愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦]
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| 勤務組 於 2003/06/09 12:38 | |
| 愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
愛國者相關資料及討論 | |
NO:25_1
| VOR 於 2003/06/17 14:58 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
幾則消息 http://aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_aerospacedaily_story.jsp?id=news/gmd05123.xml Panel OKs PAC-3/MEADS Merger, GMD Increase, F/A-22 Cut 概要﹕美國國會同意將 MEADS 跟 PAC-3 這兩項計劃合併。 By Marc Selinger May 12, 2003 The Senate Armed Services Committee announced May 9 that it has approved a fiscal 2004 defense authorization bill that merges the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) programs, adds an intercept test to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and cuts two F/A-22 Raptors from the Bush Administrations request. While fully funding the Administrations $9.1 billion request for ballistic missile defense (BMD), the committee voted to combine the research and development efforts of PAC-3 and MEADS. Because MEADS essentially is an upgrade of PAC-3, committee members decided it was not necessary to maintain two separate anti-missile programs. The PAC-3 and MEADS R&D; efforts, now at the Army, would return to the Missile Defense Agency, but PAC-3 procurement would stay at the Army. International participation, a key part of MEADS, would continue in some form in the merged program. About $20 million of the $450 million the Administration requested for PAC-3 and MEADS R&D; would be shifted to other programs. For GMD, the committee added $100 million for an additional intercept test and other To pay for the GMD increase, the committee cut $70 million from the $301 million request for MDAs new boost-phase interceptor missile program. Minor reductions were made to Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and the BMD system core. .... -------- 提點 MEADS 的基本資料– 原本使用新科技研發新彈體的計劃已改成直接使用 PAC-3 ，再經過上面報導描述的計劃合併，MEADS 跟愛國者計劃已無法分割。MEADS 跟愛國者最大的差異為 MEADS 強調系統機動性及三百六十度的全面防禦，除此之外 MEADS 可視為愛國者三型縮短攔截範圍的改良型 (以減少射程換取多面防禦)。 使用 X-band 雷達的MEADS 計劃分為三個階段﹕PDV (產品定型及確認)、D&D; (設計及研發) 、量產。LRIP (低量預產) 可能在 2009 開始，測試及正式量產多半在 2012 以後。 --------- http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003Jun16287/index.htm (Source: EADS; issued June 14, 2003) --------- TOKYO (Reuters) - Japan aims to deploy a new U.S.-made missile defense system as early as 2006 in response to rising tension over communist North Korea (news - web sites), Japanese media said on Saturday. Japanese officials have repeatedly said Japan lacks the capability to defend itself from North Korea, which launched a ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998 and is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. The media reports coincide with a visit to Asia by U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz amid speculation about U.S. plans to rearrange its forces in the region. Japanese government sources were quoted by Kyodo news agency as saying that the defense system would be linked to a revision of Tokyos National Defense Program Outline, likely to be carried out by the end of the year. The program was last updated in 1995. Japan intends to deploy the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile system, an upgraded version of the PAC-2 system that Japans air force currently possesses. It also would upgrade its four Aegis destroyers, currently equipped with hi-tech missile detection systems, with a U.S.-made missile defense system, the sources were quoted as saying. Officials at the Defense Agency were not available for confirmation of the report, but military sources have said that both options were being considered to boost Japans defenses. Government endorsement is required for the new deployment to proceed, but such approval is likely to be difficult to obtain due to Japans nervousness of anything that threatens to exceed the limitations of its pacifist constitution. Japans postwar constitution bans war as a means of settling international disputes, and that has been interpreted to mean the nations military must be restricted to self-defense. The new deployment would not come cheaply. Wolfowitz began a trip to Asia on Friday aimed at reinforcing Americas commitment to the region. Wolfowitz, en route to South Korea (news - web sites) and Japan at the end of his current visit to Singapore, denied speculation the United States was considering moving troops from the Japanese island of Okinawa to Australia. But a U.S. official said the United States would begin relocating troops from the South Korean capital in early 2004. | |
NO:25_2
| TTSO 於 2003/06/17 16:57 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
我比較好奇的.. 以後是要叫PAC3+還是MEADS....:) | |
NO:25_3
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/06/17 17:00 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
哇哈哈！雷神集團的國防事業部門賺翻了....... | |
NO:25_4
| TTSO 於 2003/06/17 17:34 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
Raytheon的股價卻沒好到哪裡去... http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=RTN&d;=c&t;=5y&l;=on&z;=b&q;=l 我已經監看Raytheon、Lockheed的股市變化很久了...:p | |
NO:25_5
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/06/22 18:50 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
http://news.yam.com/cna/international/news/200306/200306220086.html 傳日將於2007年部署飛彈防禦系統 （中央社記者黃菁菁東京二十二日專電）日本讀賣新聞今天報導，日本政府為對抗北韓彈道飛彈的威脅，已計劃導入可在高空攔截的「標準飛彈三型」及地對空誘導彈的「愛國者飛彈三型」。同時計劃將於2004年重新編列相關預算，2007年正式實戰部署飛彈防禦系統。 該報導指出，日本防衛廳現在在海上自衛的四艘神盾艦上配備有「標準飛彈二型（SM2）」、航空自衛隊的二十四高炮部隊等的二十七座發射台也有配備「愛國者飛彈二型（PAC2）」的迎擊飛彈。但是這些都是以飛機等為攔截對象，幾乎沒有攔截彈導飛彈的能力。 所以日本政府準備導入以SM2和PAC2為基礎改良的SM3和PAC3最新型迎擊飛彈。日本計劃將在二到三艘的神盾艦上配備可從大氣層外高空攔截飛彈的「標準飛彈三型（SM3）」，預估神盾艦的改修工程費及飛彈採購費用等，合計約需一千億日圓。 另外，計劃將目前配備的「愛國者飛彈二型（PAC2）」漸進式地更換成在低空攔截的地對空誘導彈「愛國者飛彈三型（PAC3）」，預估飛彈採購費、指揮通訊系統、雷達系統費用等，合計也需一千億日圓左右。報導中指出，有關此計劃的二千億日圓經費預算，日本計劃儘可能在今年底的安保會議和內閣會議時，在2004年度預算案中編列出相關經費。年底還將重新檢視現在的中期防衛力整備計劃，靠削減採購戰車經費等來調整經費的編列，並於2007年開始實戰備配SM3和PAC3防禦飛彈。 | |
NO:25_6
| VOR 於 2003/07/01 06:19 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
新出爐的美伊戰爭愛國者報告，數據及戰果跟之前的略有不同 http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/features/data/fe319/index.htm Hold Your Applause: the Patriot Missile Defense System’s Wartime Record Reveals a Complicated Mosaic of Innovations and Flaws (Source: Center for Defense Information; undated) (Reproduced courtesy of CDI) According to some proponents of missile defense, the Patriot missile defense system may have saved hundreds of lives on the ground during the second Gulf War. According to the U.S. Army Test & Evaluation Command, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, and undoubtedly the families of the pilots lost in friendly fire incidents, the Patriot had not developed enough to warrant full-rate production. While analysis of the missile defense system’s performance is on-going, we do know several things for sure: Iraqi missiles were not responsible for any deaths during this Gulf War. The Patriot missile defense system was involved in three friendly fire incidents resulting in the deaths of one American and two British pilots. And any assessment of the Patriot will be done keeping in mind the exaggerated and misleading hype the system received during the first Gulf War. Reading through media accounts, there are reports of at least 16 Iraqi missiles having been launched at coalition forces and Kuwait in March and April 2003. That number has been continually revised upward as time passes. The latest number of total Iraqi missiles launched is 20. This confusion over the totals seems unusual, as a missile attack would be something that would be hard to ignore. However, it may be because many Iraqi missiles were not launched at anything in particular and landed away from populated areas. The Iraqis likely were focused more on just getting the missiles launched, with little thought to accuracy. That would explain why so many six by reading through press accounts, up to nine by official accounts Iraqi missiles were deemed “unengageable,” or not posing enough of a threat to merit a Patriot counter-attack. Another topic of which the official military accounts have been studiously silent is how many Patriots were fired in total. Press accounts, based on reliable sources, state that 20 PAC-2s were launched, the majority of which probably were the Guided Enhanced Munition (GEM) and GEM-Plus (GEM+) variants. The only hard number given thus far for Patriots fired was by Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of the Missile Defense Agency, while testifying to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee on April 9. He stated that 4 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)s were launched during the entire conflict. Looking at daily events, at least 20 Patriots in total were launched, assuming that at least two Patriots were launched against every Iraqi ballistic missile but only one Patriot per aircraft down. Seeing as how the U.S. doctrine for the Patriot entails a “ripple fire” effect, where more than one Patriot is launched at every target to increase the missiles’ potential for lethality, this is not an unrealistic number. The reason why the total number of Patriots launched even matters is because it is a crucial part of assessing how effective the Patriots actually were. From press accounts, there are reports of 10 Iraqi missiles engaged by Patriots: six by U.S. Patriot batteries and four by Kuwaiti Patriot batteries. This differs from U.S. Army officials’ total of nine (six by the United States; three by Kuwait). U.S. military officials further break down the engagements by noting that two were done by PAC-3s, 6 by PAC-2/GEMs, and one by a PAC-2/GEM+. While their total number is different from what can be determined by reading daily news accounts, it is useful in analyzing general patterns in Patriot usage. First, no matter how effective the Patriot is proven to be in the intercepts of this war, it has to be emphasized that it was targeting short-range ballistic missiles: Ababil-100s and al-Samoud-2s. Iraq never launched any of the missiles which were so vexingly difficult for the Patriot to intercept during the first Gulf War the Scud. Iraq’s version of the Scud is an extended variant with a range of around 400 miles and therefore is very rickety. During the first Gulf War, they were so poorly maintained that they often fell apart in flight and were exceedingly difficult to track. If Iraq even has any Scuds left, they have been hidden away in less than optimal conditions and undoubtedly would be even more challenging to intercept. Iraq’s Ababil-100s and al-Samoud-2s, on the other hand, have a shorter range of maybe 100 miles, so they are slower and relatively easier to intercept than the Scuds would have been. Another striking aspect of the Patriots used in Iraq is that nearly all of the engagements were done by PAC-2/GEMs or PAC-2/GEM+s. These are upgraded versions of the Patriot that was used in the first Gulf War but still incorporate the blast-fragmentation warhead popular from the early days of theater missile defense design. Contrast this against the PAC-3’s track record of two acknowledged engagements against Iraqi ballistic missiles. The PAC-3 utilizes hit-to-kill technology where the warhead strives to directly intercept the enemy missile. Hit-to-kill, or “hitting a bullet with a bullet” as it has been vernacularly referred to, is what all the latest missile defense research and development has been working toward. The ground-based midcourse and the sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defense systems that are to begin deployment next year both use this kind of technology. Rightly or wrongly, the Patriots in Iraq were used by both sides of the aisle to prove or disprove whether hit-to-kill specifically and missile defense in general could work. If it turns out that the PAC-3 really was involved in such a small fraction of the successful engagements, hit-to-kill advocates have only been slightly vindicated. Of course, this may be because there was a limited number of PAC-3s in the U.S. arsenal around 50 when hostilities started or because the Iraqi missiles being targeted did not merit the PAC-3 interceptor. The Army would do well to clear up this confusion. Another thing Western media has not highlighted is the heavy involvement of the Kuwaiti Patriot batteries in the reported engagements. Whether one uses the CENTOM total of three engagements or inferring from daily news stories that there were four, the Kuwaiti batteries represent a significant percentage of the Patriots’ successes. The PAC-3 is deployed solely to U.S. Patriot batteries, which means that the Kuwaitis were limited to using the PAC-2/GEMs or PAC-2/GEM+s. Also, the Kuwaiti Patriot batteries likely were not manned by Americans. Finally, all three friendly fire incidents involved U.S. Patriot batteries rather than those of Kuwait. The first friendly fire incident occurred on Sunday, March 23. A British RAF Tornado GR-4 was returning from a mission in Iraq when a PAC-2 shot it down and killed both pilots on-board. Shortly after this blue-on-blue tragedy took place, the British Royal Air Force detachment commander, Group Capt. Simon Dobb, announced, The Americans have made a rapid and prudent re-evaluation of Patriot rules of engagement. I can categorically assure my crews that there is no danger of inadvertent engagement. He spoke too soon, as the second friendly fire incident occurred just one day later. A U.S. Air Force F-16CJ flying a suppression of enemy air defense mission thought it was being targeted by a forward-deployed Patriot radar and consequently launched a high-speed anti-radiation missile against it. The Patriot’s radar was damaged slightly. There was no human cost as the system was operating on automatic, due to the heavy mortar fire which forced the Patriot operators to withdraw. After this second incident, the Air Force decided to revamp its rules of engagement and announced that its pilots were to double-check before launching missiles against what appeared to be enemy air defense systems. U.S. Air Force Secretary James Roche also portrayed the March 24 incident as merely a lack of familiarity between the Patriot and air crews, explaining that he didnt think weve operated in the vicinity of Patriot batteries before. That hypothesis is somewhat questionable, as Patriot crews train with air support, but perhaps it may be appropriate for the early stages of the war. By April 2, all communication problems should have been worked out but they were not. On that date, a U.S. Navy F/A-18C was shot down by a PAC-3, killing the pilot. Investigations for all three friendly fire incidents are on-going, but speculation as to the causes has run rampant. One of the first explanations given was that it was pilot error, either by turning off the identification friend or foe (IFF) transponder beacon that all aircraft are required to use or by veering out of designated flight paths. To begin, human error possibly could explain one incident, or maybe two incidents, but when the same issue crops up with three very different military branches, that explanation begins to lose credibility. Second, the IFF beacons very well may not have worked quite as they should have - but since the Iraqi Air Force was not flying, the first assumption of any aircraft spotted by the Patriot should have been that it was friendly. And while there may have been specified corridors the blue aircraft should have been following, the Patriot’s radar swept such wide paths in the sky that it would be virtually impossible to avoid. Additionally, during development tests in the mid-1990s, the Patriot targeted friendly aircraft even when they remained where they were supposed to be. That problem may have been worked through and fixed in later tests, but it is a possibility which should not be discounted by investigators. What seems to be gaining popularity as an explanation is that, due to the extremely cluttered environment the Patriots were operating in and the resulting electronic interference that may have been generated by the radars operating in close proximity, the radar system simply failed to recognize the aircraft as aircraft. Instead, it is plausible that the blue aircraft were deemed by the Patriot’s radar to be missiles. While this theory explains why aircraft were being targeted at all, it raises a whole slew of more disturbing questions. Part of the $3 billion spent on upgrading the Patriot was used to make its radar much more discriminatory. It is supposed to be able to handle a much more cluttered air picture with objects of a much smaller radar cross section than the earlier radar could have done. Why didn’t the Patriot’s radar recognize the IFF beacons on the blue aircraft? Even if the beacons weren’t working perfectly, the aircraft were flying in formation with others shouldn’t that have let Patriot operators know that those weren’t missiles they were targeting? And how could this more discriminatory radar system mistake an aircraft for a missile? They have different radar cross sections, shapes, and speeds. If indeed this proves to be the cause of the friendly fire incidents, unless the U.S. military takes a hard look at why the Patriot’s radar made these errors, the Pentagon will be limited to deploying the Patriot missile defense system only to theaters where there will not be U.S. aircraft. That is to say, nowhere. Finally, any commentary on the Patriot missile defense system’s performance in Iraq should include how it handled cruise missiles. To be blunt, it didn’t. The only two missiles which got through the Patriot’s radar unnoticed were apparently CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise missiles. One landed outside Camp Commando in Kuwait in the morning of March 20; the other landed just off-shore Kuwait City’s shopping mall on March 29. In both cases, there was minimal damage and only two minor injuries reported. What is notable is that these missiles, by flying low to the ground, seemingly were able to avoid setting off the Patriot’s radar. Cruise missile proliferation, while not often discussed, is becoming an increasingly dangerous problem. The Patriot will undoubtedly be deployed in the future against countries which have cruise missiles; that the Patriot failed to even note the missiles is discouraging. Also, given the wild popularity of unmanned aerial vehicles in U.S. military circles, it makes sense that other governments will start investigating using them. This could pose a threat if the Patriot radar is going to continue entirely missing threats low to the ground. The Patriot missile defense system has proven it is lethal against aircraft. It has proven that it is not lethal against cruise missiles. What remains to be determined is how exactly lethal it is against ballistic missiles. In order to head off accusations of misleading the public about the Patriot’s acumen, which was the response following the U.S. military’s triumphant (and later proven to faulty) proclamations during the first Gulf War, an objective and thorough investigation must be made of the Patriot’s usage during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The results of this scrutiny should be made available, as much as possible, to the public so that it may be independently confirmed. Only by doing so can whatever problems that bedeviled the Patriot this past spring be rooted out, allowing the system to become a reliable part of U.S. defense operations. (ends) ----- http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=1001&StartRow;=1&ListRows;=10&appendURL;=&Orderby;=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID;=6&from;_page=index.cfm | |
NO:25_7
| VOR 於 2003/07/17 17:27 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
其實從這些相關消息可看出愛國者尚未成熟，還有不少修改空間。 最近新聞說台灣國防預算增加以購買愛國者，以時程來看顯然購買的為基本構型。 ------- | |
NO:25_8
| VOR 於 2003/08/08 08:51 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.69586.1060303418∏=23853&modele;=release Successful System Interface Demonstration of MEADS (Source: MEADS International issued Aug. 6, 2003) | |
NO:25_9
| VOR 於 2003/08/15 01:03 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
08-14 青年日報 美退役將領：台灣C4ISR採購計畫 可支援飛彈防衛任務 記者孫立方／台北報導 有限資源下，如何平衡戰備需求與預算？在昨日舉行的一場座談會中，幾位美軍退役將領，分享了他們的經驗。退役美陸軍中將Malcolo ONeil博士表示，針對所需武器裝備採取「漸進式」獲取方式，可於固定期程，針對科技發展與威脅演變，將系統升級，進而避免在「畢其功於一役」之心理下，使系統獲得期程、預算均面臨高風險的窘境。財團法人國家政策研究基金會昨日針對我國飛彈防禦系統建構，召開座談會，全球規模最大的國防承包商洛克希德馬汀公司 (Lockheed Martin Corp.)，亦首度派出十餘位代表，包括美陸、海軍退役將領，針對「將台灣空防系統轉型為防空與飛彈防衛整合型」提出簡報。座談會由國政基金會國家安全組召集人蘇起與政策委員帥化民共同主持，包括立法委員李文忠、關沃暖及各軍種代表、國防大學人員均共同與會。 曾任職美國彈道飛彈防禦組織的ONeil表示，美國早年的採購過程，係依需求而定，負責規劃人員必須深入未來，設計一種可完全符合需求的系統概念與採購計畫，加諸政治方面的阻力，以及飛彈防衛對指揮結構造成的壓力，使相關計畫的執行遭遇相當困難，如今則已克服問題，向前邁進。 ONeil認為，我國現有各項C4ISR採購計畫，可支援飛彈防衛任務。自動化空防系統與博勝專案有極佳連線能力、備援系統及存活率，未來隨著所需之整合式空防與飛彈防禦能力，聯合指、管暨戰場管理能力及作戰概念的發展，自動化空防系統頻寬，足以容納新增之漸進式飛彈防禦系統。 | |
NO:25_10
| Luke-Skywalker 於 2003/08/15 07:20 | |
| Re:愛國者相關資料及討論[茶館推薦] | |
昨天詢問雷神國防事業部門台灣分公司的老朋友，關於PAC-3的研製進度，表示PAC-3目前尚在測試階段。 | |
歡迎前往茶黨2005年新論壇TaiwanBBS.ORG參與討論。 以下表格僅供管理人員整理資料輸入之用
