Nepali Times, 16-22 May 2003
尼泊爾時報﹕我們為何需要坦克﹖
Why do we need tanks?
Nepal does not need, nor can it afford, to buy tanks and helicopter gunships.

ANALYSIS by Kanak Mani Dixit

The Procurement Office of the Master General of Ordnance of the Royal Nepali Army (RNA) has sought applications from agents of international firms wishing to be included in a list of companies to supply hardware. The notice, published in the Gorkhapatra of 14 May, provides the description of the equipment to be supplied, which include different kinds of arms, accessories, spare parts, ammunition, as well as radio sets, jamming devices, satellite phones, mine detectors, bomb disposal suits, and night vision devices.

Doubtless, the army needs to modernise after years of stagnant budget. But how is one to react to the requirement of tanks and armoured gunship helicopter/aircraft, as stated in the notice?

The country seems to be caught in a headlong rush towards an unsupervised, unrestricted military buildup that it can ill afford. One wonders if there is proper discussion even within the military command about the need for and implications of adding tanks, helicopter gunships or bombers to the arsenal. An attempt last year to import two used Russian-made Mi-24 gunships via Australia was scrapped, because better sense prevailed. But it looks like the army hasnt given up.

Are these weapons appropriate, and can we afford them? The national budget cant, so which foreign source is pulling out the checkbook? Could it be the Indian military, whose COAS was in Kathmandu recently indicating a willingness to add another billion rupees to the significant support already provided. Since the British are already committed to non-lethal support when it comes to helicopter assistance, would it be the United States that is making the RNA think big?

What seems to be a deliberate plan to acquire such weaponry must be questioned primarily because of their lethal internal consequences, both in military terms and the larger inter-institutional equilibrium of the state.

Long-range weapons will increase the destructive power of army units, and the chances of added victimising of hapless civilians, which was a factor in the latest bout with the Maoists. Further, the ability to call in the gunships is liable to make commanders lax about on-the-ground intelligence gathering and improvement of the ability to fight clean.

If the army is to be an effective fighting force it surely needs to increase capacity at the personnel level, it does need better transport and logistics, and it requires more officers per soldiers so that there is better command and control and less civilian collateral damage. The army will also require weaponry suited to Nepals terrain and the nature of the enemy. Helicopter gunships and tanks are not appropriate weapons.

All militaries want the latest technology, and the display of high-end firepower during the latest Iraq war has only increased these desires the world over. But will the enemy the army expects to fight have armor, installations and encampments of the sort that requires gunships and tanks?

There are other questions of a more political nature. Will such extra-lethal hardware make the centralised state more powerful? In the period after the Peoples Movement the cap in the RNAs budget affected the armys fighting capability and operational strength. But the last year has been a different story, with a doubling in size of its air wing, and its battlefield capability reinforced with the arrival of Belgian Minimi belt-driven guns and US M-16 rifles. There has also been an active recruitment drive to add thousands more soldiers.

With its enhanced firepower and countrywide deployment, it becomes clear that the Nepali military is fast acquiring a position in national affairs that it has never had in the modern era. Further, and ominously, the RNA seems willing to descend to the political playing field as evident in its pronouncements against the political parties on behalf of the king. How will domestic politics and the peace process be affected by the acquisition of these weapons?

The expenditure of this money should be made with civilian oversight and some measure of debate among experts who can consider the merits and evaluate the rationale of tanks and helicopter gunships.

Report by Jonathan Katzenellenbogen: With the G6-52, Denel outguns its competitors.

Artillery was hardly used in the recent Iraq war, making it tricky to derive any hard lessons on its use. Had there been conclusive lessons, the timing of the release of the G6 cannon SAs state-owned arms manufacturer Denels new version of its flagship weapon would not have been better.

Denel claims its recently released G6-52 is the worlds most advanced and effective artillery system in terms of what counts mobility on the battlefield, in distance, and accuracy of fire.

With an ability to fire 67km, the G6-52 outguns the nearest competitor in the 155mm class, the German PzH2000. Even when the German gun fires special rounds, produced in SA, these can only reach 42km. The German gun can reach the same rate of fire of eight rounds a minute, but lacks the high level of automation of the SA gun.

Of all the weapon systems initially developed in SAs apartheid isolation, the G5 and G6 have achieved the greatest commercial success globally. The pressure of the war in Angola forced the initial development of the gun and its later sales success abroad gave a further impetus to development of SA artillery systems. The publicly known sales have been to Iraq in the late 1980s, and the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Malaysia after 1993, when the G6 was released.

The advanced features of the G6-52 will not alone guarantee sales. In the arms industry it is not necessarily what is best that counts, but protection of domestic industrial interests.

Bastiaan Verhoek, head of business development for the Denel subsidiary, LIW, that manufactures the turret, says the company is negotiating some good deals. He declines to say with whom.

There are signs India could be a large potential market. Janes Defence Weekly has reported India plans to make what is an enormous investment in up to 4000 guns in the next few years. India has already shown interest in the G series. The G5 has been mounted on an Indian-manufactured truck while the G6 turret, called the T6, has been integrated on the Arjun tank chassis.

There is silence from Denel on the issue, but the United Arab Emirates, which according to Janes Defence Weekly already has 78 G6s, would be a logical market for upgrades. In a show of determination to sell to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation states, Denel has a version of the new gun which meets Nato standards.

The SA army has yet to decide whether to upgrade to the new gun. The heavy financial burden of the strategic arms package, which boosts the SA Navy and Air Force, has left the army short of cash to invest in new equipment.

Denel is also marketing its advanced ammunition and its own unmanned vehicle, the Seeker RPV-2, for reconnaissance. SA has already sold ammunition and laser rangefinders to the UK and is marketing its Arachnida system for control of artillery batteries.

The significant moment for artillery use in the recent Iraq war was during the sandstorms, which grounded all except very high-flying aircraft. And British forces used guns to bombard Iraq positions at the siege of Basra.

This demonstrates that even in the age of air power, artillery is a necessary back-up weapon as close air support cannot always be guaranteed.

As air power on a massive scale is beyond the reach of most countries, a continuing role for artillery is guaranteed and Indias massive planned investment could force others to consider new systems. That could well be Denels best hope for its flagship weapons system.

While the new G6 model looks much like the older G6-45, it can shoot 13km further and can launch projectiles twice as fast. Much of the improved rate of fire is thanks to automatic loading and managing of ammunition. The older system relied largely on manual handling.

Another new feature is that on-board systems can lay the gun and help the crew navigate to new positions. Like the older model, the G6-52 is self-propelled it does not have to be towed. An advantage of self-propelled over towed systems is that having fired and been detected by enemy radar, they can quickly move out of the way of return fire.

The G6-52 can move within 30 seconds of firing a round, get up to a speed of 70/kmh and within 45 seconds of arriving in a new position, open fire again. The precursor to the G6, the G5, can only move short distances on its own.

WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO PURCHASE RUSSIAN TANKS?
為何必須購買俄國戰車
Tekhnika i Vooruzhenie, No. 1, 2003, pp. 21-25
Mikhail Rostopshin

HIGHLIGHT:
MODERN CONFLICTS HAVE CHANGED THE SITUATION ON THE WEAPONS MARKET: RUSSIAN TANKS CURRENTLY HAVE MORE ADVANTAGES OVER THEIR FOREIGN RIVALS.

During the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact the main requirement to a new model of weapons was to make its fighting efficiency better than that of its foreign counterpart. The rivalry showed that the Soviet Unions positions in the tank sector were a bit weaker. First and foremost, this concerned protection and fire control systems. However, to date the situation has changed along with the development of self-guided anti-tank weapons. It turned out that the top and bottom of Russian and foreign tanks created according to the classical scheme are not protected. This is why the situation on the weapons market has changed in favor of Russian tanks. (...)

France, Germany, and the US offer tanks at very high prices. The media report that one Abrams or Leopard tank costs $4 to $7 million, depending on the modification. In the meantime, the price for a T-90S tank does not exceed $2 million. Is it reasonable to purchase expensive foreign tanks with weak roof, side and bottom protection? No, its not. All tanks offered on the market present a classical scheme, which does not make it possible to improve tanks protection. The classical scheme means that all basic weapons are concentrated in the turret; control systems are located in the front section, and the power unit in the back part of the tank. In other words, almost all modern tanks are not protected from the top, bottom, and sides. It shouldnt be forgotten that the Leopard-2 and M1A2 tanks, which weigh around 60 tons, require special additional measures connected with transportation. At the same time, the T-90S tank does not need extra transport facilities. (...)

At the same time, the upper hemisphere of the T-90S tank can be protected by the Arena active protection system, which functions in an automated mode and intercepts anti-tank means flying at a speed to 700 m/s. In addition, the T-90S tank can be equipped with the Shtora optoelectronic countermeasures complex, which can protect the tank from generation two guided anti-tank missiles. (...)

(...) Russian tanks are tested in diverse climatic zones. Russian tanks protection and weapon systems are also tested on the basis of a thorough analysis. (...)

(...) Two conflicting sides - Pakistan and India - have purchased Russian and Ukrainian tanks in order to strengthen their ground units. Pakistan purchased 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine for $600 million in 1996. This fact forced India to reinforce its Ground Force with 310 T-90S tanks (five regiments). (...)

Russias T-90S has some advantages over Ukraines T-80UD. But it shouldnt be forgotten that both tanks were created on the basis of Soviet methods. This is why the fighting potential of both tanks is almost equal. Ukraine failed to create new weapons and had to combine all advantages of Soviet tanks in the T-80UD. The T-90S and T-80UD are armed with 125-mm guns. However, Ukraine does not have legal reasons to produce allowances of ammunition for this gun. This has happened owing to the fact that design bureaus and research enterprises, which created shells, were located on Russian territory before the break-up of the USSR.

The 3BM42 (Mango) armor-piercing shell is the foundation of the allowance of ammunition of both tanks. The shell was added to arsenals in 1986. The Mango shell can pierce monolayer armor 210 mm thick. Over 15 years has passed since the shell was added to arsenals, and designers have created multilayer armor with built-in dynamic protection. This reduces the efficiency of the Mango shell in modern fights.

It should be reminded that the T-80UD tank was equipped with dynamic protection systems thanks to the development of such technologies in the city of Donetsk in the Soviet era.

The allowance of ammunition includes the 9M119M (Invar) guided anti-tank missile with laser control channel, which Ukraine replaced with the Combat missile in the T-80UD tank. Fragmentation shells of the T-80UD and T-90S tanks are produced in Russia too.

Production of the Combat missile began in 1999. The missile is equipped with a tandem charge; explosives weigh 2.5 kg. The charge can pierce armor 650 mm thick. The scheme of the Combat missile resembles the tandem charge of Russias 9M128 (Zenith) missile. Such a scheme does not make it possible to overcome dynamic protection very effectively. As a rule, dynamic protection systems destroy such missiles before their charges blow up.

(...) India has managed to substantially strengthen its ground units thanks to the T-90S tanks (...) and ensured a reasonable compromise from the point of view of the cost-efficiency criterion.

The use of a guided anti-tank missile with the T-80UD tank necessitated improving the reliability of the T-90S tank by means of:

- the Shtora optoelectronic countermeasures complex, which protects tanks from direct hits of generation two guided missiles;

- the Arena active protection complex, which destroys anti-tank shells and missiles;

- a complex of built-in dynamic protection, which reduces the armor piercing ability of artillery shells.

It should be noted that weight characteristics of the Combat missile does not make it possible to upgrade it further. This means that increasing the length of elements of dynamic protection system will improve the efficiency of protection of the T-90S if a Combat missile overcomes the Shtora and Arena protection complexes.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003May16030/index.htm
British Infantry Gets Firepower Boost
(Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued May 28, 2003)

[美國人事]倫斯斐德一反常態,推舉退休將領修梅克擔任陸軍參謀長

[路透華盛頓電] 據美國國防部高層官員周二表示，國防部長倫斯斐德(拉姆斯菲爾德)一反常態，已選擇一名退休三年的將軍，擔任新的陸軍參謀長。

官員說，倫斯斐德要求布希(喬治布殊)提名已退休的57歲四星陸軍將軍修梅克(Peter Schoomaker)接任即將退休的辛賽克(Eric Shinseki)將軍。

辛賽克將於周三離任。倫斯斐德選擇一名退休將軍直接擔任陸軍最高將領，並成為參謀長聯席會議的一員，可能與他和陸軍的關係緊張有關。

一名官員說，倫斯斐德已經在周二將修梅克的推薦書送交白宮。

修梅克生於密西根，為懷俄明大學畢業生。他在1997年擔任佛羅里達州麥克迪爾空軍基地的美軍特種部隊指揮官，負責陸海空三軍的所有特種部隊。他在陸軍服役31年後，於2000年退休。

美國陸軍參謀長的任命必須經由參議院批准。(完)

據波蘭媒體報導，波蘭一個軍事裝備研究所12號發生導彈爆炸事故，造成三人死亡。

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/xml/uncomp/articleshow?msid=12682
Army is on a shopping spree, makes most of funds allocated

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003Jun16260/index.htm
General Dynamics Wins Armys Objective Force Warrior Agreement

(Source: General Dynamics Land Systems; issued June 12, 2003)

FALLS CHURCH, Va. --- General Dynamics was awarded the lead technology integration agreement today for Phase II of the U.S. Armys Objective Force Warrior (OFW) Advanced Technology Demonstration program. The OFW program will provide the core network-centric soldier systems deployed by all soldiers by 2010.

The $100 million Phase II award is for completion of detailed designs of the Objective Force Warrior system of systems over a 25-month period. There are two additional options: a Phase III 15-month Prototype Development and Demonstration effort estimated to be worth $41 million, and a non-competitive System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. The SDD and production phases have a potential value of $1 to 3 billion over a 10-year period.

The Armys vision for the Objective Force Warrior is of a highly lethal, survivable, networked soldier within a small combat team operating across a spectrum of future Army and joint service operations. The soldier will be equipped with self-protection gear, a range of weapons of varying lethality, and will be completely integrated into the fire support and C4ISR components of the Objective Force. The system will provide complete situational awareness, fully integrating the individual soldier into joint and combined arms operations. The Objective Force Warrior will use assets such as robotic cargo transporters, networked sensor fields and unmanned air vehicles.

These capabilities will be compatible with the Armys Future Combat Systems command, control, computer, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system now in development as well as with existing and joint service C4ISR assets.

The General Dynamics Objective Force Warrior effort is headed by its Eagle Enterprise unit, a company formed to address technology and system of systems integration challenges. Eagle Enterprise was one of two lead technology integrators during the Phase I concept development for OFW.

We are very proud to be selected as the lead technology integrator for the OFW program which, along with FCS, is one of the centerpieces of Army transformation, said Scott Myers, vice president of General Dynamics Eagle Enterprise. OFW will provide an unprecedented level of survivability and lethality to the individual soldier. It will also realize the Army and the Department of Defense vision of pushing combined arms operations down to the soldier level and providing full integration with joint forces.

In partnership with the Army and the Natick Soldier Center, well select the best technology and systems of systems solutions to produce a 10-fold increase in overall combat effectiveness and a more survivable, mobile and lethal 21st century warrior, Myers said.

General Dynamics, headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, employs approximately 57,000 people and anticipates 2003 revenues of $15 billion. The company has leading market positions in land and amphibious combat systems, mission-critical information systems and technologies, shipbuilding and marine systems, and business aviation.

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http://www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2003Jun16233/index.htm
Lockheeds LOSAT Successfully Fires Guided Missile

泰購中共坦克車已成廢鐵

　　(中央社記者郭芳贄曼谷十六日專電)坦克車在泰國昔日軍人當權時期是政變的重要工具，如今軍人失權，經濟水不景氣，無錢購油坦克很少發動，如同廢鐵。尤其是泰國在一九八九年向北京購得中共製T-六十九S型一百零八輛坦克車大多更是淪為廢鐵，只剩下二十一輛尚可供訓練用而已。

　　去年中共為討好副總理昭華利(CHAVALITYONGCHIAYUDH在陸軍總司令任內購入這批坦克)，向泰提供高達二億泰銖 (約五百萬美元)價值的T-六十九S型坦克零件給泰國，竟遭到泰國拒絕，因這批坦克車已經變成廢鐵，即使重新換新零件，也無法修理。

　　軍械局局長韋猜中將(VICHA TECHAVANICH)向英文的曼谷郵報透露，當年中共出售這批坦克車價格非常低，每輛只賣一百萬泰銖。

http://outlookindia.com/full.asp?sid=1&fodname;=20030616&fname;=Army+%28F%29
Uncles Grand Slam!
The top brass fumes at a secret American report which calls the Indian army arrogant and protocol-obsessed
山姆大叔的大灌藍 (XX 的亂翻譯 ^^) ﹕
印度軍方高層不滿一份美國秘密報告嚴厲批評印度陸軍自大、過於注重儀式。
RANJIT BHUSHAN

Is the mighty Indian army crumbling? Are Indian army officials much too protocol-conscious as compared to the Pakistanis? And is, indeed, the top army brass here extremely difficult to work with?

In an unprecedented move, a highly confidential and sensitive report prepared by the US Pacific Command has put in critical perspective the abilities of the Indian army.
The assessment is sponsored by the high profile American Defence Department. It is authored by Julie A. Macdonald, director, Net Assessment office of the US Secretary of State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. The 141-page report is titled Indo-US relationship: Expectations and Perceptions.

The report draws heavily from inputs provided by top Pentagon officials. These officials have been in constant touch with the Indian military in a decade-long army-to-army cooperation that became stronger in the early 90s. This relationship has intensified since India went nuclear.

Predictably, the American critique has raised hackles within the defence establishment in New Delhi. Several serving and retired officials have said that the report has missed vital points and is laced with typical American bias.

The dossier, given its conclusions, is not meant for official presentation. It was reportedly made available to Indian sources in Washington. The US assessment, say Indian army officers, are too simplistic. According to all the American officials interviewed,

Indian officers are difficult to work with𨫎ithout exception. Some interviewees saw a sharp contrast between the intellectual Indian approach and American pragmatism. Many of them referred to intellectual arrogance on the part of Indian officers. Says the report: Indian elites are quintessentially intellectual. They thrive off finely tuned arguments and logic but US military officials are businesslike and not interested in intellectual arguments鍟hey are interested in practical issues. Consequently, they find Indias intellectual arrogance offputting and counter-productive.

Understandably, such sweeping conclusions does not go down well with senior army officers here. The former vice-chief of army, Lt Gen V.K. Sood, feels that the American premise is totally misplaced. While its fair to say that the Indian officer class is well educated, there are no intellectuals; most often, all the reading and writing begins post-retirement. As for the American obsession with lack of paperwork, Sood feels that the Indian system involves a lot of filework and the army, therefore, is no exception. It, too, has a bureaucracy monitoring its activities.

Not surprisingly, given the long history of US-Pakistan military relations, which goes back to the early 50s, a number of the Americans interviewed had a good word to say about the Pakistanis. They noted that they would much rather interact with the Pakistanis whom they described as more accommodating, flexible and easy to work with.

However, what is more serious is the assessment of the capabilities of the Indian army. Says the Macdonald report: Many American officers observed that while the Indians have a large military and is relatively more sophisticated than others in the region, the vast infrastructure is crumbling. How did they reach this conclusion? The report has the answer. Americans, who recently travelled to Delhi, commented on the dilapidated state of the ministry of defence and other government buildings and argued that the neglect of the buildings offer a glimpse of the challenges facing the Indian military as it modernises.

One four-star US general described his walk through the Indian army headquarters as walking back in time.A civilian from Americas Pacific command (that deals with India) who apparently took the walk along with the general, wanted to know, How any self-respecting military could allow bared light bulbs to hang dangerously from the ceiling? Says the report: The US should not be deceived by the Indian military size. The poor quality and lack of maintenance of Indias weapons system limits its abilities to be a capable partner.

To add salt to the wound, the Americans are of the opinion that Indians are easily slighted and flattered. Nearly every American army official interviewed in Washington and the Pacific Command who regularly interact with Indians perceive that it is highly protocol conscious. This behaviour led the Americans to two conclusions. One, Indians are easily slighted or insulted by US actions (or inactions). Two, satisfying the Indian obsession with protocol with symbolic gestures can pay big dividends in our relationship.

According to Col P.N. Khera, editor of the Asian Defence News International, the US assessment is wide off the mark and reflects the differences in value systems between the two countries. The Indian army serves at temperatures of 50 plus in Rajasthan and 50 minus in Siachen. It serves in the marshes and mountains in the Northeast. Its officer casualty rate is the highest in the world. It is apolitical and disciplined. It has done exemplary service in UN missions and the several Victoria and King Crosses will vouch for it. As for being too protocol conscious, there is no harm in it as Indians are not stooges and will stand their ground on an equal footing.

While the Indian army declined to comment, veteran infantryman Brigadier Virendra Saxena has this to say: The comparison with Pakistan does not stand. Every Pakistani officer has done time in this or that US academy; they probably have the same military drills. The Indian situation is different.

The report relies on trivial incidents to draw broad generalisations. It quotes the example of how a former Indian Air Force chief took umbrage at the security detail accompanying an American general during his trip to India. It, however, confirms an old threat perception in the region vis-a-vis China, which is a point of convergence between the two armies.

The US and India, both view China as a strategic threat and share an interest in understanding Chinas strategic intent, though we do not discuss this publicly. Indias suspicions of China drives most of its nuclear strategy and weapons acquisition. The report argues that a positive relationship with India was a hedge against Chinas future ambitions𤪳ut it does a neat tightrope walk as well. The US would be mistaken to portray the Indo-US military relationship as a counterweight to China. It will anger the Chinese and could lead to false expectations from the Indian side. They (the Indians) will expect the US to provide more than it can offer. At the same time, it has been acknowledged that a positive relationship with India offers a hedge against Chinas potential ambitions in North East and South East Asia and in the Persian Gulf, thereby promoting stronger regional stability.

There are agreements, too, with the report on the Indian side. Major General Y.K. Gera, deputy director at the United Service Institution of India, agrees with the assessment on modernisation. Says he, Post-Independence, while the army was seizing power all around us in a series of coups, in India, the army has been kept out of the decision-making loop altogether. The why and how of a decision lies with the bureaucracy: the army is only asked to execute it. It cannot purchase and modernise on its own. But is it not the case with democracies all over the world? Gera argues that while that is true, its a reflection of our country that successive governments have been unable to appoint a chief of defence staff, as in the UK and US, which are also democracies.

According to Gera, the US tactics are different. They rely more on technology, satellites, precision-guided missiles and censors. In contrast, in India, the iaf has been asking for Advanced Jet Trainers for years𨫎ithout any success. Now, after a series of defence-related scams in the last decade, the army has been virtually starved off funds because no bureaucrat is willing to put his signature on a defence purchase any longer, he says.

http://outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20030623&fname;=Column+Karim+%28F%29&sid;=1
OPINION
Just A Clueless Uncle
A point-by-point demolition of the secret US report slamming the Indian army
只是一個搞不清楚狀況的大叔﹕
逐一駁斥美國秘密報告對印度陸軍的批評
MAJ GEN AFSIR KARIM (RETD)

I am highly alarmed at reading the Outlook report published last week on what the Americans think of the Indian army. I reject most of their conclusions. I dont think we are clear about why we want a military alliance with the US. It would appear that we take great pride in our collaboration with the country without determining what we want from them. I have nothing against such alliances and would have appreciated if the cooperation between the two countries was confined to the navy and air force where India could benefit from superior technology. But it makes no sense to hold joint paramilitary exercises in Agra at the unit level.

While we may be unclear about what we want from the Americans, the same cannot be said about them. They know exactly what they are looking for and chances are they have got it.

The US assessment that the vast Indian army structure is crumbling is patently untrue.

Man to man, the Indian army is better than Americas. The nature of our operations is such that it calls for manpower intensity. There is a Line of Control, there is a Line of Actual Control and there are massive anti-insurgency operations. The forces necessarily have to be large. The Indian army operates on a different scale altogether and it would be a good idea to take some of the Americans to the heights and inaccessible places to make them aware of the harsh ground realities of fighting in the subcontinent. The Americans do not employ manpower-centric tactics and there is a difference in approach here which cannot be seen as value judgement on the Indian army.

The Americans, before they arrive at hasty and questionable conclusions, have to realise that our requirements are totally different. In some of the places where our units are stationed, even highly sophisticated equipment does not work and there is no harm in conceding that the Americans have very advanced technology at their disposal. Certainly much more than us. I remember during the 1962 war, some of the American equipment just did not fire and when we asked questions, the cryptic reply was information is confidential, we cannot talk.

The charge that the Indian army is protocol-bound is false. Maybe at the higher corps or division-level, there are norms that need to be followed, but the junior command levels, let us say captains and majors, take their own decisions and are quite open and mix freely. If there is any protocol, those are government rules: the Indian army has to have inhibitions since there are strict instructions not to deal with foreigners. The decisions taken are not entirely in the hands of the military either. It has to depend upon the civilian leadership and this cannot be construed as being status-conscious.

As for the accusation that Indian army officers are not easy to get along with, I dont think that it is a handicap: I see no reason why army officers have to get along with everyone. That is scarcely an asset, given the nature of the job. And if the Americans look at it that way, you can hardly blame the Indian army. After all, in our five decades of wars and operations, the Americans have always been on the side of our adversaries. So if there is some amount of suspicion, it is understandable.

Again, it is perfectly understandable if the US feels that Pakistanis are easy to get along with. The US-Pakistan army cooperation goes back a long way. In fact, the arming of Pakistan by Americans started way back in the early 1950s leading ultimately to the first military coup in 1958. It is my belief that however much we want to delude ourselves that we are now staunch US allies, it would do well to remember that the Americans will never ditch Pakistan. They have been, and will continue to be, US real ally. Euphoric as we may be with our new association with the US, it is important to remember this historical fact.

As for the charge that Indians are not businesslike, there cannot be any sweeping generalisations. I do not know who was detailed to deal with the Americans—chances are that they may have dealt with someone who was not business-like enough—but to use it as the yardstick to assess the whole Indian army is absurd and superficial. I think the important thing right now is for the Americans to look at themselves. In a sense, the US assessment of our army is an eye-opener because it puts into perspective how they perceive us. There is another aside here: just as the Americans have assessed us, we should assess the Americans. I think such an exercise should be undertaken.

Certainly, the point about adequate modernisation is a valid critique. The Indian army operates largely with borrowed equipment and there are natural handicaps. Some of our offices, no doubt, could do with better facilities—particularly some of our field offices.

Another disturbing trend is our willingness to send troops to Iraq to keep the Americans in good humour. But I think it is a move fraught with dangerous implications. It is okay to send logistical troops there—doctors, engineers. But to send a fighting combat division to Iraq is to involve the Indian army in conflict with the civilian population in Iraq. It is most likely that the Indians will be deployed in difficult areas—territories not being manned by Americans themselves.

The recommendation is part of a major exercise undertaken over a two-day brainstorming session by the army top brass in Shimla, headquarters of the Training Command, on June 5 and 6. Those present included Army Chief Gen N C Vij, top army commanders, the director-general of military operations and senior MoD officials.

The fallout of the session, which drew from the lessons of Kargil and Operation Parakram, which could have far-reaching implications on shaping Indian military strategy for the future.

One area of concern was the steady erosion over the years of conventional parity against Pakistan due to savage cutbacks and lack of funds. The current ratio of Indian forces vis-a-vis Pakistan’s is 1.2:1, down from 1.75:1 during the 1971 Bangladesh War.

To correct this imbalance, the Army has recommended the creation of a pivotal Mountain Strike Corps that will essentially enhance its offensive capabilities in mountainous terrain. India currently has three strike formations — the Bhopal-based XXI, Ambala-based II and Mathura-based I strike corps. This is an effort to ensure that Indian forces maintain a 6:1 superiority ratio on the Western borders and at least 9:1 in the mountains.

It is understood that the army also wants the government to clearly enunciate its specific response to tactical nuclear weapons to deter the adversary. The Army Headquarters has recommended that the government also review its nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) policies in light of specific threats made by Pak-sponsored terrorists on using weapons of mass destruction.

The Army has also called for an appropriate military response to grave provocations such as the December 13 attack on Parliament in 2001.

Significantly, the recommendations call for adequate reserve of arms by the Army in the event of a decisive war with an adversary at a critical time and place. During Kargil, the army had to rush in — once the conflict had started — battalions that were not acclimatised to the high-altitude regions.

Interestingly, army headquarters also calls for a clear-cut objective from the political leadership to enunciate their military aims. However, drawing on its experience during the Kargil war (where the troops did not cross the LoC) and Operation Parakram (where no military action was taken) the Army is also thinking in terms of preparing the armed forces to function under ambiguous circumstances.

This means that the political leadership should give a clearcut direction so that the overall military strategy can be put into action during emergencies.

　記者陳東龍／台南歸仁基地報導

我國向美國購買的9架CH-47D運輸直升機，20日上午在位於台南歸仁的陸軍航空訓練指揮部舉行成軍典禮，由陸軍總司令霍守業上將主持，陸軍重要將領均到場參與這項攸關提升陸軍機動打擊戰力的機隊成軍禮。

CH-47D運輸直升機的成軍，代表陸軍「聯合兵種旅（聯兵旅）」中的「空中騎兵旅（空騎旅）」已完成第一階段的全戰備，也就是可以支援陸軍現有2個「空騎旅」實施地面部隊的「垂直作戰」。

陸軍的「空騎旅」是目前亞洲第一支主要以直升機實施空中火力和兵力機動突擊的旅級陸軍航空兵作戰部隊，具有綿密偵察監視能力的OH-58D和強大機動打擊能力的AH-1W，能有效地遂行立體化的作戰任務，是新一代兵力中最具戰鬥力的聯兵旅，同時也是反登陸作戰中，戰區可以運用的最有效的決戰兵力。

陸軍一戰車翻覆 三名受傷官兵無大礙

　　(中央社記者陳亦偉台北二十日電)陸軍總部今天發布新聞稿表示，陸軍第十軍團五八六旅，上午六點三十分於屏東恆春三軍聯訓基地實施射擊訓練，其中一輛 M60A3戰車疑因天雨路滑造成煞車失靈，駕駛採緊急處置，避開車隊行進路線，側滑至道路旁斜坡，造成同車三員官兵受傷，經送醫急救後均已無大礙。 廣　告
　　陸總表示，受傷的三名官兵分別是連長葉韋霈、車長洪致遠及射手陳鴻昌三人，事發後單位將他們轉送恆春南門醫院後，三人經院方進一步實施腦部及胸部Ｘ光檢查後均無大礙，意識清醒。

The US Armys M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT) top side, and rear armour remains susceptible to penetration and needs improving, according to the Tank and Automotive Commands (TACOM) Abrams programme manager office (PM Abrams).

In a report into the US Armys principal MBTs performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, PM Abrams said the tanks frontal turret and hull armour continues to provide excellent crew protection.

The tank performed extremely well providing excellent manoeuvre, firepower and overall crew protection, concluded the report, which has been seen by JDW. Engines typically outlived expectancies and transmissions proved to be durable.

PM Abrams personnel deployed forward with US Army divisions during the war and collected first-hand feedback from tank crews to compile the report. There were no catastrophic losses due to Iraqi direct or indirect fire weapons, but several tanks were destroyed due to secondary effects attributed to Iraqi weapon systems. US Army sources told JDW that the report was only preliminary observations rather than a definitive study and more work was continuing to further refine the exact causes of US tank losses in Iraq. Other US Army sources report that 14 Abrams tanks were damaged and two destroyed during the war.

Most M1 losses were attributed in the report to mechanical breakdown, or vehicles being stripped for parts or vandalised by Iraqis. There were no reported cases of an anti-tank guided missile being fired at any US Army vehicle.

Details of the M1 losses were given, including one where 25mm armour-piercing depleted uranium (AP-DU) rounds from an unidentified weapon disabled a US tank near Najaf after penetrating the engine compartment. Another Abrams was disabled near Karbala after a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) penetrated the rear engine compartment and one was lost in Baghdad after its external auxiliary power unit was set on fire by medium-calibre fire.

NEW DELHI: A team of experts from Russia will visit the country shortly to rectify problems in the functioning of the recently-inducted T-90 tanks.

The Russian side assured Army chief General N C Vij of this when he took up the snags in the functioning of the tanks with the military top brass.

The tanks are also armed with missiles which are capable of engaging enemy tanks beyond visual range, official sources here said.

Currently on his Russia tour, the first since he became the chief, Vij has discussed problems with the tank’s night-fighting capabilities.

---------
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2013/stories/20030704007300400.htm
THE HYPE AND THE FOLLY

PRAVEEN SWAMI
in Poonch

（中央社記者黃菁菁東京二十二日專電）日本讀賣新聞今天報導，日本政府為對抗北韓彈道飛彈的威脅，已計劃導入可在高空攔截的「標準飛彈三型」及地對空誘導彈的「愛國者飛彈三型」。同時計劃將於2004年重新編列相關預算，2007年正式實戰部署飛彈防禦系統。

讀賣新聞報導指出，北韓以日本為目標在日本海沿岸配備一百六十到一百七十枚「蘆洞」中程彈道飛彈，並可能已取得彈道飛彈搭載小型化核武的技術。因此在五月下旬舉行的美日高峰會談中，美日雙方已同意將協力儘速加強飛彈防禦工作。

該報導指出，日本防衛廳現在在海上自衛的四艘神盾艦上配備有「標準飛彈二型（SM2）」、航空自衛隊的二十四高炮部隊等的二十七座發射台也有配備「愛國者飛彈二型（PAC2）」的迎擊飛彈。但是這些都是以飛機等為攔截對象，幾乎沒有攔截彈導飛彈的能力。

所以日本政府準備導入以SM2和PAC2為基礎改良的SM3和PAC3最新型迎擊飛彈。日本計劃將在二到三艘的神盾艦上配備可從大氣層外高空攔截飛彈的「標準飛彈三型（SM3）」，預估神盾艦的改修工程費及飛彈採購費用等，合計約需一千億日圓。

Monday June 23 2003
The Guardian

Scorpions move in on rebels as Indonesia reneges on weapons pledge to Britain
Deployment of UK-made tanks deals new blow to ethical policy

John Aglionby in Jakarta and Richard Norton-Taylor

The government yesterday faced severe embarrassment over arms dealing as
Indonesia broke repeated assurances and deployed 36 British-made Scorpion
light tanks as part of its intensifying campaign to crush separatists in
the Aceh province.

The move came as more than 80 non-governmental organisations around the
world called for a global arms embargo on Jakarta in the wake of mounting,
credible reports of systematic human rights violations by Indonesian troops
in their five-week operation in Aceh.

Indonesia has been a test case of a foreign policy with an ethical
dimension announced by the then foreign secretary, Robin Cook, after
Labour came to power in 1997.

He said lawyers had advised him the government could not cancel orders for
Scorpion tanks, armoured cars, water cannon and Hawk jets, agreed by the
Conservative government. But he had been given assurances by Jakarta that
the military equipment would not be used for internal repression.

The Foreign Office yesterday said it was awaiting a report on developments
in the province from the British ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Gozney.
We will have to see how [the tanks] are used, a spokesman said.

The Scorpions, regarded as ideal for use in towns and the rugged, forested
interior, arrived in Aceh on Sunday. The senior military spokesman in Aceh,
Colonel Ditya Sudarsono, yesterday insisted they would not be used to
violate civilians human rights but would be used offensively.

They will become a key part of our campaign to finish off the
separatists, he said. They will be used for the benefit of the people in
Aceh and restoring peace to the province.

Colonel Ditya admitted Britain might be unhappy at the Scorpions
deployment. Maybe later the British foreign minister will have a fit, he
said.

Ministers are likely to be deeply embarrassed. Last November Jack Straw, Mr
Cooks successor, wrote to Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat foreign
affairs spokesman, saying the Indonesian government had said it would
investigate thoroughly any report of misuse of [British] military
equipment.

After Indonesia was found to be using British Hawk fighter jets offensively
in Aceh last month, the Foreign Office minister Mike OBrien paid a
whistlestop tour to Jakarta to urge the president, Megawati Sukarnoputri,
not to use British arms against insurgents or in violation of human rights.

Assurances

The assurances have been broken and the pleadings ignored. Senior
generals have repeatedly said they have no intention of abiding by
non-binding assurances made to the British government about the use of
weapons.

The military has increased its forces from 26,000 to about 40,000 since the
start of the operation on May 19 after the collapse of a five-month
ceasefire.

Indonesias independent Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of
Violence (Kontras) said in a report published last week that Jakartas
tactics were resulting in massive abuses of civilian human rights.

Kontras said 176 civilians had been killed in the first month, 101
tortured, 50 arrested and 15 had disappeared. By comparison, it calculated
that 202 Gam (the Free Aceh Movement) fighters had been killed and 112
arrested.

The majority of the civilian fatalities were shot by troops, the report
says. [We believe] most of the civilian victims were murdered
extra-judicially because from the field data it was found that the majority
of the corpses had bullet wounds. More than 40,000 people have become
refugees.

The military is refusing to disclose civilian casualties. Spokesmen claim
to have killed about 260 Gam fighters and detained a further 540, of whom
225 have surrendered.

But in numerous places visited by the Guardian locals said the Gam
fighters killed had been civilians and in some cases those arrested had
in fact been executed.

Gam has been fighting for independence since 1976 after decades of broken
promises of greater autonomy.

The founder of Tapol, the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, Carmel
Budiardjo, said yesterday she was not surprised that Indonesia is not
keeping its promises about use of weapons.

What I am surprised about is that the British government puts any faith in
assurances the Indonesian government gives them, she said.

In response to the deteriorating situation in Aceh and elsewhere in
Indonesia, combined with the militarys overt attempts to regain some of
the political power it has lost over the past five years, Tapol has
organised a global campaign to demand a total arms embargo on Indonesia.

In a statement released yesterday and signed by more than 80 other
non-governmental organisations from around the world, Tapol called for an
end to arms sales and other military cooperation with Indonesia and the
withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Aceh and Papua provinces.

Indonesias military, the NGOs say, represents a grave threat to the
stability and security of Indonesia and we believe that the policy of
western countries to strengthen their military ties with Jakarta as part of
the war against terror is wholly misguided and dangerous.

Indonesia traditionally has been a lucrative market for British arms
exporters. When it invaded East Timor in 1975 it had several dozen Saladin
armoured reconnaissance vehicles, Ferret armoured vehicles and Saracen
armoured personnel carriers, all made by the Coventry-based firm Alvis,
manufacturer of the Scorpions.

A retired Indonesian officer, who asked not to be named, said he remembered
the British vehicles being used regularly in East Timor.

They were very effective and very reliable, he said. They always did
what was expected of them.

In April 1996 the Indonesian military used Scorpions to assault a
university in the city of Ujung Pandang (now Makasar), where students were
protesting at bus fare increases. Three students were killed and many
injured.

By early 1998 General Suhartos regime was starting to crumble and
massive, peaceful student protests demanding democratic change were
becoming a daily occurrence.

British-made Tactica water cannon were regularly used on the demonstrators
and, when rioting broke out in May 1998, Scorpions and other armoured
vehicles were deployed on the streets of Jakarta.

Hundreds of people were killed in the unrest of May 1998. The majority of
analysts believe it was at least partly orchestrated by elements within the
armed forces.

Scorpions were used November 13 1998 by Gen Suhartos successor, BJ
Habibie, to crush student protesters in Jakarta. Thirteen people were
killed on what became known as Black Friday.

The other major British-made weapon the Indonesians have used in violation
of assurances given to the British government is the Hawk fighter jet.

Jakarta has bought dozens of the aircraft that are primarily used as
trainers but can, and have been, easily adapted for offensive use.

There have been regular and widespread reports that the Hawks were used in
East Timor, mainly for terrorising people on the ground rather than for
air-to-ground combat, though not all of these reports have been verified.

The Scorpions now in use there were exported to Indonesia in 1997 and 1998,
early in Labours period of office, in deals worth nearly £200m.

Ironically, Britains weapons sales to Indonesia have declined
significantly in recent years, to the extent that the diplomat stationed in
Jakarta solely to look after the arms trade has been withdrawn.

Copyright Guardian Newspapers Limited

-----
Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire
Copyright 2003 Bangkok Post
Bangkok Post

June 23, 2003

SHOP AROUND MORE FOR TANKS, ARMY TOLD

Sermsuk Kasitipradit Wassana Nanuam

The army should shop around instead of immediately fixing its preference on
the purchase of second-hand Swiss tanks, Defence Minister Thammarak
Isarangkura na Ayudhaya said.

Gen Thammarak advised the force to exercise its options by comparing
various proposals from different countries.

The army must settle for old tanks because it could not afford new ones,
but should not restrict itself to the used Pz68/88 tanks manufactured by
RUAG Land Systems of Switzerland.

The army sent its top brass to inspect the tanks and view a living firing
demonstration in Switzerland and the team reportedly came back satisfied.

RUAG Land was initially offering 160 tanks with a price tag of US $ 49
million (about two billion baht).

Gen Thammarak said army chief Somdhat Attanand had briefed him on the tank
procurement plan, but he advised against rushing into the deal.

Gen Thammarak said any purchase would not be a simple matter because there
was a rigorous scrutiny procedure. It would have to go before the defence
armament standardisation committee before being tabled for a joint
discussion by the prime minister, the defence permanent secretary, the
supreme commander and chiefs of the armed forces as part of defence power
structuring.

Any future procurement would be in packages with timing of the purchases
to be clearly specified.

It is not as though each armed forces leader can buy this or that at
will, Gen Thammarak said. The costly maintenance of the existing tank
force was part of the reason the army was looking for second-hand
replacements.

A source said Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh would lead an
official visit to China from July 1-5, accompanied by Gen Thammarak and the
three armed forces leaders. China was expected to offer to sell armaments
to Thailand at a friendship price.

The forces had already commissioned some Chinese-made equipment and
armaments. An earlier visit by Gen Chavalit last year saw China agreeing to
a free supply of spare parts valued at over 200 million baht.

Supreme Commander Gen Surayud Chulanont is currently in the United States
to discuss joint cooperation with Washington on drug suppression and
combating terrorism.

The source said Gen Thammarak was to visit England from July 18-23 at the
invitation of BAE Co.

London reportedly was looking to sell weapons at an affordable price. In
return, it would increase imports of Thai farm products and expand the
market for them.

-------
Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire
Copyright 2003 BBC Monitoring/BBC
BBC Monitoring International Reports

June 23, 2003

SHIPMENT OF US RIFLES FOR NEPAL ARMY REPORTEDLY COMPLETED

The airlift of 5,000 M-16 assault rifles ordered during the tenure of Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was completed last week, official sources who
cannot be identified told Nepalnews.

The Deuba government ordered the rifles from a US arms manufacturer to
equip the Royal Nepal Army with modern weapons with the escalation of a
Maoist insurgency.

About 3,000 pieces of the rifles landed at the airport Tuesday (17 June).
The first consignment arrived before Deubas dismissal (by the king) on 4
October last year. The deal was worth 350m rupees (approx 4.7m US dollars).

Nepal has also ordered another arms consignment from a Belgian company;
only one consignment of the arms was delivered last year.

Source: Nepalnews.com web site, Kathmandu, in English 23 Jun 03

-------
What The Papers Say (Russia)
June 20, 2003, Friday

ONE WHO HAS DEVOTED HIS LIFE TO THE ARMY IS PREPARED FOR HIGH RISKS

Izvestia, June 18, 2003, pp. 1-3

Valery Volkov

ALEXANDER BURUTIN WAS RECENTLY APPOINTED AS PRESIDENT PUTINS AIDE FOR
MILITARY-TECHNICAL POLICY AND THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. ALEXANDER
BURUTIN, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENTSIA, ANSWERS
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFENSE SECTOR ISSUES.

BODY:

First lieutenant Konstantin Burutin would have been surprised if someone
had told him during World War I that 90 years later his grandson Alexander
would become an aide to the Russian president. Alexander Burutin was
recently appointed as Vladimir Putins aide for military-technical policy
and the military-industrial complex. Alexander Burutin, a representative of
the Russian military intelligentsia (as the media call him), answers
questions about defense sector issues.

Question: No official was in charge of military-technical policy before
your arrival at the Presidential Administration. Why has the situation
changed?

Alexander Burutin: I think this question should be addressed to the
president. In my opinion, strengthening of the hierarchy of public
administration is natural. This is the leaderships reaction to threats to
Russias security and concern that its not as easy to stop crisis
processes in supplying up-to-date weapons and military hardware to the
military organization at the same time.

Question: Deputy Prime Minister Boris Aleshin, Minister Ilya KLebanov, aide
Alexander Burutin, head of the state committee Vladimir Matyukhin plus
arrange of ministries and five defense agencies... There are too many
people and structures on one field. How do they go with each other?

Alexander Burutin: Problems connected with the creation of the
military-technical policy and development of the military-industrial
complex have reached the level when the president probably has to highlight
key points and make amendments to the structure of control over this
complex. The goal of these measures is to create a reserve for a
qualitative rearmament of the Russian security structures.

The aides role does not boil down to substituting for the executive
branch. My function is to let the president realize his authorities in the
sector ofmilitary-technical policy and its priority directions.

Question: What are these priority directions?

Alexander Burutin: The president stated at a late meeting in Nizhny
Novgorod that we must complete inventory taking in the military-industrial
complex and determine enterprises, which will be able to work under the
conditions of high technologies and fulfill the state defense order in
accordance with the nations requirements. The government received a task
to design a plan of measures aimed at renovating basic assets of plants,
which are strategically important for the national security, and protect
them from unfair officials and commercial structures. We must retain and
strengthen cooperation between the Russian military-industrial complex and
foreign enterprises. I plan to visit major enterprises and design bureaus
in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Urals in June and July. I also intend to
visit Nizhny Tagil. A very interesting arms show will be held there in July
- I will be able to become familiar with our industrial elite. This is more
interesting for me that the Le Bourge air show.

Question: There are rumors that the five defense agencies will be
abolished, and the Ministry of the Defense Industry will be restored. Are
these rumors founded, and do you support such an approach?

Alexander Burutin: I learnt about such rumors from the heads of the defense
agencies. In fact, the control system of the military-industrial complex
must be reformed, including by means of strict state regulation. The
control system of the military-industrial complex currently consists of
over ten federal executive bodies and over 20 state customers.
Interdepartmental barriers remain, and it is very difficult to overcome
them. At the same time, we must not establish too strict control over the
defense industry. As far as the agencies are concerned, I think there are
no reasons to make such fundamental decisions. All organizational decisions
should not go beyond general directions of the administrative reform.

Question: Do you think that the state defense order will go up in 2004? Do
you consider this necessary?

Alexander Burutin: Yes, we expect that the state defense order will go up.
At the same time, we rely on the initiative and independence of general
directors of defense enterprises.

Question: The media currently discussing a very topical problem: all
up-to-date weapons are exported, while the Russian Army is armed with
obsolete weapons. The question is how we intend to repulse new threats.

Alexander Burutin: This is an abnormal thing when the major part of
military products is exported. The margin of safety of the Russian Armys
weapons has reached a critical point. Up-to-date weapons account for only
30% of the Russian Armys arsenals. To compare: this indication reaches 60%
to 70% in advanced countries. At the same time, there is encouraging news
such as the program of comprehensive modernization of the Sukhoi fighters.
Multifunctional prototypes of these fighters surpass Eurofighter, Rafal,
and F-15E. Considering the fact that we can upgrade 30 fighters instead of
purchasing one Su-30 fighter, we have an opportunity to upgrade the Russian
Air Force in the near future.

Question: However, the Army also needs new weapons. Some officials have
been discussing the prospects of spending part of export revenues on the
needs of the Russian Army. Will anything change in this sector?

Alexander Burutin: You know, I dont consider military-technical
cooperation as a panacea. One shouldnt think that the military-industrial
complex can only be revived at the expense of military-technical
cooperation. Export revenues played a positive role for many industrial
structures and helped them survive in the mid-1990s. At present these
enterprises spend their export revenues on creating new weapons and
military hardware, and renovating their scientific and industrial basis. We
appreciate their effort.

It should be noted that there are too many defense enterprises in Russia.
However, this does not concern strategic enterprises (enterprises the
abolishment of which woulddamage Russias security). In other words,
producers of felt boots or tinned stewed meat are not strategic
enterprises, though these products can be used for strategic purposes.

Question: Will you try to solve this problem in the near future?

Alexander Burutin: The character and direction of military threats to
Russia, methods to parry these threats, and defense systems change. This
means that the list of strategic enterprises must be revised. It is
possible that some enterprises will lose their strategic role, and the
government will make amendments to this list.

Question: Do you think that the legislation should be improved?

Alexander Burutin: The legislation must be revised in some sectors. We have
to correct mistakes in privatization and financing policies, and work out a
reasonable strategy and well-founded programs.

Question: Two widely-publicized murders recently took place in the
military-industrial complex. What do you think about them, and arent you
afraid for your own life?

Alexander Burutin: This is a strange question for a career officer. One who
has devoted his life to the Army is prepared for high risks.

I understand that crime groups are interested in some decision concerning
the functioning of the military-industrial sector. However, attempts to
gain control over the defense sector are doomed to failure. The state will
never let anyone do this. I think that people using illegal methods
understand this.

Metal Storm 的概念

Introduction

Metal Storms technology provides a means whereby objects, such as bullets that have been tightly grouped in multiple tube containers such as barrels, can be stored, transported in and electrically fired from those same containers. These containers or barrels can be grouped in any configuration, to meet any particular application.

The technology has no known equivalent, and can provide an electronically variable burst rate of fire, from conventionally slow to previously unobtainable rates, in excess of one million rounds per minute.

The technology was originally inspired by a desire to try to reduce the number of mechanical steps required to load, fire, eject and reload weapons. In a quantum leap Metal Storm takes ballistics from nineteenth century mechanical operations into the new millennium.

The Concept

Metal Storms technology achieves its unparalleled performance through the concept of numerous bullets stacked in a barrel, with each bullet separated by a propellant load, such that the leading propellant can be reliably ignited to fire the bullet, without the resulting high pressure and temperature causing unplanned blowby ignition of the trailing propellant load, and without collapse of the projectile column in the barrel.

This unique concept has been accomplished through the invention of a bullet which on the one hand expands and locks in the barrel in response to high pressure immediately in front of the bullet. As a consequence, each bullet in turn can be fired in sequence from the barrel, and an individual barrel tube, loaded with numerous rounds and exclusive of any ammunition feed or ejection system, breech opening, or any mechanical operation whatsoever, when provided with an electric priming system is, in effect, a complete weapon.

Barrels can be grouped in any configuration required for a particular application, while remaining simple and compact, and have no moving parts, no separate magazine, no ammunition feed or ejection system. Excluding consideration of appropriate ancillary systems such as recoil control systems, target acquisition systems and turreting systems, the only moving parts in Metal Storms barrel technology are the bullets.

Use of the Technology

As an effective military weapon system, the technology offers the safety of 100% electronic keying capabilities, the advantage of on-board selection of a non-lethal response capability, and in another form, the potential to provide an area denial capability without the use of conventional landmines.

The technology also has potential application in a range of diverse commercial areas, including fire fighting, fireworks, precision agricultural chemical distribution, fastening systems for use in the construction industry, and seismic surveying for minerals and oil.

信不信由你，一名澳洲人研發出一種宣稱一分鐘可以發射一百萬發子彈的超級機槍。據說這個發明引起美國和澳洲軍方的興趣，願意提供後續研發的經費。 曾經經營雜貨店的澳洲男子歐卓伊爾，花了三十年的時間、幾乎用盡他畢生積蓄，發明出這種超級機槍。 這種超級機槍的技術，絕大部分都被列為機密，只知道它沒有活動的零件，唯一可以移動的就是子彈，它有電子鎖裝置，可以預防被盜用，最神的是，它可以依不同目的需要調整火力，威力可從手槍變化到榴彈炮，可以致命、也能非致命。 到底這種超級機槍如何運作不得而知，不過應該不是使用傳統的槍彈，否則就算一分鐘能發射一百萬發子彈，槍手也不可能帶著一百萬發子彈趴趴走吧？