際航空航太博覽會將於2004年11月1日-7日在
珠海市航展中心隆重舉行，參觀人數預計將達25万人，參展商、洽購商3万人左右。
据悉，中國技術檔次最高、最新一代的高級教練机--“山鷹”也將首次亮相中國航
展。
　　
　　据香港文匯報報道，第五屆航展的參展國家和參展企業數量及參展規模比上屆
有明顯增加。參展國家和地區數量已達32個，已超過歷屆航展。其中阿聯酋、希腊、
瑞典、芬蘭、印度、智利、伊朗等國家將首次亮相中國航展。室內參展淨面積超過
16000平方米，比上屆航展增長15%。

大陸20日早上在江蘇南通舉行一場規模最大的水陸空水上搜救綜合演習，場面逼真，是大陸有史以來規模最大，也是環境最複雜、難度最高的一次水上搜救演習。

整個演習現場模擬一艘失控的3萬噸油輪，和一艘載有400多名旅客的渡輪發生碰撞，水上搜救人員獲報後，立刻趕抵事故現場，進行救援。

落水人員在救難人員的協助下，順利登上救生船，而直升機也已經飛抵現場，進行運輸工作。

由於現場風力強大，使得直升機救援任務難度增加，不過後來直升機還是順利降下救生繩索，救難人員將落水者綁在繩索上後，順利由直升機拖吊起，載往附近醫院急救。

北京市擴大非農業人口徵兵[08:05]

2004/10/23

北京市今年徵兵政策出現新變化，非農業戶口適齡青年的徵集比例上升，在校大學生徵集範圍擴大。

北京市徵兵辦負責人指，今冬本市的非農業戶口適齡青年的徵集比例由原來的65%提高至73%，上升8個百分點。

今年在全日制高等學校徵兵範圍亦擴大，中國人民大學等知名高校名列其中，在高等學校徵集在校大學生的學校由去年4個區9所高校擴大為9個區17所高校。

大陸新聞中心／綜合報導 10/28 03:21

大陸自行設計、研製、生產的多用途、全天候、超音速殲擊轟炸機「飛豹」，裝備部隊後，多次完成重大演練任務，戰機編隊協同和艦機協同能力，都有所提升。

「中國軍網」報導「飛豹」參加演練情況。今年秋天某日，大陸江南某海軍航空兵機場，一架架新型「飛豹」戰機攜帶新型飛彈，直衝雲霄。數分鐘內，搜索、跟蹤、鎖定，一連串戰術動作一氣呵成。隨著指揮員「攻擊」令下，飛彈飛出，頃刻間目標凌空爆炸。

報導說，緊接著，「飛豹」與水面艦艇進行一體化訓練時，戰機編隊為艦艇編隊提供強有力的空中支援，同時對海上目標實施飛彈攻擊，目標被連續擊中。

據指出，多年來該艦艇師先後在夜間複雜氣象、夜間海面超低空、飛彈超視距攻擊等高難課目訓練中取得突破。如今裝備先進系統的「飛豹」戰機，可追蹤搜索和發現目標，超視距遠程實施攻擊和轟炸，作戰能力明顯提高。

報導說，位於江南某機場的中共空軍航空兵某團飛行員，全部具備「某新型戰機」（飛豹）最低起降條件下持續升空作戰能力，部隊整體戰鬥力實現新跨越。

華盛頓記者林寶慶／二十八日電 10/29 02:29

中共中央軍委委員、總參謀長梁光烈廿八日上午在華府拜會美國國務卿鮑爾。梁光烈會後表示，雙方談及台灣問題。

梁光烈廿八日上午由中共駐華府大使楊潔篪陪同，在美國國務院和鮑爾會談約半小時。梁光烈在會後答覆本報記者問題時表示，雙方「當然談了台灣問題。」

會談後，鮑爾並未至國務院門口送客。可能是為迴避媒體。

鮑爾廿五日在北京指出，海峽兩岸應致力於「和平統一」；及台灣沒有國家主權，是美國堅定的政策。鮑爾廿七日已作出修正。

據了解，梁光烈向鮑爾提出美國對台軍售議題，鮑爾指出美國對台軍售是根據「台灣關係法」及北京對台灣的威脅而定。雙方並討論了美中關係。

梁光烈此行是應美國參謀首長聯席會議主席邁爾斯之邀赴美訪問。與鮑爾的會面則是中方要求。邁爾斯廿八日下午將於官邸所在的麥耳砲台以軍禮歡迎梁光烈。隨後雙方將前往五角大廈會談，之後再回到官邸晚宴。

梁光烈廿四日抵達美國訪問一周。他是繼一九九七年傅全有之後首位訪美的中共總參謀長。

梁光烈此行是對邁爾斯之回訪。邁爾斯曾於今年一月訪問中國大陸。

梁光烈已在美國維吉尼亞州諾福克海軍基地參觀喬治華盛頓號航空母艦，並在喬治亞州的班寧堡陸軍航空基地參觀。梁光烈一行計畫廿九日離開。

在台灣一波波台獨及軍購聲浪中，近期中共軍事動作也愈加頻繁，昨日上午九時許，兩架疑似中共蘇愷戰機飛越海峽中線，闖入澎湖領空，這是最近一個月內中共戰機盤旋軍事行動的第三波。

不過，對於此一從澎湖傳回的訊息，包括國防部、參謀本部和空軍總部都異口同聲否認，軍方強調，在上月底共軍曾以大編隊飛行出海進行組合訓練後，近期並無共軍戰機接近海峽中線的狀況。

駐澎湖軍方人士指出，九月廿七日陳水扁總統蒞臨澎湖秋節慰問三軍弟兄，當天規模最大，有十二梯次共計廿四架次的中共戰機飛臨澎湖領空附近，示警意味濃厚。

隨後，十月二日呂秀蓮副總統蒞臨澎湖參加「西瀛虹橋」點燈儀式，當天也有兩梯次的四架戰機，在澎湖領空附近出沒盤旋，同時澎湖附近海域發現廿多艘大陸漁船滯留，形跡可疑，海巡隊出動驅離；昨天中共戰機又第三波出現海峽中線領空附近。

不過，國防部則否認這項訊息。將領表示，如果有共軍戰機越線，我方戰管雷達馬上就會發現，飛彈部隊也會立即進入紅點，空軍同時也會升空，但昨天台海一切正常，我方空軍也照例進行一般例行訓練，沒有發現任何異常狀況。

哈電高層﹕軍工訂單歷來最多

核潛艇電力設備唯一廠商 旗下公司港上市

【 明 報 專 訊 】 哈 爾 濱 電 站 設 備 集 團 公 司 （ 簡 稱 哈 電 ） 副 總 經 理 、 中 國 發 電 設 備 國 家 研 究 中 心 主 任 苗 立 杰 昨 日 透 露 ， 該 集 團 目 前 獲 得 的 軍 品 生 產 訂 單 數 額 之 多 是 前 所 未 有 ， 不 僅 帶 來 可 觀 的 經 濟 利 益 ， 也 為 黑 龍 江 省 「 振 興 東 北 老 工 業 基 地 」 的 決 策 注 入 動 力 。 哈 電 集 團 旗 下 的 哈 爾 濱 動 力 設 備 股 份 有 限 公 司 是 本 港 上 市 企 業 ， 是 中 國 最 大 的 發 電 設 備 、 艦 船 動 力 裝 置 的 製 造 基 地 ， 也 是 中 國 核 潛 艇 發 電 機 組 的 唯 一 生 產 商 。 另 據 悉 ， 生 產 「 武 直 九 」 型 軍 用 直 升 機 的 哈 爾 濱 飛 機 製 造 公 司 目 前 也 是 「 任 務 繁 忙 」 。

記 者 連 日 在 哈 爾 濱 採 訪 ， 不 少 省 市 級 官 員 在 介 紹 當 地 優 勢 時 ， 都 不 避 諱 地 提 到 哈 電 集 團 「 是 我 國 生 產 核 潛 艇 電 力 設 備 的 廠 家 」 並 且 是 「 唯 一 的 廠 家 」 。 記 者 昨 日 到 哈 電 參 觀 ， 由 苗 立 杰 向 記 者 介 紹 情 ?G 。 在 回 應 本 報 記 者 關 於 哈 電 「 現 在 獲 得 的 軍 品 生 產 訂 單 多 不 多 」 和 「 公 司 是 否 因 而 獲 得 很 大 利 益 」 的 提 問 時 ， 身 兼 清 華 大 學 教 授 的 苗 立 杰 微 笑 而 又 壓 低 語 調 回 答 一 句 ﹕ 「 前 所 未 有 」 ， 隨 即 不 再 詳 談 。

研 發 周 期 長 攤 分 利 潤 小

不 過 ， 苗 立 杰 表 示 ， 哈 電 雖 然 從 軍 品 生 產 的 繁 重 任 務 中 獲 得 可 觀 報 酬 ， 但 由 於 這 只 是 近 期 收 穫 ， 放 在 公 司 為 軍 品 生 產 研 發 所 付 出 的 漫 長 周 期 中 ， 均 攤 之 後 仍 然 不 算 什 麼 。 他 還 說 ， 軍 品 生 產 的 投 入 ， 為 中 央 「 振 興 東 北 老 工 業 基 地 」 的 決 策 ， 為 哈 電 解 決 國 有 企 業 存 在 的 問 題 ， 「 注 入 了 動 力 」 。 參 觀 哈 電 的 生 產 車 間 時 ， 記 者 隨 口 向 一 名 工 人 探 問 ﹕ 「 軍 品 車 間 忙 不 忙 ﹖ 」 工 人 爽 快 應 道 ﹕ 「 怎 麼 不 忙 ﹖ 老 加 班 ﹗ 」

黑 省 首 批 股 份 改 造 企 業

哈 電 集 團 是 中 共 建 政 後 由 前 蘇 聯 援 建 的 首 批 156 項 目 之 一 ， 是 原 哈 爾 濱 三 大 動 力 廠 （ 哈 爾 濱 電 機 廠 、 鍋 爐 廠 、 氣 輪 機 廠 ） 組 建 而 成 ， 也 是 黑 龍 江 省 首 批 股 份 改 造 企 業 之 一 ， 其 下 轄 的 哈 動 公 司 於 1994 年 12 月 16 日 在 本 港 聯 交 所 上 市 。 雖 然 黑 龍 江 省 當 局 目 前 正 緊 鑼 密 鼓 對 全 省 400 家 大 中 型 國 企 進 行 徹 底 的 改 制 ， 但 會 否 涉 及 哈 電 ， 官 員 一 致 表 示 ， 哈 電 被 國 資 委 列 為 53 家 關 係 國 家 安 全 和 國 民 經 濟 命 脈 的 重 要 骨 幹 企 業 ， 「 再 怎 麼 改 ， 企 業 姓 國 （ 國 有 制 ） 是 絕 會 不 變 的 」 ， 一 名 當 地 官 員 說 。

另 據 了 解 ， 位 於 哈 市 的 另 一 家 重 要 軍 工 企 業 哈 爾 濱 飛 機 製 造 公 司 目 前 也 是 「 生 產 任 務 緊 迫 」 。 接 近 該 廠 的 人 士 形 容 ， 哈 飛 現 在 是 「 賺 大 錢 的 時 候 ， 忙 得 不 得 了 」 。

「 哈 飛 」 生 產 直 升 機 需 求 大

哈 飛 是 解 放 軍 「 武 直 九 」 型 直 升 機 的 生 產 商 ， 該 機 型 已 裝 備 駐 港 部 隊 和 解 放 軍 部 分 集 團 軍 。 據 報 道 ， 軍 方 計 劃 將 武 直 九 配 備 到 每 一 集 團 軍 ， 以 適 應 現 代 化 作 戰 之 需 。

林中斌說，北京新大戰略下的對台策略，上上策是「不戰為上」及「不戰併台」；中策是「臨界威懾」，儘量不流血、不破壞、不落彈到敵區等；下策則是「阻美奪台」，為達此策略，中國積極發展洲際飛彈（核彈頭）、巡弋飛彈、潛艦、點穴點、無人飛機及電磁脈衝等，這些新戰爭武器的到位時間約在2010年至2012年間，此時中國有能力攻台、也有能力以核子彈頭威嚇美國介入台海戰事。

他指出，中國國家主席胡錦濤(新聞、網站)上台後，中國對台政策展現更靈活、更有彈性，嚴格區隔官與民、縮小打擊面，值得注意的是，胡錦濤與江澤民(新聞、網站)對台最大差異是，江處理台灣問題一直有急迫感，下台前放任解放軍將領企圖以武力解決台灣問題，胡錦濤上台後，以經濟建設發展為第一要務，不急於以武力恫嚇台灣，胡秉龤u爭取談、準備打、不怕拖」，中國有自信時間是站在中國那邊。

Beijing: An Australian naval vessel arrived in Qingdao, a port city in east Chinas Shandong province, Sunday morning for a joint naval search-and-rescue exercise with the North China Sea Fleet of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) Navy to be held on October 14.

Chinese guided missile destroyer Harbin and the Australian frigate Anazc, led by Rowan Moffitt, chief of staff of Australian maritime headquarters, will be present in the drill.

It is the first time for the two navies to conduct cooperation in the nontraditional security area.

The Australian vessel, with a crew of 191 aboard, will stay in the port city for five days and hold a series of friendly, culture and sports activities.

劉劍

新學期伊始，海軍潛艇學院党委按照求真務實、改革創新的工作思路，從教員隊伍
建設這個源頭抓起，努力為他們搭建攀升的階梯，提供競技的擂台，注入攻關的動
力，使教研水平不斷提高。

搭建攀升的階梯

在某潛艇支隊新型潛艇上，該院船電、輪机、魚水雷、艇務等教研室的12名教員，
認真听取記錄艇員們介紹新裝備的性能、技術特點和參數。該院領導介紹，他們每
年都派出10多批教員到科研所和潛艇部隊學習掌握新裝備知識，為教員們開展新裝
備教學搭建攀升的階梯。

隨著高新技術的發展，潛艇部隊實現了由單一艇型向多艇型發展的歷史性跨越。而
不同的艇型、不同的裝備，有著不同的使用操作与維護管理要求。如何及時向部隊
輸送用得上的优秀技術人才？該院在廣泛征求潛艇部隊意見和建議的基礎上，實施
了“貼近實戰要求，跟蹤部隊新裝備及部隊訓練改革的發展，加強針對性教學訓練，
提高學員實戰能力”為主題的教學改革，及時把教學理念從“我培訓什么樣的學兵，
你用什么樣的學兵”，轉變為“你需要什么型號的技術骨干，我培養什么樣的學員”，
實行了分班、分型號的教學模式。

新裝備教學的發展，教員業務素質是基礎。他們在組織教研室主任開展潛艇新裝備
知識講座的同時，与潛艇部隊建立起了廣泛的聯系，一邊發揮教員的自身优勢，為
部隊解決技術難題，一邊把潛艇部隊作為教員繼續教育的基地，組織240多人次深入
潛艇部隊參加錨訓、出海和遠航訓練，使任課教員及時熟悉掌握新裝備的操作使用
与維護保養、戰法、訓法等，為有效地開展新裝備教學奠定了堅實的基礎。近年來，
教員們完成了多种艇型的新裝備教材編寫工作，出版教材25种，不但能講好老艇型
的課，還能全部擔任新裝備的課程。

提供競技的擂台

該院党委始終把提高廣大教員的積極性和創造力作為工作的出發點和落腳點，以行
之有效的制度措施搭建比、學、赶、幫、超的競技舞台。

4年前，該院針對教員輪流上課、“吃大鍋飯”造成部分教員積極性不高、創新能力
較弱等問題，開始探索研究教員隊伍量化管理的辦法和措施，制定出《專業技術干
部工作量評定及獎懲暫行辦法》。年終總結時，按照這個《辦法》測評，教學、科
研、學術等綜合工作量排在前4名的教研室被評為基層建設先進單位，個人工作量排
在前10名的教員，有的立功受獎，有的提前晉級。教員們的視野、思想和行為一下
子聚集在教學科研工作上，教研積極性顯著提高。

以科學的量化管理建立起有效的激勵机制。4年多來，他們先后多次召開座談會、研
討會，廣泛吸取學員、教員、机關干部的意見，對激勵机制進行修改、補充和完善。
青年教員侯宏光、鐘建波，既擔任机關工作又負責教學工作，他們加班加點，刻苦
鑽研，不斷創新教學方法，分別獲得學院教學質量特等獎和一等獎，侯宏光榮立三
等功，鐘建波被評為學院优秀教員。

注入攻關的動力

為支持教員跟蹤新裝備進行科研，該院不斷加大投入的力度，拿出經費作為科研啟
動、成果推廣和項目獎勵基金。為全面調動廣大教員科研攻關的積極性，他們還本
著突出重點的原則，堅持在長遠建設上多投入，建成計算机网絡實驗室；為全體教
員配備計算机，為專業教室配備了移動硬盤等。

針對士官組訓能力弱，上艇工作适應期長和學兵第一任職能力差的問題，他們組織
專業教員合力攻關，先后研制各型號潛艇魚水雷發射管、魚水雷發射艙等模擬器材，
革新改裝各种零部件上百個，建造了艇號齊全、模擬器材配套的“科教海戰場”，
做到了各种型號的學員和學兵能在相應型號的模擬器材上進行操作訓練。

科研成果的推廣應用，帶來了教學內容的更新和教學手段、方式的改進，使潛艇
“上”陸地，戰場“進”課堂，定期實施多型號潛艇專業骨干在戰時條件下的對敵
攻擊、技術故障排除、水下脫險演練，讓士官和學兵們在沒有硝煙的“戰場”上，
學習掌握了各型號、各專業的戰時裝備操作、故障排除等方法，取得了良好的教學
效益。近几年，該院在科技攻關上取得了較大突破，先后有多項科研成果在部隊推
廣應用，為部隊戰斗力的提高做出了積極的貢獻。

The Chinese Dragon submerges
By Phar Kim Beng

TOKYO - Over the past decade China has been expanding and enhancing its maritime forces to make them blue-water capable. A major focus is submarines, the Chinese Dragon U-boat. An obvious inference is the use of subs in the narrow, shallow Taiwan Strait in a possible conflict with renegade Taiwan, but military analysts say submarines are virtually obsolete and would easily be killed by ships and planes in the strait.

Still, the submarine, that sleek high-tech military platform, is an important symbol of prestige for both China and Taiwan, where the Legislative Yuan is battling over the military budget. Both Beijing and Taiwan are acquiring the vessels, despite what may be the futility of their deployment in a conflict.

A Chinese appraisal of future naval warfare in 2001, translated by the Foreign Broadcasting International Service of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), concludes that the prospect for using submarines is good, because of their covertness and power. Submarines are menaces existing anywhere, at any time. In the same report, another Chinese analyst affirmed that submarines are the maritime weapons posing the greatest threat to an aircraft carrier formation. Submarines are also our navys core force.

According to US and Taiwan intelligence estimates, China has about 70 submarines (virtually all conventional), it is building more and buying more from Russia. It has one nuclear submarine, two more being built and eight Kilo-class diesels on order from Russia, to be delivered in 2005 (Russian sources) or 2007 (Chinese sources). David Shambaugh, a leading military analyst at George Washington University, confirms at least 70 submarines, basing his figure on the authoritative International Institute for Strategic Studies on military balance for his article in the Washington Quarterly in 2002.

According to Sid Trevethan, an Alaska-based specialist on the Chinese military, Beijing has deployed 57 submarines, including one Xia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine, five Han-class sub, four Kilo-class subs, seven Songs, 18 Mings, and and 22 Soviet-designed Romeos.

Writing in the Spring 2004 issue of the journal International Security, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray affirmed: Contrary to Western forecasts, Chinas confidence in imported Kilos has not halted domestic production of the new Song-class diesel submarine. In addition, Chinas nuclear propulsion program will soon field the first of its second-generation vessels, which will include both attack submarines and strategic missile boats. Finally, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is undertaking an overhaul of the submarine forces weaponry, training, recruitment, and doctrine.

The conservative Washington Times reported in July that to the surprise of US observers, China had built new Yuan-class diesel submarines that combine Russian technology and Chinese engineering.

Indeed, China is only in the middle of extending the size and range of its submarine fleet, while acquiring modern weapons to transform its fleet from a coastal defense navy to a force capable of sustained open-ocean operations.

These developments have increased the security concerns of Japan, Taiwan and the United States.

After all, even if China took at least two decades to achieve open-ocean operations, Beijing has the option to develop some midget submarines that would tap into underwater communication lines or get up close to a coastline to land its special forces.

It is always a threat, said William Taylor, a retired Army colonel who was director of national-security studies at the US Military Academy. In a study on Chinese submarines, co-authored with Lyle Goldstein in the Spring 2004 issue of International Security, he said, The subs can put special operations teams in place, they can target aircraft carriers, locate other targets, and with the Chinese nuclear [weapons] capability, there are different threat categories altogether.

Nor is there a limit to what China wants to achieve with its submarine forces. In addition to its one nuclear-powered submarine, which has been ridden with troubles that confine it to the port, China is building two new U-boats.

Chinas Type-093 sub is believed to be based on the Russian Victor-III class, while the Pentagon believes that its Type-094 attack submarine with a finished hull will be ready for deployment in 2005.

Regardless of type or form, however, most military analysts agree that Chinese submarines could create serious trouble during a regional conflict, either by menacing sea lanes or by forcing US aircraft carriers to stay further away from targets for fear of being torpedoed.

In this context, the US, Taiwan and Japan have begun to take Chinas submarine forces seriously, especially given Beijings option to ally its maritime efforts with North Korea, another country with a massive, though archaic, and still deadly submarine fleet mostly inherited from World War II.

A Pentagon report published in May stated that China is changing from a coastal defense force to one employing active offshore defense.

This change in operations requires newer, more modern warships and submarines capable of operating at greater distances from Chinas coast for longer periods, the report said, noting that submarine construction is a top priority.

Indeed, over the last two months, the US Navy has begun conducting tests in the Sea of Japan, as well as similar trials off Hawaii, to test the prototype of a detection device that analyzes submarines underwater color patterns and detects color gradations too faint for the human eye to detect.

Early versions of the device called the Littoral Airborne Sensor Hyperspectral, or LASH, have spotted whales and submarines below the surface. Current detection methods used by the US Navy rely on sonar and other methods to hear the location of enemy submarines. The LASH system is designed to permit the Navy to see the submarines.

Japan is wary of Chinas efforts and has fully supported such detection exercises, since Chinese submarines have been spotted off the coast of Japan with increased frequency. Indeed, China has even begun to conduct resource surveys in the vicinity of Okino-Torishima, 1,700 kilometers south of Tokyo.

The Chinese survey activities have been undertaken within Japans Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in violation of the Law of the Sea, according to the Maritime Safety Agency of Japan. China, however, has insisted that Okino-Torishima should not be considered an island, but a cluster of rocks not qualified for EEZ status, as stipulated by the Law of the Sea.

While these submarines, Tokyo military experts believe, do not have any offensive intention in the immediate or short term, they are nonetheless positioned to increase Chinas intelligence-gathering activities and to explore the opportunity to block US naval forces in the event of a Taiwan conflict. China has the nasty habit of surfacing its submarine fleets off the coast of the Sea of Japan, as in November 2003, 25 miles offshore.

Taiwan also is taking the Chinese submarine threat seriously. Taiwan is severely disadvantaged, although the Taiwan Strait is narrow and relatively shallow because of the continental shelf, making it difficult for submarines to operate and hide.

According to Shambaugh, the China military analyst, Taiwans two antiquated World War II-vintage (Guppy class), and two Dutch-built Zvaardis diesel submarines are no match for Chinas 70 submarines, were a conflict to break out.

Indeed, Taiwans airborne anti-submarine warfare capability also remains limited, this despite the fact that the shallow Taiwan Strait actually gives Taiwan the military advantage.Taiwan is taking steps to strengthen its submarine forces accordingly. To begin with, the Taiwan navy has signed a submarine-rescue agreement with the US. According to Chinese-language news reports, the agreement states that the US is required to send a deep submergence rescue vehicle (DSRV) to Taiwan in the shortest time possible if any of Taiwans four submarines become disabled.

That China is improving its submarine and naval capability has clearly made Taiwan wary. In October 2003, the Taiwan parliament was informed that a Chinese destroyer from the North Sea fleet had, for the first time, sailed through the waters east of Taiwan to join exercises in the South China Sea. This has never happened before, said Defense Minister Tang Yao-Ming. President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly has urged Taiwan to improve its naval combat readiness.

Chen did not go into details about Taiwans own naval buildup, but its highlights include the purchase of four US second-hand Kidd-class destroyers and eight conventional submarines. US President George W Bush in April 2001 approved the sale of eight diesel-electric submarines as part of Washingtons most comprehensive arms package to Taipei since 1992.

The multibillion-dollar arms package, including submarines, has generated a fierce debate in Taiwans Legislative Yuan, or parliament.

Although the chances are slim that China and Taiwan would return to the heyday of Cold War submarine warfare, when submarines pursued one another under the sea, the exponential expansion of Chinese submarine forces clearly has not been taken lightly.

Phar Kim Beng is a regular contributor to Asia Times Online. He is currently on a Sumitomo Foundation fellowship, where he is studying the state of Japanese social sciences. He was trained in international relations and strategic studies, first at Cambridge University, later the Fletcher School and Harvard University.

　　中新网10月23日電昨天，空軍運輸航空兵某師在复雜背景下，千里奔襲至中原
某地，成功實施了多机型、大机群陌生空域空投演練。解放軍報報道說，這次演練
机种之多、環境之复雜、難度強度之大，在該師尚屬首次。
　　
　　上午8時40分，云霧迷蒙，气象條件較差。這個師10多架不同型號的運輸机從3個
机場同時起飛，向陌生空域千里奔襲，飛抵指定空域后，立即組成密集編隊突破地
面防空兵的攔截，快速投放大批作戰人員和物資。
　　
　　該師鄭師長對記者說，未來戰場對運輸航空兵的要求越來越高，為此，他們大
膽探索，出台多項舉措，把复雜背景下在陌生空域多批次大強度遠程空投能力作為
主攻課題，從難從嚴訓練，加速部隊整體戰斗力的攀升。
　　
　　演練現場，亮點多多。空中，師建制、多机型机群正以高難度的密集編隊快速
机動；地面，由高炮、地空導彈等組成的強大“藍軍”不斷向戰机發起“攻擊”。
戰机到達陌生空域后，在沒有指揮引導、地面气象資料和地標指示的情況下，數分
鐘內便完成空投任務；隨后，戰机經短暫加油准備，又立即升空展開第二波次空投。
据了解，他們為提高遠程空投能力，對全師机型和人員進行优化組合，加大复雜气
象飛行、長距离無靶標空投等高難課目訓練，并組織人員攻關，先后在數十個空投
關鍵難題上獲突破。(丁艷麗、譚洁)

http://military.china.com/zh_cn/news/568/20041028/11937170.html
中國軍工空空導彈激光陀螺等引進項目完成驗收
2004-10-28 08:01:26

　　据04年《航空科學技術雜志》第三期報道：中國總裝備部組織國內專家學者，
對西安飛行自動控制研究所承擔的主動雷達型空空導彈激光陀螺及陰極技術、A-12加
速度計部分關鍵技術和設備、低空突防飛控系統等三個引進項目進行了驗收。
　　
　　驗收組認為：飛控所根据型號研制和技術發展的需要，在調查研究和充分論證
的基礎上，針對相關領域所具有的先進技術和工程經驗，開展了5215激光陀螺組合、
單晶硅擺式伺服加速度計和低空突防飛控系統等三個項目的國際合作，項目合作內
容選題科學、合理、正确，針對性強。項目的實施大大提高了我國新一代慣導、飛
控產品的開發研制水平，達到了較高的效費比，取得了較好的綜合效益，縮短了与
國外先進水平的差距。驗收一致通過。（白陽）

http://military.china.com/zh_cn/news/568/20041030/11941572.html
中國空軍“霹靂中隊”可以在中大雨里起飛戰斗
2004-10-30 11:07:46 解放軍報

軍方權威管道透露，自九月下旬中共軍機大編隊出海後，陳總統特別注意共軍動態，特別是東山島，每隔一或兩週，都要聽取國防部機密報告；唯自九月中共軍機「不尋常」出海後，共軍動態一切正常，東山島也沒有任何部隊集結演訓。

據了解中共軍機九月中旬「大編隊」不尋常出海動作，的確引起台美高度關切，我國防部高層多次開會，研討中共此一動作的政治與軍事意涵。

軍方透露，九月下旬某日，中共解放軍包括蘇愷廿七、蘇愷三十和殲八、殲十等戰鬥機，以及戰轟機，總計三十多架次，分批出海再會合，採大編隊隊型返航，是近年少見的「演訓動作」。

軍方消息人士說，中共於沿岸軍機演訓科目，以往都是「轉場」，即同一型軍機，由甲基地飛往乙基地，落地後，進行油料彈藥補給，再飛返原駐防基地。

這樣的「轉場」演訓動作用意是在操練軍機多批次進駐沿海基地的能量，例如中共若想取得台海制空權，打頭陣的數批軍機，可能遭我擊落，但中共有能力才調動較遠基地的同型軍機進駐，進行第二波制空權的爭奪。

消息來源強調，最重要的是，中共軍機做「轉場」演訓，都是同一機型，而且從不出海；即便是「兩國論」引發台海危機時刻，中共軍機出海，甚至有兩次貼近海峽中線，也都是同型軍機，而且架次極少，不會像這次是不同機型的「大編隊」，浩浩蕩蕩地出海會合。

據透露，九月下旬這次不尋常的演訓動作，是中共各型軍機，包括戰機與戰轟型，總計有六型軍機，分批次，每批次由數架同型軍機自基地起飛出海，而出海後，未立即返航，反而是飛到海上指定的會合點後，待所有機型於海上會合後，進行編隊，總計達三十多架，隨後一起編隊返航，所以隊型「浩蕩」，前所未見。

儘管中共軍機出海，是沿著大陸海岸飛，並沒有逼近海峽中線，或故意做出軍事挑釁動作，兩岸軍機也未發生意外，或出現擦槍走火情事，但政府相當重視並立即告知美方，表示台灣不樂見台海發生衝突，或發生軍事挑釁衝突。

當發現中共軍機「大編隊」出海動作，國防部即盯著東山島，發現東山島並無部隊進駐，此外，中共電訊頻率也相當正常，顯示中共並非進行三軍聯戰演訓，而是單一軍種編隊飛行訓練，是軍種單獨的演訓活動，才鬆了口氣，「情勢還算穩定」。

軍方官員分析，陳總統與國防部之所以一直「盯著」東山島，主要是中共若有任何兵力集結動作，一定是藉著演訓名義掩護，而東山島因地理位置之故，是中共集結部隊做軍事挑釁最佳地點之一，因此，確定中共軍機「大編隊」出海時，地面並沒有部隊集結，「事情就單純多了」。

另一方面，國防部也開會研判中共「大編隊」演訓的用意，在軍事方面，是國防部專職所在，很快便研討出相關意涵，至於政治層面，有人認為時機恰在游揆發表「你打我一百枚飛彈，我回打你五十枚」，以及「恐怖平衡」說之後，是否意味著解放軍以軍機「大編隊」出海，回應遊揆不當的叫陣，但隨即有人指出，軍機大編隊飛行，事前的飛行計畫作業，至少要有一個月，所以不至於是突發回應的動作。

因此，國防部將之定位為「中共演訓活動」，唯是不尋常且以往罕見的演訓科目，自此即密切注意東山島及沿岸共軍動態；而中共自九月下旬的軍機編隊出海後，再無異常，兩岸軍事相當「平靜」，軍方的研判是適值美國大選，台灣立委選舉，中共軍事動作在「點到為止」後，也採取了觀望態度。